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Algorithmic Complexity
Chun Ye
Mathematical modeling is a central component of operations research. Most of the academic research in
our field focuses on developing algorithmic tools for solving various mathematical problems arising from
our models. However, our procedure for selecting the best model to use in any particular application
is ad hoc. This dissertation seeks to rigorously quantify the trade-offs between various design criteria
in model construction through a series of case studies. The hope is that a better understanding of the
pros and cons of different models (for the same application) can guide and improve the model selection
process.
In this dissertation, we focus on two broad types of trade-offs. The first type arises naturally in
mechanism or market design, a discipline that focuses on developing optimization models for complex
multi-agent systems. Such systems may require satisfying multiple objectives that are potentially
in conflict with one another. Hence, finding a solution that simultaneously satisfies several design
requirements is challenging. The second type addresses the dynamics between model complexity and
computational tractability in the context of approximation algorithms for some discrete optimization
problems. The need to study this type of trade-offs is motivated by certain industry problems where
the goal is to obtain the best solution within a reasonable time frame. Hence, being able to quantify
and compare the degree of sub-optimality of the solution obtained under different models is helpful.
Chapters 2-5 of the dissertation focus on trade-offs of the first type and Chapters 6-7 the second type.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mathematical modeling is a central component in the field of operations research. A model allows
us to capture the essence of a real world problem and map it to a mathematical framework. Once
such a framework is established, we then adapt the existing tools or develop new ones to tackle the
mathematical problem at hand. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that much of the academic
research in our field focuses on developing algorithmic tools for solving various mathematical problems
induced by our models. Consequently, we have established sophisticated methods and benchmarks
for evaluating the performance of our solution given a model. On the other hand, our procedure for
selecting the best model to use is more ad hoc. Models that are more powerful and accurate tend to
be more complex, making analysis more difficult. As a result, the standard approach is to circumvent
the intractability of a complex model by making some simplifying assumptions:
1. the simplified model still captures the essence of the problem, and
2. the assumptions made significantly simplify our analysis; it is often the case that an optimal
solution can be computed efficiently for the simplified model.
Unfortunately, these justifications are more philosophical than scientific, as we lack rigorous analysis
for comparing and contrasting the pros and cons of various models in order to determine which model
will yield the best solution in practice. It may well be the case that a suboptimal solution of a complex
model outperforms an optimal solution of a simple model in practice. This dissertation by no means
proposes a general methodology for model selection. Rather, it seeks to rigorously quantify the trade-
offs between various design criteria in model construction through a series of case studies, in order to
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better understand the pros and cons of different models and help guide the model selection process. Our
case studies include problems from fair division and resource allocation, facility location, knapsack, and
assortment optimization. In each case, we find the best computationally tractable algorithm between
a pair of simple and more sophisticated models, compare the quality of the solution with respect to a
given benchmark in each case. Since the given benchmark often becomes more demanding as model
complexity increases, we seek to quantify trade-offs by measuring the degree of “optimality loss” against
the benchmark when we go from a simple model to a more complex model.
With the abundance of data in the modern information age, the empirical performance of algo-
rithms constructed under different models can be evaluated and compared. Nonetheless, a rigorous
framework for model selection is not as well developed as finding a good solution to a given model.
Understanding the trade-offs across different models will help guide the model selection process. More-
over, establishing a rigorous framework for model selection will help discourage the common academic
practice of overloading a model with stylized assumptions so as to be able to obtain an optimal solution.
The trade-offs across various models that will be addressed in this dissertation fall into two cate-
gories. The first type of trade-offs arises naturally in mechanism or market design, a discipline that
focuses on developing optimization models for complex multi-agent systems. Such systems may re-
quire optimizing multiple objectives that are potentially in conflict with one another. Hence, finding
a solution that simultaneously satisfies several design requirements is challenging. The second type
of trade-offs addresses the dynamics between model complexity and computational tractability in the
context of approximation algorithms for some discrete optimization problems. The need to study this
type of trade-offs is motivated by certain industry problems where the goal is to obtain the best solu-
tion within a reasonable time frame, rather than computing the optimal solution. Hence, being able
to quantify and compare the degree of sub-optimality of our solution obtained under different models
is crucial for decision making. Chapters 2-5 of the dissertation focus on trade-offs of the first type and
Chapters 6-7 the second type.
1.1 Trade-offs in Multi-Agent Optimization Models
Nowadays, many models of consumer purchase behavior, competition or cooperation among different
firms, and algorithms for resource allocation inherently involve human actors. The nature of such
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problems often gives rise to multiple objectives: not only should we optimize the system performance
at the aggregate level, but we would also like to treat all participants of the system fairly. The
multi-objective algorithmic challenge is further complicated by the need to elicit valuable private
information from the participants of the system and use this information as inputs to our algorithm.
Eliciting truthful inputs is not straightforward when the participants’ objectives are not aligned with
the objective of the designer. Whenever potential incentive issues are not recognized and dealt with
by the designer, unintended consequences may arise.
Hence, the algorithmic challenge in these problems is the delicate balance between the need for
truthful input acquisition and optimization, where optimization means finding an efficient and fair allo-
cation. In such settings, the model complexity, in addition to operational constraints, is often captured
by preferential inputs. While a richer model allows for more modeling power, attempting to satisfy a
given set of efficiency, fairness, and truthfulness criteria simultaneously in such a model becomes more
challenging if not impossible. Any good algorithm aims to satisfy strong equity and efficiency proper-
ties must cater to agent preferences closely, making it in turn vulnerable to manipulation. One way
to avoid this impossibility is to assume an environment in which agents (and the designer) can make
or receive payments; allowing for payments introduces an extra lever that the designer can exploit.
There are many settings, however, in which such monetary compensations are either not possible or
are undesirable. For instance, selling one’s kidney is forbidden by law in many parts of the world,
which motivates the need for a kidney exchange program. Consequently, Chapters 2 through 4 of the
dissertation explore the boundary between what can and cannot be achieved by a mechanism without
the using of monetary transfers. Moreover, we also consider a quantitative measure of how far our
solution is from the ideal benchmark in Chapter 5.
One application of mechanism design without money is the division and allocation of common/shared
resource(s). From rent splitting between housemates, to property disputes between property owners,
work sharing between co-workers, fair division problems arise naturally in every day life. The goal of
the designer here is to create an allocation protocol that treats all parties fairly, achieves an efficient
outcome, and discourages agents from falsifying their preference in order to game the protocol. The
typical fairness notion that we will consider is called envy-freeness, which means that every agent
weakly prefers her allocation to every other agent’s allocation. For efficiency, we will consider Pareto
optimality and it variants. An allocation is Pareto optimal if one cannot improve the allocation for one
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agent without hurting another agent. Finally, in order to discourage agents from misreporting their
preference, we require our mechanism to be strategyproof : it should be a dominant strategy for every
agent to report her preference truthfully.
A well known problem in the resource allocation mechanism design literature is the assignment
problem. In this problem, we have a set of agents and a set of resources. Each agent has some demand
requirement and each resource has a capacity limit. Moreover, each agent expresses some form of
preference over the resources.1 In a simple model, the preference can be dichotomous: either the agent
finds a resource acceptable or not. On the other hand, a richer model allows an agent to specify a
utility for each resource or a preference ordering over the resources. In the standard model, each agent
is assumed to have a unit demand and each resource a unit capacity (however, we will consider a
general model with arbitrary demand and capacity quantities in Chapters 3 and 4). The resources in
consideration can either be divisible or indivisible. For each indivisible resource, we view a fractional
allocation as the probability that a given resource is allocated to a given agent.
In Chapter 2,2 we consider a special case of the assignment problem where agents have a uniform
preference over the resources,3 which are indivisible. This problem is motivated by a single machine
scheduling problem where every job has a unit processing time. Every job would like to be scheduled as
early as possible and has a deadline that it needs to be scheduled by. We would like to find an algorithm
that outputs an efficient allocation while treating all jobs fairly. Furthermore, since the deadline of
each job is private information, we would like the algorithm to be truthful so that no job can game
the allocation made by the algorithm. This problem can be used to model a patient scheduling system
where agents are patients and objects are appointment time slots. In such a setting, all patients would
like be to treated as early as possible. Moreover, each patient has a deadline by which she needs to
receive treatment before her condition gets worse.
When preferences are strict, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [30] characterized the probabilistic serial
(PS) mechanism as the only mechanism satisfying some nice equity (equal treatment of equals), effi-
ciency (ordinal efficiency), and truthfulness (strategyproofness) properties. Nonetheless, agents may
1We assume that each agent has a homogeneous preference within each resource.
2Chapter 2 is based on the paper [111].
3An uniform preference domain is one in which agents rank order their acceptable resources in the same fashion,
modulo indifferences.
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express indifference over resources in many realistic settings. Failure to incorporate indifference into
the model would allow us to forgo a potentially more efficient allocation in reality. Therefore, we aim
to understand whether an extension of the PS mechanism to the weak preference domain, one in which
agents are allowed to express indifference over objects, can still maintain the properties that it satisfies
for the strict preference domain. We show that, in the weak preference domain, not only does the PS
mechanism fails strategyproofness, but so does every other mechanism that is ordinally efficient and
treats equals equally. If envy-free assignments are required, then any mechanism that guarantees an
ex post efficient outcome must fail even a weak form of strategyproofness. Our impossibility results
suggest that allowing agents to express their preferences more explicitly comes at a price: a mechanism
with good performance could be gamed by the agents in some cases.
In Chapter 3,4 we study the fair allocation of a single divisible good to multiple agents with
heterogeneous preferences, also known as cake cutting in the literature. Cake cutting is often used to
model the fair division of a common resource. It is particularly applicable to the allocation of server
time, as the advent of cloud computing for example, has increased the need for allocation policies in
environments with heterogeneous user demands. In the most general model for cake cutting, a cake is
often represented by the unit interval. There is a set of agents who are the cake recipients. Every agent
has an integrable valuation function over the cake. For computational reasons, we consider a restricted
domain where each agent has a privately known piecewise constant valuation function (PCV) over the
cake. This special domain already has enough richness to capture many applications.
The main goal of the chapter is to identify and understand the trade-offs between various desirable
properties attainable by a cake cutting algorithm when agents report PCV. These properties fall into
three categories: efficiency (Pareto optimality and non-wastefulness), fairness ((robust) envy-freeness
and proportionality), and truthfulness (group strategyproofness, strategyproofness, and strategyproof-
ness in expectation). For a special case of PCV called piecewise uniform valuations (PUV), Chen et al.
[44] proposed an algorithm that jointly satisfies the strongest property within each category. We ex-
amine different extensions of this algorithm to the PCV setting and prove that while these algorithmic
extensions maintain strong efficiency and fairness guarantees, they do not satisfy strategyproofness.
Specifically, we present two algorithms: the Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA) and the Mar-
ket Equilibrium Algorithm (MEA). CCEA is inspired by the probabilistic serial mechanism of [29] and
4Chapter 3 is based on the paper [13].
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its extension due to [76]. It is non-wasteful and robust envy-free. The Market Equilibrium Algorithm
(MEA) is based on the Eisenberg-Gale convex program for computing a market equilibrium. It is
Pareto optimal and envy free. To demonstrate that our algorithmic results are the best achievable,
we show that no strategyproof algorithm can jointly satisfy the properties satisfied by our algorithmic
extensions. Finally, if we allow for randomization and only required strategyproofness to be satisfied
in expectation, then we are able to obtain an algorithm (MCSD) inspired by a constrained version of
random serial dictatorship that is robust proportional and strictly dominates the uniform allocation.5
Just as in Chapter 2, we notice here that ensuring truthfulness in conjunction with strong equity and
efficiency guarantees becomes more difficult as the agent preference domain becomes more expressive.
In Chapter 4,6 we consider a model of resource allocation with arbitrary demand and supply
quantities. Moreover, each agent’s demand can only be satisfied in its entirety by one single resource
whose capacity quantity can accommodate the demand. This problem is a generalization of the setting
of Chapter 2, where each agent has an unit demand and each resource a unit supply. It is also different
from the the cake cutting problem,7 as an agent’s demand here cannot be satisfied partially nor can
it be split up by multiple resources in this setting. Kurokawa et al. [81] first considered the problem
in the context of classroom assignment for charter schools. They modeled the agent’s preference as
dichotomous, and designed a mechanism that satisfies many nice properties, including: proportionality,
envy-freeness, Pareto optimality, and strategyproofness. Their mechanism always computes a leximin
allocation: one that maximizes the lowest probability of any school having its demand satisfied in an
acceptable facility; subject to this constraint, it maximizes the second lowest probability; and so on.
In Chapter 4, we seek to understand whether the leximin mechanism still satisfies the aforementioned
properties that Kurokawa et al. showed for the dichotomous setting in the general preference domain.
It is known from [29] that even for the unit demand and unit supply setting, the leximin mechanism
fails to be strategyproof. We show in the chapter that it fails envy-freeness as well. Nonetheless,
the mechanism remains Pareto optimal and we conjecture it to be proportional as well. In terms of
computing a leximin allocation for this setting, Bogomolnaia [27] gave an alternative definition of the
5The uniform allocation is one in which every agent is indifferent between her allocation and any other agent’s
allocation.
6This chapter is based on the working paper [112].
7A cake cutting problem with PCV to a corresponding instance of the assignment problem with divisible resources.
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probabilistic serial mechanism in the unit supply and unit demand setting by showing that mechanism
always computes a generalized leximin allocation. We propose a generalization of the probabilistic
serial mechanism to the classroom setting and show that our generalization also always computes a
generalized leximin allocation.
In Chapters 2-4, we quantified the trade-offs among desirable properties in a binary fashion. We
can also measure the efficiency loss when we impose truthfulness as a constraint. One standard method
for measuring efficiency loss is to compare the ratio of optimal values with and without the incentive
constraint. We apply this method in Chapter 5 to study a facility location problem on a line where
the designer needs to elicit preferences from a set of agents in order to locate a facility.8 Each agent
incurs a cost equal to her distance to the facility whereas the designer wishes to minimize the Lp norm
of the vector of agent costs. Note that the Lp social cost function serves as a way to trade-off between
efficiency and fairness, as minimizing the L1 norm optimizes the aggregate individual cost, whereas
minimizing the L∞ norm reduces the cost of the agent(s) who is worst off. Since an agent’s objective
function does not perfectly align with that of the designer, locating the facility at an optimizer of the
social cost function is not strategyproof. Instead, our goal is to design a strategyproof mechanism
that approximates the optimal cost well. The design of a strategyproof mechanism is important in
certain applications of the problem such as peer valuation/rating, where it is crucial for no participant
to purposely exaggerate or shade her rating in order to make the aggregate rating closer towards her
own. Our main result shows that the mechanism that always locates the facility at the median of
agents’ reports provides a 21−1/p approximation ratio, and that this is the optimal approximation
ratio among all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. Moreover, the approximation ratio provided
by the median mechanism is also optimal over a large class of randomized mechanisms. This class
of randomized mechanisms subsumes many existing mechanisms proposed in the literature, see e.g.
[4, 60, 98]. We also exhibit an optimal randomized mechanism for two agents. By identifying a family
of approximate optimal strategyproof mechanisms (AOSM), we observe that a Lp norm objective for p
large (which corresponds to objectives that puts more emphasis on fairness than on efficiency) is more
vulnerable to manipulation by the agents, resulting in a worse approximation ratio.
8Chapter 5 is based on the paper [57].
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1.2 Model Predictive Power versus Computational Tractability Trade-
offs
The remaining chapters address how model complexity affects its computational tractability. We often
work with stylized models because they lead to elegant mathematical results and are often computa-
tionally tractable. However, many problems of interest to practitioners are often much more complex,
and key elements of such problems cannot be captured in a stylized model. As a consequence, practi-
tioners tend to favor more accurate but less computationally tractable models. Fast heuristics are then
developed to solve the associated optimization problems approximately. With the information revolu-
tion and data explosion, there is an increasing need for a rigorous understanding of the tractability of
more accurate and complex models that fit the data or match the real world problem description well.
For instance, the knapsack problem is a fundamental problem that can be used to model many
applications related to resource allocation. It captures any situation where the decision maker seeks
to identify an optimal set of projects to invest in. Each project incurs a cost and results in a profit.
Due to a budget limitation, the decision maker must select a subset of projects to invest in that
maximizes profit without violating the budget constraint. The simplicity of the knapsack problem
fails to capture applications where investment decisions can be made over a time horizon and the
decision maker receives additional budget in each time period to invest in additional projects. To
model these applications, we consider a knapsack problem whose capacity grows with time in Chapter
6.9 The increment in knapsack capacity from period to period represents the additional budget that
the decision maker receives in each time period (which can be either discrete or continuous). We are
given a set of items with weight and values at the beginning of the time horizon and need to decide
the subset of items to pack into the knapsack in each time period such that:
1. the sum of weights of items packed in the knapsack does not exceed its capacity in each time
period.
2. an item packed into the knapsack can never be removed from the knapsack later on.
3. the discounted sum of item values in the knapsack over time is maximized.
9Chapter 6 is based on the working paper [23].
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We refer to this problem as the incremental knapsack problem (IK for short). A natural question
emerges: how much computational tractability do we give up for implementing a richer model in the
context of knapsack? By formally studying its computational complexity in Chapter 6, we show that
the discrete version of IK with no discounting is strongly NP-hard, whereas the regular knapsack is
only weakly NP-hard. The distinction in complexity classes between regular knapsack and incremental
knapsack can be attributed to two things. First, the time horizon T introduces a curse of dimensionality
on computations, as an adaptation of the standard dynamic programming approach for the knapsack
problem has an exponential dependence on T . Second, there is a fundamental trade-off between
packing the best subset now given the available budget versus saving up some unused budget for
future investment, which is not present in the standard knapsack problem and introduces additional
complexity. Our algorithmic results for the discrete IK problem are two folds:
1. We give a constant factor approximation algorithm relying on a novel reduction to a well studied
problem known as generalized assignment.
2. We give a PTAS (with worse running time than the constant factor approximation algorithm)
by combining linear programming and enumeration based methods.
The above approximation results holds whenever the discounting factor is non-decreasing with respect
to time.
For the continuous case, we focus on the special case when the knapsack capacity grows linearly
with time. We show that for a special case of discounting functions that we refer to as order inducing, it
suffices to determine the subset of items that we will pack by the time horizon. With this observation,
we develop a FPTAS to determine a near optimal subset of items to pack. We partially complement
our algorithmic result with an NP-hardness result for a piecewise linear capacity function with two
pieces.
Similarly, understanding the interplay between model complexity and tractability allows us to
effectively quantify the trade-offs among different models of consumer purchase behavior in operations
management. One key challenge in any assortment planning problem is to find the “right” choice model
that can simultaneously capture the purchase behavior of customers based on historical sales data and
allow a firm to decide on what products to offer to maximize revenue. Since the complexity of a choice
model generally increases with its modeling power, it is critical to choose a model that strikes a balance
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between predictability and tractability. Many existing random-utility based choice models proposed in
the literature are limited by distributional assumptions. The Markov chain model is a distribution-free
model introduced by Blanchet et al. [25] to combat the model selection errors that many existing choice
models tend to suffer from. In this model, each item (including the no-purchase option) corresponds to
a state, and consumer substitution behavior is modeled by transitions in the Markov chain. Whenever
the retailer offers an item, the corresponding state becomes absorbing. A random customer arrives
to her favorite item according to an initial probability distribution and continue to transition through
the Markov chain until she reaches an absorbing state, which corresponds to purchasing an item (or
leaving the system if the no-purchase state is reached). The authors showed the Markov chain model
is rich enough to subsume the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL), arguably one of the most popular
models used in practice; it also approximates many other parametric choice models well.
In Chapter 7,10 we study the tractability of the assortment optimization problem under the Markov
chain choice model. In particular, we focus on scenarios where the retailer is faced with additional
operational constraints such as budget, and shelf-space limitations. Mathematically, the problem
correspond to modifying a given Marko chain by selecting a subset of its states absorbing in order to
maximize revenue. In the capacity constrained problem, there is a cost of selecting a state and the
total cost of our solution cannot exceed a given budget. We show that even though the Markov chain
model is not as tractable as the MNL model, we can still find a good approximate solution efficiently.
Unlike the MNL model, (where cardinality and TU constrained assortment optimization problem can
be solved in polynomial time) we show that the same problem is APX-hard (and independent set hard
respectively) under the Markov chain choice model. We then proceed to give a 1/2-approximation
algorithm for the cardinality constrained problem and a 1/3-approximation algorithm for the capacity
constrained problem. Our algorithm increments the assortment one at a time from a consideration
set. Subsequently, prices of all remaining items are adjusted to account for their incremental revenue
contribution. The price updates allow us to “linearize” a non-linear revenue function, which enables
us to provide theoretical worst case guarantees on the performance of our algorithm. Moreover, we
demonstrate empirically that the algorithm often returns a near optimal solution and scales gracefully
as the problem size grows. Finally, our solution approach is intuitive and offers operational insights
into the substitution behavior of customers captured by the Markov chain choice model.
10Chapter 7 is based on the paper [53].
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Chapter 2




We study the assignment problem, which is concerned with allocating objects to agents, each of whom
wishes to receive at most one object. Agents have preferences over the objects, and the goal is to
allocate the objects to the agents in a fair and efficient manner. Further, as each agent’s preference
ordering over the objects is private information, we require the mechanism to be strategyproof: it
should be a dominant strategy for the agents to report their preference ordering truthfully. If the
objects are divisible, we can think of a fractional assignment in which an object may be allocated in
varying amounts to multiple agents so that the total amount allocated of any object is at most 1, and so
that each agent receives at most one unit in all. If the objects are indivisible, one can think of a lottery
over assignments, which again results in a fractional assignment matrix in which entry (i, a) represents
the probability that agent i receives object a. These two views are equivalent for our purposes; while in
the rest of the chapter we assume that the objects are indivisible, all of our results extend to the case
of divisible objects with the obvious change in interpretation. There is now a rich literature on such
models with applications to many real-life allocation problems including allocating students to schools
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in various cities, the design of kidney exchanges, etc. [1, 2, 39, 103]. The two prominent mechanisms
that have emerged from this literature are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism and
the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism. The PS mechanism is stronger in terms of its efficiency
and equity properties, but it is only weakly strategyproof in the strict preference domain and not
strategyproof in the full preference domain; whereas the RSD mechanism is strategyproof, but satisfies
only a weaker version of efficiency and envy-freeness. Furthermore, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [29] show
that no strategyproof mechanism can satisfy the stronger form of efficiency and equity that the PS
mechanism satisfies.
This chapter is inspired by the paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [30], which characterizes the PS
mechanism on a restricted preference domain. The PS mechanism was introduced in an earlier paper of
Crés and Moulin [49] that was motivated by the problem of scheduling unit-length jobs with deadlines.
Suppose there are n jobs, each requiring a unit processing time, and all jobs are available at time
zero. As the jobs all have unit-length, one could think of the scheduling problem as one of assigning
time-slots 1, 2, . . . , n to the jobs, so that slot k represents the interval (k − 1, k], and a job assigned to
slot k finishes at time k. Jobs have deadlines and earn a non-negative utility if they complete before
their deadline. Specifically, if the deadline of job j is dj , then the utility of assigning j to slot k is
monotonically decreasing in k until the deadline, after which it drops to zero. That is, if uj,k denotes
the utility of assigning job j to slot k, then
uj,1 > uj,2 . . . > uj,dj > 0 = uj,dj+1 = uj,dj+2, . . . , uj,n.
The goal is to use a mechanism to schedule the jobs in a fair and efficient manner based on their reported
utility information without the usage of money. Crés and Moulin [49] proposed the PS mechanism
and showed that it finds an ordinally efficient and envy-free allocation (all definitions appear in the
next section); furthermore, they showed that the PS mechanism is strategyproof on this domain: in
the event each job/agent need only report their deadline, they show that it is a weakly dominant
strategy for each job to report its deadline truthfully. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [30] characterize the
PS mechanism on this restricted domain in two different ways: first, they show that ordinal efficiency
and envy-freeness characterize the PS outcome on this restricted domain; and second, they show that
it is the only strategyproof mechanism that is ordinally efficient and treats equals equally. Taken
together, their result shows that the PS mechanism is perhaps the only compelling mechanism on this
restricted preference domain. (Crés and Moulin [49] showed that the PS mechanism is in fact group
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strategyproof, although this stronger property is not needed in their characterization result of PS.)
In this chapter we consider a slightly more general domain, again inspired by the problem of schedul-
ing unit-length jobs. For simplicity, assume there are n agents and n objects, and suppose the objects
are arranged in the order (1, 2, . . . , n) by all the agents. Each agent’s preference ranking, however, is
determined by a weakly decreasing utility function over the objects, in contrast to a strictly decreasing
utility function over the objects till a deadline. (A good way to visualize this preference domain is to
have each agent separate the sequence of objects into indifference classes, without disturbing the com-
mon order on the objects.) This domain is quite natural in the scheduling context, where completing
a job early is always (weakly) better, but jobs may be insensitive to completion times within a certain
time interval, and these intervals may change from job to job. The domain considered in the earlier
papers is a special case in which, for each agent, all but the final indifference class has a single object.
It is then natural to ask if the two characterizations of PS extend to this domain. It turns out that the
answer is negative in each case. We show that the PS outcome (actually, a correspondence) is no longer
the only outcome that is ordinally efficient and envy-free, nor is the PS mechanism strategyproof on
this domain. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that:
• No weakly strategyproof mechanism can satisfy both ex post efficiency and envy freeness on this
domain, when there are three or more agents; and
• No strategyproof mechanism can satisfy both ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of equals on
this domain, when there are four or more agents.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The literature on random assignment problems focuses on simultaneously satisfying various notions
of fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness, and several impossibility results have been established
over the last two decades [10, 29, 41, 75, 76, 131]. Our two main impossibility results are strength-
ened versions of similar results in the literature in which preferences are drawn from richer domains.
Specifically, versions of the two impossibility results have been obtained by [76] on the full preference
domain (where any weak ordering of the objects is permissible), and by [29] on the strict preference
domain (where any strict ordering of the objects is permissible). Thus the surprising element in our
result is that these difficulties persist even in domains in which the preferences are severely restricted.
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Our work contributes to the rich and growing literature on matching and allocation problems in
which monetary transfers are not permitted. The PS mechanism and the Random Serial Dictatorship
mechanisms are central mechanisms for such allocationproblems and have been studied extensively
from several points of view, see the recent survey [116] for an overview. This has also inspired other
characterizations and extensions of the PS mechanism [8, 10, 28, 72, 77, 78]. There is an equally exten-
sive literature on models where monetary transfers are allowed to restore fairness or strategyproofness
in a queueing or scheduling setting [55, 87, 88, 93, 120], and we refer the reader to the survey [73] for
a comprehensive overview.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Model and Definitions
An assignment problem is given by a triple (N,O,%), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents,
O = {o1, . . . on} is the set of objects, and the preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies each agent’s
preference ordering over the objects. If the number of agents is not the same as the number of
objects, one can always balance such a problem by adding dummy agents or dummy objects. We will
assume that the preference relation of each agent is complete (every pair of objects is comparable) and
transitive. By a %i b, we mean that agent i weakly prefers object a to object b. We write a i b if i
strictly prefers a to b, i.e. a %i b but b 6%i a; and we use a ∼i b when i is indifferent between a and
b, i.e. a %i b and b %i a. Note that the indifference relation is also transitive. Thus each agent has a
most-preferred subset of objects (and the agent is indifferent between all the objects within this set),
followed by a most-preferred subset of objects among the remaining ones, etc.
In this chapter, we shall consider the uniform preference domain in which o1 %i o2 %i . . . %i on for
every agent i ∈ N . Agents differ in their preference ordering only in their strict preference relation i
(and hence their indifference relation ∼i). In the rest of the chapter, we use the following notation for
the preference ordering of the agents: all the objects within an indifference class for an agent appear
within braces in that agent’s preference list, and these maximal indifference classes are separated by
a comma; objects are always written in subscript order; and the braces are omitted for singleton
indifference classes. Thus, the preference ordering
o1 i o2 ∼i o3 ∼i o4 i o5
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for agent i is written as
i : o1, {o2 o3 o4}, o5.
By a mechanism, we mean a mapping from the set of all preference profiles (within this restricted
domain) to a doubly stochastic matrix, which we call the assignment matrix for that profile. The
assignment matrix is deterministic if its entries are {0, 1} (and so the outcome is a matching of the agents
and objects); otherwise, it is probabilistic. When the matrix is deterministic, the ij-th entry indicates
whether agent i receives object j. When the matrix is probabilistic, then its ij-th entry represents the
probability that agent i receives object j. If a mechanism maps each preference profile to a deterministic
matrix, the mechanism is deterministic; otherwise the mechanism is probabilistic. (Alternatively, we
could have defined a probabilistic mechanism as a lottery over deterministic mechanisms. In this view,
different lotteries are regarded as different mechanisms, even if they result in the same assignment
matrix for each preference profile.) As a consequence of the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem [24], the
outcome of a probabilistic mechanism can be implemented as a lottery over deterministic assignments.
Given two probabilistic assignments P and Q, we say that agent i prefers P to Q if Pi, the i-th
row of P stochastically dominates Qi according to i’s preferences. Formally,






qik, ∀j ∈ O.
We say that i strictly prefers P to Q, denoted by Pi i Qi, if at least one of the inequalities in the
above definition is strict. Note that this definition is only a partial order, as an agent may not be able
to compare two probabilistic allocations. Finally, we say that P stochastically dominates Q, denoted
by P % Q, if Pi %i Qi for all i ∈ N , with Pi i Qi for some i ∈ N . Again, this notion of stochastic
dominance defines a partial order on the set of doubly stochastic matrices.
2.2.2 Desirable Properties
We define some desirable properties of mechanisms that play an important role in the rest of the
chapter.
Ordinal Efficiency An assignment matrix P is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated
by any other random assignment matrix Q such that Q % P . It is well known that any ordinally efficient
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matrix can be implemented as a lottery over deterministic Pareto efficient assignments. Furthermore,
checking whether or not a given assignment matrix is ordinally efficient is computationally easy [29, 76].
Ex post Efficiency A weaker notion of efficiency that we will consider is ex post efficiency. A bi-
stochastic matrix P is ex post efficient if it can be written as a convex combination of Pareto efficient
assignments.
Envy-Freeness An assignment matrix P is envy free if the probabilistic assignment of every agent
i stochastically dominates the probabilistic assignment of every other agent with respect to agent i’s
preference ordering. Let Pi denote the probabilistic assignment of agent i in the matrix P . Then, P is
envy-free if Pi %i Pi′ for all i, i′ ∈ N .
Equal Treatment of Equals An assignment matrix P satisfies equal treatment of equals if agents
with identical preferences get equivalent allocations. Formally, P satisfies equal treatment of equals if





pi′k, ∀j ∈ O.
Strategyproofness The properties defined so far pertain to the outcome on a single profile. Strate-
gyproofness, however, is a property of the mechanism, in particular, on how the mechanism behaves on
pairs of profiles in which all but one of the agents report the same preference ordering. A mechanism is
strategyproof if it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to report her true preference ordering.





for all agents i ∈ N , and for all preference profiles %−i of the other agents, and for every pair of
preferences %i,%′i that i could report. A random assignment mechanism is weakly strategyproof if for
each i ∈ N , and for each preference profile %−i of the other agents, there does not exist preference
ordering %′i such that Pi(%
′
i,%−i) i Pi(%i,%−i). In a strategyproof mechanism, the assignment
under truthful reporting stochastically dominates the assignment under any other report; in a weakly
strategyproof mechanism, however, reporting her preference ordering truthfully will not result in an
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assignment that is stochastically dominated by the assignment under any other report. It is clear from
the definitions that strategyproofness implies weak strategyproofness, but not vice-versa.
2.2.3 The Extended Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
We end this section with a very brief description of the EPS mechanism [76]. The EPS mechanism,
like the PS mechanism, can be described as a “cake-eating” mechanism in which agents consume their
best object(s) at unit rate. Roughly, each agent simultaneously consumes her “best set” of available
objects at a unit rate at each point in time. If all the preferences are strict, this determines a unique
allocation for the agents; when agents have indifferences, this mechanism is not well-defined as each
agent has a choice on how her unit rate is apportioned across the objects in her best set of objects.
For instance, if agent i strictly prefers a to b, whereas agent i′ is indifferent between a and b, letting
both agents consume a initially will result in each agent getting 1/2 of a and 1/2 of b, which is clearly
inefficient in the ordinal sense; if i′ consumes b at rate 1, however, the outcome is ordinally efficient.
To address this issue, Katta and Sethuraman [76] proposed the EPS mechanism that:
1. Identifies a subset S? of agents with the least collective claim over the union of their best objects
C(S?) (in terms of average claim per agent within the subset); (We will refer to S? as the
bottleneck set.)
2. Assigns each agent in S? an amount of |C(S
?)|
|S?| of their favorite object(s);
3. Promises the rest of the agents an amount of at least |C(S
?)|
|S?| of their favorite object(s); and
4. Removes the allocated objects, and recurses on the subproblem (agents in S? now start consuming
their favorite objects(s) out of the remaining objects.)
The authors showed that the bottleneck sets can be identified by solving a sequence of parametric max
flow problems. We refer the reader to their paper for a complete description of the algorithm.
Note that in the full preference domain, an agent is insensitive to different probabilistic allocations
of objects within the same indifference class as long as the allocations sum up to the same quantity for
every indifference class. This motivates the following equivalence relation over the set of assignment
matrices. Given a preference profile %, let Ii be the collection of indifference classes of objects for
agent i. For every I ∈ Ii, let piI =
∑
oj∈I pij . We say that two random assignment matrices P and Q
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are equivalent if and only if
piI = qiI ∀i ∈ N, I ∈ Ii.
One can check that this defines an equivalence relation on the set of assignment matrices. An assign-
ment matrix is an EPS assignment if it is equivalent to the random assignment found by the EPS
mechanism.
2.3 Main Results
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [30] showed that if the preference domain is further restricted so that the
acceptable set of objects for each agent i is the set {o1, o2 . . . , oki}, and if the agents have strict (and
uniform) preferences over their acceptable objects, then the PS outcome is characterized by ordinal
efficiency and envy-freeness, and that it is the only strategyproof mechanism that guarantees ordinal
efficiency and equal treatment of equals. We show that neither one of these results holds when the
agents have weak preferences.
2.3.1 Non-uniqueness of Ordinally Efficient and Envy Free Assignments
The EPS mechanism finds an equivalence class of ordinally efficient and envy free assignments for each
preference profile. However, there are other assignments with these properties. For the preference
profile below the following assignment is ordinally efficient and envy free.
1: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4





















However, the EPS mechanism will not compute the above assignment since agents 1 and 2 strictly
prefer o1 to o2 whereas agents 3 and 4 are indifferent between o1 and o2. Thus, in the EPS mechanism,
agents 3 and 4 consume o2 first so as to not compete with agents 1 and 2 for their unique best object.
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Consequently, EPS finds the following assignment





















Clearly the two assignments do not belong to the same equivalence class: agents 1 and 2 strictly prefer
the latter, whereas agents 3 and 4 strictly prefer the former.
2.3.2 Impossibility Results
Theorem 2.1. For n ≥ 3, any mechanism that is both ex-post efficient and envy-free is not weakly
strategyproof in the uniform preference domain.
Proof. We first show the impossibility result for n = 3. Consider Profile 1 (below). Clearly, the set of
envy-free (EF) assignments at this profile is as described for some 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/6.
Profile 1
1: o1, o2, o3
2: o1, {o2 o3}










2 − y 16 + y
By the structure of the preferences in Profile 1, agent 2 cannot receive object o2 in any Pareto
efficient assignment, as there is always a Pareto improvement with the agent who is assigned o3 in the
same assignment. Thus y = 0 in any ex-post efficient (EPE) assignment.
Similarly, in Profile 2 below, the set of envy-free assignments is as described for some 0 ≤ w ≤ 16
and 0 ≤ z ≤ 112 .
Profile 2
1: o1, o2, o3
2: o1, {o2 o3}
3: {o1 o2}, o3
o1 o2 o3
1: 12 − w 14 + w − z 14 + z
2: 12 − w w + 2z 12 − 2z
3: 2w 34 − 2w − z 14 + z
Again, agent 2 cannot be assigned o2 in any Pareto efficient assignment, as there is always a Pareto
improvement with the agent assigned o3 in the same assignment. Hence, w = z = 0 in any ex-post
efficient assignment.
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Observe that the properties of ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness determine a unique assignment
in both Profile 1 and Profile 2. Furthermore, agents 1 and 2 have the same preferences in both profiles,
but agent 3’s allocation in Profile 1 stochastically dominates his allocation in Profile 2, implying a
failure of weak strategyproofness.
For n ≥ 4, extend each of the profiles as follows: the first 3 agents have exactly the same preference
ordering over the first 3 objects; and they have strict preferences over the objects o4, o5, . . . , on; finally,
agent i (for i ≥ 4) is indifferent between the first i objects, after which he has strict preferences over
the others. That is, i’s preference ordering is
i : {o1 . . . oi}, oi+1, . . . , on.
It is straightforward to check that agent i receives object oi in every Pareto efficient assignment, and
so the first 3 agents must be allocated the first 3 objects, leading to the same two profiles analyzed
earlier.
As the EPS mechanism is ordinally efficient (and so ex-post efficient as well) and envy-free, an
immediate consequence is that the EPS mechanism is not weakly strategyproof on the uniform domain.
The Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism, which orders the agents uniform at random,
and lets them successively choose a favorite object in that order, can be adapted to the setting of
indifferences. RSD is both strategyproof and ex-post efficient [1, 102, 121], and so fails envy-freeness
on the uniform domain. For the domain considered by Bogomolnaia and Moulin, neither of these
results hold, as the PS mechanism is strategyproof and the RSD mechanism is envy-free.
Next, we show that if we relax envy freeness to equal treatment of equals, but strengthen weak strat-
egyproofness and ex-post efficiency to strategyproofness and ordinal efficiency respectively, a similar
impossibility result holds for the uniform preference domain.
Theorem 2.2. For n ≥ 4, any mechanism that satisfies ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of
equals is not strategyproof in the uniform preference domain.
Proof. We first show the result for n = 4. We will consider eight different profiles and show that in
Profile 8 there is no probabilistic assignment that simultaneously satisfies ordinal efficiency (OE), equal
treatment of equals (ETE), and strategyproofness (SP) in relation to the first seven profiles.
First, we compute the probability assignment for Profile 1. Notice that the only assignment that
satisfies ETE is as follows:
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Profile 1
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: o1, o2, o3, o4





























Consider Profile 2. Let pij be the probability that agent i is assigned the object oj . By ordinal
efficiency, p41 = 0. For otherwise p42 < 1, which means that at least one of p12, p22, p32 is strictly
positive; this agent can exchange a small amount of o2 for an equal amount of o1 from agent 4, without
altering any of the other allocations, to obtain a new allocation matrix that stochastically dominates
the current one, which violates ordinal efficiency.
By strategyproofness, we must have that p41 + p42 =
1
2 , because if it were not the case, then there
is a profitable deviation of agent 4 either from Profile 1 to Profile 2 or vice versa. Thus, we get p42 =
1
2
since p41 = 0. Similarly, by strategyproofness, we have p41 + p42 + p43 =
3






Finally by ETE, we know the probability assignment of the first three agents must be identical, thus
we get the following assignment:
Profile 2
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4



























Consider Profile 3. By SP in relation to Profile 2, we must have p31 + p32 =
1





4 . By ETE, the assignment for agent 4 satisfies the same constraints as that of agent 3.
By OE, p31 = p41 = 0, because either p31 > 0 or p41 > 0 would imply that p32 + p42 < 1 (as
p31 + p32 + p41 + p42 = 1) or equivalently that p12 + p22 > 0. Then again we have a situation where
agent 1 or 2 can exchange a small amount of o2 for an equal amount of o1 from agent 3 or 4, which
leads to a new assignment matrix that stochastically dominates the current one, violating OE. Thus,
OE and SP together determine the probabilistic assignment for agents 3 and 4. Now, we can fill in the
CHAPTER 2. A NOTE ON THE ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM WITH UNIFORM
PREFERENCES 22
assignments for agents 1 and 2 using ETE to get:
Profile 3
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4





















Consider Profile 4. By SP in relation to Profile 3 and ETE, we must have p11 + p12 = p31 + p32 =
p41 + p42 =
1
2 , p13 = p33 = p43 =
1
4 , and p14 = p34 = p44 =
1
4 . Since p12+ p32 + p42 ≤ 1, in order
to satisfy the unit demand for agents 1, 3, and 4, we must have that at least one of p11, p31, p41 is
strictly positive. Thus by OE, we must have p22 = 0 and p21 =
1
2 . Although we cannot pin down a
single assignment for this profile, any feasible assignment must be of the form:
Profile 4
1:{o1, o2}, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4






3: y 12 − y 14 14
4: 12 − x− y x+ y 14 14
for some x, y ≥ 0 and x+ y ≤ 12 .
Consider Profile 5. Applying the same argument of ordinal efficiency for agent 4 in Profile 2 to
agent 2 in Profile 5, we get p22 = 0. By strategyproofness in relation to Profile 1, we must have p21 =
1
4
and p21 + p22 + p23 =
3
4 . These imply p23 =
1
2 and p24 =
1
4 . Finally by ETE, we know the probability
assignment of the agents 1, 2 and 4 must be identical, resulting in the following assignment:
Profile 5
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: o1, o2, o3, o4



























Consider Profile 6. By SP in relation to Profile 2, we must have p21 =
1





4 . By OE, we must have p22 = 0, which implies p23 =
5
12 . By SP in relation to Profile 5, we
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must have p41 + p42 =
7
12 , p43 =
1
6 , p44 =
1
4 . Again, by OE, we must have p41 = 0, which implies
p42 =
7
12 . Subsequently, we can fill in the assignment for agents 1 and 3 using ETE to get:
Profile 6
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4

























Consider Profile 7. By SP in relation to Profile 3, we must have p21 =
1





4 . By OE, we must have p22 = 0, which implies p23 =
1
4 . By SP in relation to Profile 6, we have
p31+p32 =
13
24 , p33 =
5
24 and p34 =
1
4 . By ETE, agent 4 gets an equivalent assignment as agent 3. Notice
that in this case, we must have p31 > 0 and p41 > 0 as p32 +p42 ≤ 1 and p31 +p32 +p41 +p42 = 1312 > 1,
so either p31 or p41 is strictly positive. This implies p12 = p22 = 0 in order to satisfy OE. Thus, we get
an assignment of the following form:
Profile 7
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4











3: z 1324 − z 524 14
4: 112 − z 1124 + z 524 14
Finally, consider Profile 8. By SP in relation to Profile 4, we have p21 =
1
2 , p22 + p23 =
1
4 , p24 =
1
4 .
By OE, we have p22 = 0, which implies p23 =
1
4 . By SP in relation to Profile 7 and ETE, we must
have p11 + p12 = p31 + x32 = x41 + x42 =
5
12 , p13 = p33 = p43 =
1
3 , p14 = p34 = p44 =
1
4 . Now consider
the partially filled assignment below:
Profile 8
1: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4








3: ? ? 13
1
4
4: ? ? 13
1
4
Note that this assignment allocates more than one unit of object 3. Since we used the necessary
conditions induced by SP, OE, ETE to pin down all possible assignments for each of the Profiles 1-7,
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and none of these leads to a valid allocation for Profile 8, it is impossible to write down a random
assignment for Profile 8 that simultaneously satisfies ETE, OE, and SP in relation to the other 7
profiles.
For general n ≥ 5, we extend each of the 8 profiles as follows: agents 1 through 4 have the same
preference for objects o1 through o4; moreover, these agents have a strict preference ordering for the
rest of the objects. For every j = 5, . . . , n, agent j is indifferent amongst objects o1 through oj and has
strict preference for the rest of the objects. Similar to the argument made for general n in Theorem
2.1, we see that by OE, every agent j = 5, . . . , n receives object oj with probability 1. Consequently,
the first 4 agents must be allocated the first 4 objects, leading to the same 8 profiles analyzed earlier.
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Chapter 3
Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise
Constant and Piecewise Uniform
Valuations
3.1 Introduction
Cake cutting is a fundamental problem that is concerned with the fair division of resources among
competing agents, see e.g. [34, 101, 97]. This basic problem comes up in many applications including
the division of rent among housemates, disputed land between land-owners, and work among co-
workers. The framework is general enough to encapsulate the important problem of allocating a
heterogeneous divisible good among multiple agents with different preferences: for example, scheduling
the use of a valuable divisible resource such as server time [67].
We approach the cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective. The cake is modeled
by the interval [0, 1]; and each cake recipient—who we will refer to as an agent— has a private value
density function over the cake that is piecewise constant. We consider three of the most enduring goals
in mechanism design and fair division: fairness, Pareto efficiency, and strategyproofness. Since many
fair division algorithms may need to be deployed on a large scale, we will also aim for algorithms that
are computationally efficient. The main research question in this chapter is as follows: among the
various definitions of fairness, Pareto efficiency, strategyproofness, and efficient computability, what
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are the maximal sets of properties that can be satisfied simultaneously? Our main contribution is a
detailed study of this question and include the design of a number of desirable cake cutting algorithms
satisfying many of the properties. Our algorithms rely on transforming the cake-cutting problem to
an equivalent problem of allocating objects to agents where each agent has a homogeneous preference
for each object, similar to the classical assignment model. The transformation is done by pre-cutting
the cake into subintervals using the union of discontinuity points of the agents’ valuation functions.
This transformation allows us to adapt some well-known results in the random assignment and market
equilibrium literatures to the cake-cutting problem.
Drawing on the connection between cake cutting and random assignment, we present CCEA (Con-
trolled Cake Eating Algorithm) for piecewise constant valuations. CCEA is a polynomial-time algorithm
and satisfies robust envy-freeness and robust proportionality, which are stronger than the notions of
fairness that have been considered in the traditional cake cutting literature. (Formal definitions of
these properties appear in Section 3.2.1.) Informally, an allocation is robust envy-free if it remains
envy-free even if an agent re-adjusts or perturbs his value density function, as long as the ordinal
information of the function is unchanged.11 CCEA uses generalizations [76, 8] of the PS (probabilistic
serial) algorithm introduced by [29] for the random assignment problem.12
While CCEA satisfies some appealing properties, the allocation it finds may not be Pareto efficient.
Motivated by this shortcoming of CCEA, we design an alternative algorithm called the MEA (Market
Equilibrium Algorithm), which relies on the solution to an Eisenberg-Gale convex programming for-
mulation for market equilibrium. MEA is a deterministic, polynomial-time algorithm that is Pareto
efficient, envy-free, and proportional for piecewise constant valuations. The algorithm developed for
solving the convex program often relies on solving a sequence of max flow subroutines. The original
algorithm is due to [100], who also used it for finding an α-envy-free allocation for general cake cut-
ting valuations. Subsequently, Devanur et al. [54] developed a variant of the algorithm that runs in
polynomial time. Although similar ideas using linear programs have been used explicitly to compute
11Although full information is a standard assumption in cake cutting, it can be argued that it is unrealistic that agents
have exact Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities for each segment of the cake. Even if they do report exact VNM utilities,
they may be uncertain about these reports.
12The CC algorithm of [8] is a generalization of the EPS algorithm [76] which in turn is a generalization of PS algorithm
of [29].
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envy-free allocations in cake-cutting (see e.g. [48, 32]), they do not necessarily return a Pareto efficient
allocation.
Although CCEA and MEA are desirable algorithms, they are not strategyproof for piecewise con-
stant valuations. This motivates us to consider two questions: first, are there special cases of valuations
for which these algorithms are strategyproof? And second, are there other algorithms that are strat-
egyproof and satisfy the properties that CCEA and MEA satisfy? To answer the first question, we
consider the case in which agent valuations are piecewise uniform—the special case of piecewise con-
stant valuations in which each agent’s value density function takes on at most one positive value. In
this case, CCEA and MEA are not only strategyproof, but also group strategyproof; furthermore,
these two algorithms coincide for the case of piecewise uniform valuations! Previously, Chen et al. [44]
presented a deterministic, strategyproof, polynomial-time, envy-free and Pareto efficient algorithm for
piecewise uniform valuations. We prove that for piecewise uniform valuations, CCEA and MEA are in
fact equivalent to their algorithm. In a recent paper, Tian [123] characterized a class of strategyproof
and Pareto efficient mechanisms for cake cutting when agents have piecewise uniform valuation func-
tions. The algorithm of Tian involves maximizing the sum of concave functions over the set of feasible
allocations. It is worth noting that MEA when restricted to the piecewise uniform valuation setting is
a member of this family of algorithms characterized by Tian. To answer the second question, we show
that no strategyproof algorithm satisfies the properties that CCEA or MEA satisfies when agent value
density functions are piecewise constant. Unlike the piecewise uniform valuation setting, where each
agent only cares about obtaining as much of their desired pieces of the cake as possible, an agent with
a piecewise constant valuation cares about the trade off in quantities of having pieces at different levels
of desirability. We lose strategyproofness when going from piecewise uniform to piecewise constant
valuation function because when the agents have more flexibility in expressing their preferences, they
are more likely to be able to manipulate an algorithm.
A key difficulty in obtaining a strategyproof algorithm via the transformation to an assignment
problem is that the discontinuity points of each agent’s valuation function is private information for the
agent. Consequently, the “objects” that we obtain (under the transformation) by pre-cutting the cake
can be potentially manipulated by the agents. Unlike allocating multiple homogeneous objects that
are well specified in a random assignment setting, a misreporting agent in the cake cutting problem
may actually have a heterogeneous preference over an “object” that he reports to have a homogeneous
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preference over. As a result, even though it is sufficient for a strategyproof algorithm in random
assignment to output just the fractional amount as opposed to the actual piece of each object that an
agent will receive, the conversion from fractions of intervals into an actual allocation is also a necessary
step in a cake cutting algorithm. Moreover, this step needs to be done properly in order to prevent
agent manipulations. To drive this point further, we describe an algorithm that is strategyproof in
the random assignment setting, but is no longer strategyproof if we implement the conversion process
from fractions of intervals to the union of subintervals in a deterministic fashion.
Our final algorithm, called MCSD (Mixed Constrained Serial Dictatorship), addresses this difficulty:
It is strategyproof in expectation, robust proportional, and satisfies unanimity. For the important case
of two agents,13 it is polynomial-time, and robust envy-free. To the best of our knowledge, it is the
first cake cutting algorithm for piecewise constant valuations that satisfies strategyproofness, (ex post)
proportionality, and (ex post) unanimity at the same time. MCSD requires some randomization to
achieve strategyproofness in expectation. However, MCSD gives the same utility guarantee (with
respect to the reported valuation functions) over all realizations of the random allocation. Although
MCSD uses some essential ideas of the well-known serial dictatorship rule for discrete allocation, it
is more involved. First, we constrain an agent’s allocation by requiring that each time a dictator is
chosen from a random ordering, the piece he takes has to be of maximum value 1/n length of the total
size of the cake. Next, MCSD derandomizes the allocation obtained from all n! different permutations
and aggregate them in a suitable manner.
Our main results are as follows.
Theorem 3.1. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists a deterministic polynomial time algo-
rithm (CCEA) that is robust envy-free and non-wasteful.
Theorem 3.2. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists a deterministic polynomial time algo-
rithm (MEA) that is Pareto efficient and envy-free.
Theorem 3.3. For piecewise uniform valuations, there exist deterministic polynomial time algorithms
(CCEA and MEA) that are group strategyproof, robust envy-free and Pareto efficient.
13Many fair division problems involve disputes between two parties.
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Theorem 3.4. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists a randomized algorithm (MCSD) that
is (ex post) robust proportional, (ex post) symmetric, and (ex post) unanimous and strategyproof in
expectation. For two agents, it is also polynomial-time and robust envy-free.
Our positive results are complemented by the following impossibility theorems. These impossibility
theorems show that the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are maximal subsets of properties that
can be satisfied by any algorithm.
Theorem 3.5. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there exists no
algorithm that is strategyproof, robust proportional, and non-wasteful.
Theorem 3.6. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there exists no
algorithm that is strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and proportional.
Theorem 3.7. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there exists no
algorithm that is both Pareto efficient and robust proportional.
As a consequence of CCEA and MEA, we generalize the positive results on piecewise uniform
valuations in [44] to handle more general valuation functions, and the results in [48] for piecewise
constant valuations to achieve stronger fairness and efficiency guarantees.
3.1.1 Related Work
A mathematical analysis of cake cutting started with the work of Polish mathematicians Steinhaus,
Knaster, and Banach (see e.g. [117]). As applications of fair division have been identified in various
multiagent settings, a topic which was once considered a mathematical curiosity has developed into
a full-fledged sub-field of mathematical social sciences (see e.g. [91]). In particular, in the last few
decades, the literature of cake cutting has grown considerably (see e.g. [34, 101, 91, 96]).
The cake cutting literature has been concerned with designing algorithms to allocate a cake fairly.
The most important criteria of a fair allocation are envy-freeness and proportionality. In an envy-
free allocation, each agent considers his allocation at least as good as any other agent’s allocation.
Stromquist [118] and Su [119] showed that an envy-free allocation is guaranteed to exist . In a pro-
portional allocation, each agent gets at least 1/n of the value he assigns to the cake. Envy-freeness is
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generally a stronger notion than proportionality.14
Brams and Taylor [33] designed an envy-free cake cutting algorithm for an arbitrary number of
players. Although their algorithm is guaranteed to eventually terminate, its running time is unbounded.
Moreover, their algorithm can divide the cake into infinitely small segments, which may be unrealistic in
some applications. Since the result of [33], researchers have examined restricted value density functions
and proposed envy-free algorithms with efficient running time. In order to ascertain the running time
of a cake cutting algorithm, it is important to formally specify the computational model and input
to the problem. In some of the literature (e.g. [101]), it is assumed that the value an agent ascribes
to any segment of the cake can be queried or evaluated via an oracle. While the classical literature
uses this query model, recent work by computer scientists assumes agents report their value density
function over the entire cake, as is common in mechanism design. We follow this approach in our work
as well.
Strategyproofness has largely been ignored in cake-cutting barring a few recent exceptions [89, 84,
44, 123]. Alternative notions of strategyproofness abound in the literature on cake-cutting problems.
Our definition of strategyproofness requires truthful reporting of their value density function to be a
(weakly) dominant strategy for each agent. On the other hand, Bram [31] considered an algorithm to
be “strategyproof” if truth-telling is a maximin strategy (maximizes the minimum payoff that an agent
can get), which is a weaker notion than our requirement of dominant strategy incentive compatibility.
There is a literature that studies Nash equilibria of cake-cutting algorithms, see [95, 36].
The papers most directly relevant to our chapter are [48, 32, 44]. Chen et al. [44] presented a
deterministic, strategyproof, polynomial-time, envy-free and Pareto efficient algorithm for piecewise
uniform valuations. Our work addresses their open problem of generalizing their algorithm to the case
of piecewise constant valuations. Cohler et al. [48] and Bram et al. [32] formulated linear programs
to compute envy-free allocations for piecewise constant and piecewise linear valuations. However, the
algorithms are not Pareto efficient in general.
14Envy-freeness implies proportionality when every portion of the cake that is desired by at least one agent is allocated
to some agent. Otherwise, the empty allocation satisfies envy-freeness, but not proportionality.
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3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Model
We consider the problem of dividing a “cake”, represented by the interval [0, 1], among the set of
agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Agent i’s value for different parts of the cake is represented by a value
density function vi : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) that is piecewise constant with a finite number of pieces. In other
words, each agent can partition the cake into a finite number of intervals such that vi is constant
over each interval. We will also consider a special case of a piecewise constant function called piecewise
uniform function v, where the constant is kv or 0 (the constant may be different for different functions),
for some kv ≥ 0. Occasionally we shall consider a family of value density functions rather than a
single one. To that end, we say that two value density functions v and v′ are ordinally equivalent if
v(x) ≥ v(y) ⇐⇒ v′(x) ≥ v′(y) ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1]. For example, the valuation functions of each of the
agents in two subfigures in Figure 3.1 are ordinally equivalent.
Figure 3.1: Example of a cake cutting problem with piecewise constant value density functions. The
area with vertical lines is under the value density function of agent 1 and the area with horizontal
lines is under the value density function of agent 2. The valuation functions of agent 1 are ordinally
equivalent in the two subfigures above.
It is easily verified that the notion of ordinal equivalence partitions the class of value density
functions into equivalence classes. Let V̂ denote the class of value density functions ordinally equivalent
to a given value density function v.
An allocation is a partition of the interval [0, 1] into a set A = {X1, . . . , Xn,W}, where each Xi is
a finite union of disjoint subintervals of [0, 1], and is the portion of the cake allocated to agent i; and
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I vi(x)dx, which can be expressed as a finite sum, as each Xi is a finite
union of intervals, and agent i has a piecewise constant valuation function. Note that valuations are
non-atomic (Vi([x, x]) = 0) and additive: Vi(X ∪ Y ) = Vi(X) + Vi(Y ) where X and Y are disjoint15.
The set of agentsN and the profile of valuation functions {v1, . . . , vn} completely specify an instance
of the cake-cutting problem. The goal is to find an allocation to the agents satisfying some appealing
properties.
3.2.2 Properties of Allocations
The standard efficiency criterion is that of Pareto efficiency. An allocation is Pareto efficient if no
agent i can get a higher value via a different allocation without some other agent j getting a lower
value in that allocation. Formally, (X1, X2, . . . , Xn,W ) is Pareto efficient if there does not exist another
allocation (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn,W
′) such that Vi(Yi) ≥ Vi(Xi) for all i ∈ N and Vi(Yi) > Vi(Xi) for some
i ∈ N . Occasionally, we shall weaken the efficiency requirement to Non-wastefulness: An allocation is
non-wasteful if every portion of the cake desired by at least one agent is allocated to some agent who
desires it. Formally, let Zi represent the subintervals of [0, 1] for which agent i has zero value, and define
Z =
⋂
i∈N Zi. Then, an allocation (X1, X2, . . . , Xn,W ) is non-wasteful if and only if Xi ∩Zi ⊆ Z for
all i and W ⊆ Z.
The two most important and commonly used criteria for an allocation to be fair are envy-freeness
and proportionality. An allocation is envy-free, if Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(Xj) for every pair of agents i and j,
that is every agent considers his allocation to be at least as good as any other agent’s allocation. In a
proportional allocation, Vi(Xi) ≥ 1nVi([0, 1]) for every agent i, that is, each agent gets at least 1/n of
the value he has for the entire cake. Envy-freeness implies proportionality provided that every desirable
part of the cake is allocated.
We can strengthen the fairness requirement by demanding envy-freeness or proportionality for
every value density function ordinally equivalent to vi, for each agent i. This gives rise to robust
notions of these properties that we term, respectively, robust envy-freeness and robust proportionality.








i(x)dx. (Recall that V̂i contains all value density functions ordinally equivalent to vi.) An
15Some papers in the literature assume Vi[0, 1] = 1 for each agent i, but we do not make this normalization assumption.
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The motivation behind these requirements is clear: even if an agent re-adjusts or perturbs his value
density function, the allocation remains envy-free or proportional as long as these perturbations do
not change the relative desirability of the various parts of the cake. Thus, an agent does not have to
worry too much about learning or reporting his utility accurately for various parts of the cake16.
3.2.3 Properties of Cake Cutting Algorithms
A deterministic cake cutting algorithm maps each valuation profile to an allocation. A randomized
cake cutting algorithm maps each valuation profile to a probability distribution over allocations. An
algorithm (either deterministic or randomized) satisfies one of the aforementioned properties (e.g.
Pareto efficiency) if it returns an allocation that satisfies the property for every valuation profile.
We assume that each agent’s valuation function is private information for the agent that is not
known to the algorithm designer. Therefore, the designer first asks the agents to report their value
density function and then runs the algorithm on the reported input to find an allocation. As we
consider piecewise constant value density functions, each agent need only report 2k+ 1 numbers if his
valuation function has k breakpoints: the location of the k breakpoints, and the (constant) value rate
he has for each of his k + 1 pieces. To incentivize the agents to report their valuations truthfully, the
designer must employ a strategyproof algorithm, defined next.
A deterministic algorithm is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misreport in order
to get a better allocation. Formally, let Xi(vi, v−i) be the allocation returned by an algorithm when
agent i reports vi and the other agents report v−i. Then we say that an algorithm is strategyproof if
vi(Xi(vi, v−i)) ≥ vi(Xi(v′i, v−i)), ∀i, vi, v′i, v−i.
Similarly, a deterministic algorithm is group-strategyproof if it is not possible for any subset S ⊆ N
of agents to misreport their preferences such that each of them weakly prefers his allocation under
the misreport, and such that at least one of them strictly prefers his allocation under the misreport.
A deterministic algorithm is weakly group-strategyproof if it is not possible for any subset S ⊆ N of
16Let us say that a cake is part chocolate and part vanilla. An agent may easily state that chocolate is more preferable
than vanilla but would require much more effort to say that if the vanilla piece is exactly 1.372 times bigger than the
chocolate piece then he would prefer both pieces equally.
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agents to misreport their preferences such that each of them strictly prefers his allocation under the
misreport.
The definitions of strategyproofness and group-strategyproofness can be extended to randomized
algorithms in different ways. In a randomized algorithm, the allocation of each agent is probabilistic,
and so the definition of strategyproofness will require us to compare an agent’s probabilistic allocation
under his true report to his probabilistic allocation when he misreports. A natural way to compare is to
compare his expected utility under the two allocations. This leads us to the definition of strategyproof-
ness in expectation: a randomized algorithm is strategyproof in expectation if the expected utility to
an agent from reporting truthfully is greater than or equal to his expected utility from any misreport,
regardless of the reports of the other agents.
Finally, consider a special class of valuation profiles in which any part of the cake desirable to one
agent is undesirable to every other agent, and in which each agent has a positive valuation for at most
1/n fraction of the cake. A cake cutting algorithm satisfies unanimity, if for any such valuation profile
each agent is allocated all the intervals for which he has a positive valuation.
3.2.4 Relationship between the Properties
We record some important relationships among the various properties we have discussed so far. Specif-
ically, for the cake-cutting problem:
• robust proportionality =⇒ proportionality.
• robust envy-freeness =⇒ envy-freeness.
• (robust) envy-freeness and non-wastefulness =⇒ (robust) proportionality.
• group strategyproofness =⇒ weak group strategyproofness =⇒ strategyproofness.
• Pareto efficiency =⇒ non-wastefulness =⇒ unanimity.
• (robust) proportionality =⇒ (robust) envy-freeness when there are two agents (see [44]).
3.2.5 The Free Disposal Assumption
We may assume without lost of generality that every part of the cake is desired by at least one agent.
If that is not the case, we can discard the parts that are desired by no one and rescale what is
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left so that we get a [0, 1] interval representation of the cake. Notice that this procedure preserves
the aforementioned properties of fairness and efficiency. We will make use of this assumption in our
description of CCEA and MEA.
3.2.6 The (Random) Assignment Problem and its Relationship to Cake Cutting
An assignment problem is specified by a triple (N,O,%, cap(·)), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of
agents, and O = {o1, . . . om} is the set of objects. Each object j has a consumption capacity cap(j).
The preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies each agent’s preference ordering over the objects. We
will assume that the preference relation of each agent is complete (every pair of objects is comparable)
and transitive. By a %i b, we mean that agent i weakly prefers object a to object b. We write a i b
if i strictly prefers a to b, i.e. a %i b but b 6%i a; and we use a ∼i b when i is indifferent between a and
b, i.e. a %i b and b %i a. We assume that the indifference relation is also transitive. Thus each agent
has a most-preferred subset of objects (and the agent is indifferent between all the objects within this
set), followed by a most-preferred subset of objects among the remaining ones, etc. An agent may find
some of the objects unacceptable, and each agent is allocated only objects that he finds acceptable.
We will let Ai denote the set of acceptable objects to agent i. In the (random) assignment literature,
it is also further assumed that the number of objects equals the number of agents, every object has a
unit capacity, and every agent is allowed to obtain at most one unit of object(s) in total. We make no
such assumptions here.
Given an instance of the cake cutting problem, we can obtain a corresponding instance of the as-
signment problem as follows. First, we identify the union of breakpoints of the agents’ value density
functions, and divide the cake up into disjoint intervals each of whose endpoints are consecutive break-
points. We refer to these intervals as intervals by the breakpoints, which play the role of objects in
our assignment problem. The preferences of the agents over the objects are naturally induced by their
values for the corresponding subintervals. The objects that an agent finds unacceptable correspond to
intervals where his value density function is zero. Moreover, the capacity of an object is exactly the
length of the corresponding interval. From now on, we will refer to this transformation as the canonical
transformation. Below is the pseudocode for the canonical transformation.
The output to an assignment problem is often captured by an allocation matrix p. If the objects are
divisible, then pioj denotes the amount of object oj allocated to agent i. If the objects are indivisible,
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Algorithm 3.1 Canonical Tranformation
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations (v1, . . . , vn).
Output: An assignment instance (N,O,%, cap(·)).
1: Identify the union of breakpoints of agents’ value density functions. Let J = {J1, . . . , Jm} be the set of intervals of
[0, 1] formed by the breakpoints.
2: Consider (N,O,%, cap(·)) where
• O = {o1, . . . , om} where oi = Ji for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with cap(i) = len(Ji).
• % is defined as follows: o %i o′ if and only if vi(x) ≥ vi(y) for x ∈ o and y ∈ o′;
•
3: Discard the objects that give every agent an utility of zero from O.
then one may view
pioj
cap(oj)
as the probability that object oj is allocated to agent i. The objects
in the assignment problem obtained from the canonical transformation are assumed to be divisible.
Given a cake cutting instance, let (o1, o2, . . . , om) be objects in the corresponding assignment problem
obtained from the canonical transformation. Let pi be the i-th row of the allocation matrix p. We
say that the allocation matrix p is stochastically envy-free if for every pair of i and i′, and for every






pi′ok . Similarly, we say that the







cap(ok). In other words, an allocation is stochastically
proportional if it stochastically dominates the uniform allocation. The following two propositions
show that robust envy-freeness/proportionality in a cake cutting instance is equivalent to stochastic
envy-freeness/proportionality in the corresponding assignment instance.
Proposition 3.1. For a given allocation A = {X1, . . . , Xn} in a cake cutting instance, let p be the
allocation matrix in the corresponding assignment problem. Then
• A is robustly envy-free if and only if p is stochastically envy-free.
• A is robustly proportional if and only if p is stochastically proportional.
Both propositions follow from basic properties of first-order stochastic dominance (see [9]). Note
that, as a corollary, we see that both robust envy-freeness and robust proportionality require each
agent to get a piece of cake of the same length if every agent desires the entire cake.
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3.3 CCEA — Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm
Given an instance of the cake cutting problem, CCEA first applies the canonical transformation to
obtain a corresponding instance of the assignment problem and then applies the EPS algorithm of [76]
to that instance. The EPS algorithm can be described as a “cake-eating” algorithm in which agents
consume their best object(s) at unit rate. Roughly, each agent simultaneously consumes her “best set”
of available objects at a unit rate at each point in time. If all the preferences are strict, this algorithm
reduces to the original Probablistic Serial (PS) algorithm of [29], which determines a unique allocation
for the agents. Please see Section 2.2.3 for a description of the EPS algorithm. Note that although
Katta and Sethuraman considered the standard assignment problem in which each agent has unit
demand and each object has unit capacity, the algorithm can be easily extended to the case in which
objects have different capacities and there is no constraint on the total size of an agent’s allocation.17
It is straightforward to compute the corresponding division of the cake from the solution given by the
EPS algorithm: If an agent i is given pj units of object oj , then in the cake allocation agent i receives
a subinterval of length pj from the interval Jj .
Algorithm 3.2 CCEA (Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm).
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations (v1, . . . , vn).
Output: Robust proportional, robust envy-free, and non-wasteful allocation.
1: Apply the canonical transformation to obtain (N,O,%, cap(·)).
2: p←− EPS(N,O′,%, cap(·))
3: For interval Jj be the interval correspond to object oj , agent i is an allocated subinterval of Jj , denoted by J
i
j , which
is of length pioj . For example, if Jj = [aj , bj ], then J
i
j = [aj +
∑i−1







j for all i ∈ N return X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
Example 3.1 (Illustration of CCEA). We examine how CCEA runs on the cake cutting problem in
Figure 3.1. Firstly, the set J = {J1, . . . , J4} of subintervals of [0, 1], formed by the consecutive points of
discontinuity of the agent valuation functions, are identified: J1 = [0, 0.1], J2 = [0.1, 0.3], J3 = [0.3, 0.5],
and J4 = [0.5, 1]. The interval J2 is discarded because it is desired by no agent. The corresponding
assignment problem has three objects, {o1, o3, o4}, where object oj corresponds to subinterval Jj. The
17When there is an upper bound on how much an agent can consume, EPS stops the agent from consuming beyond
this limit.
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capacities of the objects are given by the lengths of the corresponding subintervals: thus, cap(o1) = 0.1,
cap(o3) = 0.2, and cap(o4) = 0.5. The preferences of the agents over O are inferred from their valuation
functions in the corresponding subintervals, so that o1 1 o4 1 o3 and o3 ∼2 o4 2 o1. The assignment
found by the EPS algorithm on the associated assignment instance is: p1o1 = 0.1, p1o3 = 0, p1o4 = 0.3,
p2o1 = 0, p2o3 = 0.2, and p2o4 = 0.2. The object assignment p can be used to divide the subintervals
among the agents: X1 = [0, 0.1] ∪ [0.7, 1] and X2 = [0.3, 0.5] ∪ [0.5, 0.7].
The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 3.1. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists a deterministic polynomial time algo-
rithm (CCEA) that is robust envy-free and non-wasteful.
Proof. Two simple observations establish that CCEA is non-wasteful: first, no agent is assigned a
part of the cake for which he has zero valuation; and second, the algorithm terminates only when
every portion of the cake that is desired by at least one agent is completely consumed by some agent
who desires it. By Proposition 3.1, showing robust envy-freeness of CCEA is equivalent to showing
stochastic envy-freeness of EPS under the canonical transformed assignment instance. This result is
similar to Theorem 4 of [76]. We give the proof here for the sake of completeness. Let M(i, o) be the
set of objects that agent i weakly prefers to o, i.e. M(i, o) = {o′ | o′ %i o} for every object o that agent
i finds acceptable. Let ti,o be the time at which all objects from M(i, o) are completely consumed
under EPS. Note that on the time interval [0, ti,o], agent i has been consuming only objects from the
set M(i, o) under EPS. Moreover, since all other agents consume at the same rate as agent i, agent j’s
total consumption from objects in the set M(i, o) is at most to. Putting it altogether, we get∑
o′%o




for all i, j and objects o that agent i finds acceptable. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.1. CCEA is a polynomial time algorithm. The parametric network flow problem that EPS
relies on can be solved in time O(|V ||E| log(|V |2/|E|)) due to [64], where V and E are the vertex and
edge sets of the network respectively. Let b be the total number of breakpoints in the agents’ valuation
functions. Then |V | = O(n+ b). Moreover, the number of iterations of EPS is upper bounded by b, as
at least one object corresponding to some interval is completely consumed in every iteration.
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We showed that CCEA is robust envy-free and non-wasteful. Nonetheless, CCEA is not strate-
gyproof. We now show that this is not a flaw in our design rather the aforementioned properties are
not compatible with each other in the PCV domain.
Theorem 3.5. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there exists no
algorithm that is strategyproof, robust proportional, and non-wasteful.
Proof. Consider the following three profiles:
Profile 1:
1 : v1(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.25], v1(x) = b if x ∈ (0.25, 0.5], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
2 : v2(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.25], v2(x) = b if x ∈ (0.25, 0.5], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
3 : vn(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], vn(x) = a if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
. . .
n : vn(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], vn(x) = a if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
for some a > b > 0.
Since the algorithm is robust proportional, it must be the case that agents 1 and 2 each receives
1/2 of [0, 0.25] and 1/2 of (0.25, 0.5]. Denote agent 1’s allocation by A ∪ B, where A ⊂ [0, 0.25] and
B ⊂ (0.25, 0.5]. Thus, agent 2 receives [0, 0.5]\(A ∪B) by non-wastefulness.
Now consider profile 2:
1 : v1(x) = a if x ∈ A, v1(x) = b if x ∈ B, v1(x) = 0 otherwise
2 : v2(x) = a if x ∈ [0, 0.25], v2(x) = b if x ∈ (0.25, 0.5], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
3 : vn(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], vn(x) = a if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
. . .
n : vn(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], vn(x) = a if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
By strategyproofness, agent 1 must again receive A∪B. If agent 1 receives anything less in profile
2, then he would deviate from profile 2 to profile 1. If agent 1 receives anything more in profile 2, then
he would deviate from profile 1 to profile 2. Thus, agent 2 receives [0, 0.5]\(A∪B) by non-wastefulness.
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Now consider profile 3:
1 : v1(x) = a if x ∈ A, v1(x) = b if x ∈ B, v1(x) = 0 otherwise
2 : v2(x) = a+ε if x ∈ A, v2(x) = a if x ∈ (0, 0.25]\A, v2(x) = b if x ∈ (0.25, 0.5], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
3 : vn(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], vn(x) = a if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
. . .
n : vn(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.5], vn(x) = a if x ∈ (0.5, 1]
By robust proportionality, both agent 1 and 2 must receive 1/2 of A. By non-wastefulness, agent 2
must receive [0, 0.5]\(A ∪ B), since the rest of the agents all have a utility of 0 on these intervals.
Hence, agent 2 in profile 2 would misreport so that he receives the allocation in profile 3, violating
strategyproofness.
3.3.1 CCEA for Piecewise Uniform Valuations
We now turn to the case in which all agents have piecewise uniform valuations. This obtains when each
agent partitions the cake into desirable and undesirable parts such that all desirable parts have equal
value density, and the undesirable parts have zero value density. Clearly, this is the special case of
piecewise constant valuations in which each agent i’s value density function assumes only two values:
a positive real number ki or zero.
The CCEA when restricted to piecewise uniform valuation functions profile is identical to Mecha-
nism 1 of [44]. (The one cosmetic difference is that the underlying bipartite network used for solving
the parametric network flow have the supply and demand nodes swapped and arc directions reversed.
Note that this change will not affect the final allocation.) We provide a description of this mechanism
below as it will be needed in the subsequent parts of the chapter.
Chen et al. [44] proved their mechanism is strategyproof for when agents have piecewise uniform
valuation functions.18 We now show that their mechanism is in fact group strategyproof.
18The free disposal assumption is necessary to ensure the algorithm of [44] to be strategyproof for piecewise uniform
valuations. Therefore, we also make use of the free disposal in the canonical transformation in the algorithmic description
for CCEA. The existence of a non-free disposal algorithm that satisfies all of the desirable properties in the piecewise
uniform setting remains an open question.
CHAPTER 3. CAKE CUTTING ALGORITHMS FOR PIECEWISE CONSTANT AND
PIECEWISE UNIFORM VALUATIONS 41
Algorithm 3.3 CCEA for piecewise uniform valuations.
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise uniform valuations.
Output: Robust proportional, robust envy-free, and Pareto optimal allocation.
1: Apply the canonical transformation to obtain (N,O,%, size(·)).
2: Run subroutine (N,O,%, cap(·)).
Subroutine (N ′, O′,%, cap(·)):
1: Let C(S,O′) be the total capacity of objects from O′ that at least one agent in S ⊆ N ′ finds acceptable. Compute
bottleneck set




break ties according to any lexicographic ordering over the power-set of N .
2: Assign C(B,O
′)
|B| units of acceptable object(s) to each agent in B in the form of subinterval(s).
3: Remove the allocated objects and the bottleneck agents. Run subroutine (N ′\B,O′\C(B,O′),%, cap(·)).
Proposition 3.2. For piecewise uniform value functions, CCEA is group strategyproof.
The proof is via induction on the bottleneck set. We give a proof outline here, the full proof can
be found in the Appendix A. We first show that no agent in the first bottleneck set can receive a
desired allocation larger in length than the one he receives when reporting truthfully. Next, we show
that there is no incentive for an agent to misreport in order to receive a piece of cake that he does not
desire but another agent in a subsequent bottleneck set desires.
3.4 MEA — Market Equilibrium Algorithm
In this section, we present another algorithm for cake-cutting called the Market Equilibrium Algorithm
(MEA). MEA first applies the canonical transformation to turn the cake cutting instance into an
assignment problem instance, and subsequently makes use of the Eisenberg-Gale convex programming
formulation for finding a (Fisher) market equilibrium of that instance. The convex program can be
solved in polynomial time due to recent algorithmic advances (see [54]). We show that MEA always
returns an allocation that is envy-free and Pareto efficient. Somewhat surprisingly, we also show that
MEA can be view as another extension of Mechanism 1 in [44]. A detailed description of the algorithm
can be found below.
The connection between a fair and efficient algorithm for cake cutting and computing market
equilibria was first made by [100]. Reijnierse and Potters presented an algorithm to compute an ap-
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Algorithm 3.4 The Market Equilibrium Algorithm to compute a Pareto optimal, envy-free, and
proportional allocation.
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations.
Output: A proportional, envy-free, and Pareto optimal allocation.
1: Let J = {J1, . . . , Jk} be the intervals induced by the break points of the agents’ valuation functions.
2: Discard all interval(s) for which every agent has zero valuation over.
3: Let xij be the length of any subinterval of Ji that is allocated to agent j.
4: Let li = len(Ji), vij = vi(x), x ∈ Ji.








vijxij ∀j = 1, . . . , n
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ li ∀i = 1, . . . , k
xij ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
6: Let u?j , x
?
ij be an optimal solution to the convex program. Partition every interval Ji = [ai, bi] into n subintervals









7: Xj ←− ∪ki=1Jji be the allocation of each j = 1, . . . , n. return X = (X1, . . . , Xn).
proximately envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation for cake cutting with general valuations. However,
their algorithm is not polynomial-time even for piecewise constant valuations (see [132]). MEA requires
the machinery of convex programming. It remains open whether MEA can be implemented via lin-
ear programming. Cohler et al. [48] presented a linear-programming based algorithm to compute an
optimal envy-free allocation. The allocation they find is Pareto efficient within the class of envy-free
allocations, but need not be Pareto efficient in general.
Although MEA is not robust envy-free like CCEA, it is Pareto efficient.
Theorem 3.2. For piecewise constant valuations, there exists a deterministic polynomial time algo-
rithm (MEA) that is Pareto efficient and envy-free.
Proof. Notice that the feasible region of the math program contains all feasible allocations. Pareto
efficiency is immediately implied by the optimality of the solution. To see that the optimal solution of
the math program is also an envy free allocation, if we instead view xij as the fractional amount of Ji
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that is allocated to agent j, then scaling the vij ’s appropriately (i.e. setting v
′
ij = vijli), then solving








v′ijxij ∀j = 1, . . . , n
n∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , k
xij ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
Following Vazirani pages 105-107 of [126], consider a market setting of buyers (agents) and divisible
goods (intervals). Each good is assumed to be desired by at least one buyer (i.e. for every good i,
vij > 0 for some buyer j, which holds in our setting by the free disposal assumption). There is a unit
of each good and each buyer is given the same amount of money say 1 dollar, for which he uses to
purchases the good(s) that maximizes his utility subject to a set of given prices. The task is to find a set
of equilibrium prices such that the market clears (meaning all the demands are met and no part of any
good is leftover) when the buyers seek purchase good(s) to maximize their utility given the equilibrium
prices. Using duality theory, one can interpret the dual variable pi associated with the constraints∑n
j=1 xij ≤ 1 as the price of a unit of good i. By invoking the KKT conditions, Vazirani [126] showed
the prices given by the optimal dual solution is a unique set of equilibrium prices. Moreover, the primal
optimal solution for each buyer j is precisely the quantity of good(s) that the buyer ends up purchasing
that maximizes his utility given the equilibrium prices.
The optimal primal solution is an envy free allocation because given the equilibrium prices and
identical purchasing power, if a buyer strictly prefers another buyer’s allocation, he would instead use
his money to obtain the allocation of the buyer that he envies. This would result in some surplus and
deficit of goods, contradicting the fact that the given prices are equilibrium prices.
Even though MEA is envy-free and Pareto efficient, it is not strategyproof. We next observe that
no envy-free and Pareto efficient algorithm can be strategyproof when agents have piecewise constant
value density functions.
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Theorem 3.6. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there exists no
algorithm that is strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and proportional.
Proof. For cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations and n ≥ 2, it follows from Theorem 3 of [108]
that the only type of strategyproof and Pareto optimal mechanisms are dictatorships. Consequently,
there exists no strategyproof and Pareto optimal mechanism that is also proportional.
Setting strategyproofness aside, we further show that the notion of robust fairness is incompatible
with Pareto efficiency. Hence, the properties satisfied by CCEA and MEA are maximal subsets of
properties that can be satisfied by any algorithm for PCV.
Theorem 3.7. For piecewise constant valuation profiles with at least two agents, there exists no
algorithm that is both Pareto efficient and robust proportional.
Consider the following n-agent profile.
1 : v1(x) = v
1
1 for x ∈ [0, 0.25], v1(x) = v12 for x ∈ (0.25, 0.5], v1(x) = 0 for x ∈ (0.5, 1]
2 : v2(x) = v
2
1 for x ∈ [0, 0.25], v2(x) = v22 for x ∈ (0.25, 0.5], v2(x) = 0 for x ∈ (0.5, 1]
3 : v3(x) = 0 for x ∈ [0, 0.5], v3(x) = 1 for x ∈ (0.5, 1]
. . .





















. Let xij be the length
of the subset of interval Ij allocated to agent i. By Pareto optimality, only agent 1 or 2 can receive
allocation from [0, 0.5]. By either robust proportionality, the mechanism must make an allocation






2 = 0.25. On the other hand, in order for the mechanism to be Pareto efficient,
the allocation vector must satisfy x12 = 0 or x
2
1 = 0. Hence, we have reached an impossibility.
3.4.1 MEA for Piecewise Uniform Valuations
Next, we demonstrate the equivalence between MEA and Mechanism 1 of [44] for the uniform valuations
setting. By equivalence, we mean that MEA and Mechanism 1 will return two allocations that yield
the same utility for every agent given any valuation profile.
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Proposition 3.3. For piecewise uniform valuations, Mechanism 1 of [44] is equivalent to MEA.
Proof. Given an allocation of Mechanism 1, which corresponds to a feasible solution of the convex
program, we will find a set of prices corresponding to the allocation and show that the prices are
in fact the equilibrium prices. Moreover, this allocation would be an allocation that maximizes the
agents’ utility given the equilibrium prices.
Given a valuation profile, let N be the set of buyers or agents and G be the set of goods or intervals,
where each good has capacity equaling the length of the corresponding interval. Run Mechanism 1 on
the same profile. Let Bi be the i-th bottleneck set computed by Mechanism 1. Let O
i be the set of
remaining goods at the start of iteration i of Mechanism 1.
Let Gi be the set of goods that are distributed amongst the buyers in Bi. In the convex program,
since each buyer is endowed with 1 dollar and every buyer in Bi receives AV G(Bi, O
i) = C(Bi, O
i)/|Bi|





Notice that the prices for each good is well defined. This follows from the following observations:
1. ∪Gi = G or every good has at least one price. This follows from the assumption that every good
is desired by at least one agent, which means that Mechanism 1 will allocate all of the goods.
2. Gi ∩ Gj = ∅ for all i 6= j or every good has at most one price. This follows from the fact that
no fractional parts of any good is allocated to agents from two or more bottleneck sets, which is
another algorithmic property of Mechanism 1.
To show that the pk’s form a set of equilibrium prices, we will show that given the pk’s, the buyers
in every Bi will choose to purchase only goods from Gi to maximize their utility function. For uniform
valuation, one can show inductively that for every i and every buyer j in Bi, buyer j’s desired set of
goods Dj is a subset of ∪ii′=1Gi. Moreover, Lemma 3.4 of [44] shows that AV G(Bi, Oi) is an increasing
function of i, which means that goods belonging to Gi are cheaper than those belonging to Gi′ for
i > i′. Hence, all buyers in Bi will opt to buy as much of their desired goods in Gi as possible.
Furthermore, each buyer has enough budget to buy up to AV G(Bi, O
i) unit of goods from Gi, since
the price of each good is 1/AV G(Bi, O
i). Finally, one can partition the goods in Gi such that every
buyer in Bi receives exactly AV G(Bi, O
i) unit of goods that he desires, which means that all buyers
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in Bi will use up their budgets to purchase all of the goods in Gi. This implies that the given prices
clear the market.
Corollary 3.1. For piecewise uniform valuations, MEA is group-strategyproof.
Thus if we want to generalize Mechanism 1 of [44] to piecewise constant valuations and maintain
robust envy-freeness then we should opt for CCEA. On the other hand, if one still wants to achieve
Pareto optimality, then MEA is the appropriate generalization. In both generalization, we lose strate-
gyproofness.
3.5 MCSD — Mixed Constrained Serial Dictatorship Algorithm
In light of the impossibility results established in Theorems 3.5 and 3.6, it is reasonable to ask if there
is a strategyproof cake-cutting algorithm satisfying some appealing properties. If Pareto efficiency is
the additional property we require, it follows from Theorem 3 of [108] that every strategyproof mech-
anism must be a dictatorship, which in our case would reduce to giving some agent every part of the
cake that he finds desirable. Chen et al. [44] asked if there is a strategyproof and proportional algo-
rithm for piecewise constant valuations. Our next mechanism—Mixed Constrained Serial Dictatorship
(MCSD)—is a partial answer to that question.
Before diving into the MCSD algorithm, we would like to draw the reader’s attention to a funda-
mental difference between the (random) assignment problem and the cake cutting problem. In random
assignment, the objects being allocated are commonly known. In the cake-cutting problem, however,
the discontinuity points of each agent’s valuation function is private information for that agent, so any
algorithm that uses the reported discontinuity points to artificially create the objects must also incen-
tivize the agents to report these breakpoints truthfully. Otherwise, the transformation to the random
assignment instance could create an object over which some agent has non-uniform preferences. To
illustrate this difficulty, consider the uniform allocation rule [41] for the assignment problem, which
distributes a 1/n fraction of each object to each agent. It is easy to see that this rule is strategyproof
(the allocation is insensitive to the reported preferences) and proportional for the assignment model.
Suppose we use the same rule for the cake-cutting problem in the following manner: agents report their
value density functions (breakpoints and values in each interval), and the transformation is applied to
create an assignment instance with the objects being subintervals in which each agent’s reported value
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density is a constant. For the rule to be fully specified, we need to say precisely which piece or pieces
adding up to a 1/n fraction of each subinterval is assigned to an agent. The next proposition shows
that no deterministic conversion method can make the uniform rule strategyproof.
Proposition 3.4. No deterministic implementation of the fraction-to-subinterval conversion method
for the uniform allocation rule is strategyproof.
Chen et al. [44] proposed a randomized mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation, ex-post
robust proportional and envy-free motivated by a notion of perfect partition (see their paper details).
Their mechanism can be viewed as a randomized implementation of the fraction-to-subinterval conver-
sion method for the uniform allocation rule. However, since the uniform allocation rule does not take
into account the preference of the agents, it has poor efficiency guarantees. This motivates the design
of MCSD which achieves better efficiency guarantees by taking agent preferences into account.
We start with a randomized algorithm that is strategyproof and robust proportional in expectation.
The algorithm is a variant of random dictatorship. A random ordering of the agents is drawn, each
ordering equally likely. Agents choose pieces of the cake in this order, with the additional constraint
that each agent consume at most 1/n fraction of the cake in total. Obviously, each agent will consume
his most-preferred part of the cake when it is his turn, and there may be many equally good choices for
an agent. To handle this, we break ties consistently by allocating to each agent the left-most part of the
cake that he prefers most; if his most preferred pieces have been completely consumed, but he has not
reached his quota of 1/n, then starts consuming the left most part of his second most preferred pieces,
etc. until his quota is reached. We will call this algorithm Constrained Random Serial Dictatorship
(CRSD). Notice that CRSD is strategyproof, as in every draw of lottery, it is optimal for the agents
to report their valuation function truthfully. Later in Proposition 3.6, we show that CRSD is robust
proportional in expectation. To summarize, CRSD is a randomized algorithm that is strategyproof
and satisfies robust proportionality in expectation.
The MCSD algorithm, described next, can be thought of as a derandomized version of CRSD
obtained by computing the CRSD allocation for each of the n! different permutations and aggregating
them appropriately. The algorithm is formally presented as Algorithm 3.5.19
Note that MCSD may require an exponential number of cuts of the cake in the number of agents.
19We do not make the free disposal assumption in the algorithmic description here.
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In Example 3.2, we illustrate how MCSD works.
Example 3.2 (Illustration of MCSD). We implement MCSD on the cake cutting problem in Figure 3.1.
For the permutation (12), agent 1 first chooses the cake piece [0, 0.1]∪ [0.5, 0.9] and agent 2 then takes
the remaining piece [0.1, 0.5] ∪ [0.9, 1]. For the permutation (21), agent 2 first chooses the cake piece
[0.3, 0.8] and agent 1 then takes the remaining piece [0, 0.3] ∪ [0.8, 1].
The set of all relevant subintervals induced by the two permutations is
{[0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.3], [0.3, 0.5], [0.5, 0.8], [0.8, 0.9], [0.9, 1]}.
When we we additionally consider the discontinuities in the players’ valuations, the set of relevant
subintervals becomes
J ′ = {[0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.3], [0.3, 0.5], [0.5, 0.6], [0.6, 0.8], [0.8, 0.9], [0.9, 1].
Counting the number of times each agent receives each subinterval and dividing the counts by 2, we
get:
X1 = [0, 0.1] ∪
1
2
[0.1, 0.3] ∪ 1
2
[0.5, 0.6] ∪ 1
2







[0.1, 0.3] ∪ [0.3, 0.5] ∪ 1
2
[0.5, 0.6] ∪ 1
2
[0.6, 0.8] ∪ 1
2
[0.9, 1].
where p[a, b] for some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 denotes a subinterval of [a, b] with length equal to p times that of
[a, b].
Proposition 3.5. For piecewise constant valuations, MCSD is well-defined and returns a feasible
allocation in which each agent receives a collection of intervals of total length 1/n.
The proof is deferred to Appendix A.
Proposition 3.6. For piecewise constant valuations, MCSD satisfies robust proportionality.
Proof. We first prove that MCSD satisfies proportionality. In the case where all agents have the same
valuations as the valuation of i, i is guaranteed 1/n of the value of the whole cake as MCSD allocates a
1/n fraction of each interval to each agent. Next, fixing the value density function of agent i, agent i’s
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utility is minimized under the MCSD allocation when all other agents have identical utility. Formally,
we have for each π ∈ ΠN and preferences V−i of all agents other than i,
Vi(MCSD
π(Vi, V−i)) ≥ Vi(MCSDπ(Vi, (Vi, . . . , Vi))).
The reason is for any fixed permutation of the agents, the predecessors of i in π leave weakly better
pieces of the cake for i when their valuations are different from i compared to when their valuations
are the same. Averaging over all permutations, we get




Finally, note that when an agent selects his best possible cake piece in each permutation, the exact
height of the valuation function is not relevant and only the relative height matters. Hence, MCSD in
fact satisfies robust proportionality.
Corollary 3.2. For any valuation profile, the allocation returned by MCSD stochastically dominates
that of the uniform allocation rule.
This follows from Proposition 3.1. Hence, we have a precise measure under which MCSD is more
efficient than the uniform allocation rule.
In order to implement MCSD, we need to specify how a fractional portion of the interval Jj is
converted to a subinterval or collection of subintervals of Jj . As with the uniform allocation rule, the
strategyproofness of MCSD depends on how this conversion is done. In fact, Proposition 3.4 also implies
that no deterministic implementation of the conversion procedure can make MCSD strategyproof. This
is because, when every agent has an identical valuation function, then MCSD coincides with the uniform
rule due to robust proportionality.
Corollary 3.3. MCSD is not strategyproof under any deterministic procedure that converts fraction
of each interval of J ′ to a collection of subintervals of that interval.
In light of this difficulty, we describe a randomized conversion method (see Algorithm 3.6) that
makes MCSD strategyproof. The method first fixes an ordering of the agents and randomly picks a
starting point inside each interval. The subintervals are then carved out in proportion to the fractional
assignments. Whenever we reach the right endpoint of the interval with our cuts, we wrap around and
keep going starting with the left endpoint of the interval (equivalently, identify the two end-points of
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the interval and turn it into a circle). This randomized implemention of MCSD is called Constrained
Mixed Serial Dictatorship, or CMSD for short. We show that CMSD is strategyproof in expectation.
Also note that even though the allocation given by CMSD is random, it guarantees the same ex-post
utility for every agent with respect to the reported valuations.
Proposition 3.7. The CMSD mechanism is strategyproof in expectation.
Consider the profiles P = (Pi, P−i) and P
′ = (P ′i , P−i) that differ only in the report of agent i.
Let J1, . . . , Jk denote the intervals whose fractional allocations are specified to each agent by MCSD
in profile P and J ′1, . . . , J
′
k′ denote the intervals whose fractional allocations are specified to each agent
by MCSD in profile P ′. Let Vi(J) denote agent i’s total utility derived from receiving the interval J .
Let pPij (p
P ′
ij respectively) be the fractional allocation of interval Jj (J
′
j respectively) to agent i. Since
CSRD is strategyproof, comparing the expected utility of agent i in P and P ′ (and treating i’s true











To show that our implementation of MCSD is strategyproof in expectation, it suffices to show that
if MCSD asks for a subinterval Xij of Jj with length pijlen(Jj) for some 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1, then the output
returned by Algorithm 3.6 satisfies E[Vi(Xij)] = pijVi(Jj). The following lemma, whose proof is in
Appendix A, proves this claim.20
Lemma 3.1. Let U be uniformly distributed on the interval [a, b] and let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Let A =
[U,U + α(b− a)] if U + α(b− a) ≤ b and A = [a, U − (1− α)(b− a)] ∪ [U, b] if U + α(b− a) > b, then
we have that EU [Vi(A)] = αVi([a, b]), where Vi(A) =
∫
A vi(x)dx for any integrable function vi.
To apply the lemma, we take a and b to be the left and right end points of Jj , α = pij and
U = mod(Uj +
∑i−1
k=1 pij(bj − aj)), the left endpoint of Xij given in Algoirthm 3.6.
We end the section with some limitations of MCSD. First, while MCSD is strategyproof in expec-
tation, it is not group strategyproof, even in the weaker sense.
Proposition 3.8. For cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations, MCSD is not weakly group-
strategyproof even for two agents.
20the lemma holds for any integrable value density function vi, not just piecewise constant value density functions.
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The proof of Proposition 3.8 can be found in Appendix A.
Furthermore, as long as there are at least seven agents, MCSD is not weak group strategyproof
even if the agents have piecewise uniform valuations. This follows from the fact that RSD is not weakly
group-strategyproof for dichotomous preferences when there are at least seven agents [29, 26].
Second, even though MCSD satisfies both proportionality and symmetry, it is not envy-free.
Proposition 3.9. MCSD is not envy-free for three agents even for piecewise uniform valuations.
The proof of Proposition 3.9 can be found in Appendix A.
However for the case of two agents, it is robust envy-free and polynomial-time.
Proposition 3.10. For two agents and piecewise constant valuations, MCSD is robust envy-free, and
polynomial-time but not Pareto optimal.
For two agents, proportionality implies envy-freeness and robust proportionality implies robust
envy-freeness (see [44]). Strategyproofness follows from Proposition 3.7. Moreover, for two agents, the
algorithm is polynomial time with only two permutations.
Finally, a significant drawback of MCSD is that it is not Pareto efficient when agents have piecewise
constant valuations. This can be seen from the example of Proposition 3.8. Moreover, computing the
MCSD allocation is non-trivial as the number of agents grows (see e.g. [105]).
3.6 Discussion
The relation between the random assignment problem and cake cutting has been noticed before [44].
However, in their discussion of related work, Chen et al. [44] argue that techniques from the random
assignment literature cannot be directly applied even to piecewise uniform functions—a subclasses
of piecewise constant functions. The authors attributed this difficulty to the fact that in the random
assignment problem, each agents gets one object. We observed that PS can be adopted to the case when
agents get multiple objects and each object has arbitrary capacity. Moreover, many of its properties of
PS in the unit demand setting remain satisfied (see [39] for generalizations of PS beyond unit demand
setting).
Chen et al. [44] stated that generalizing their strategyproof algorithm for piecewise uniform valu-
ations to the case for piecewise constant valuations as an open problem. We presented two algorithms
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— CCEA and MEA — that generalize Mechanism 1 of [44]. Although they both satisfy certain desir-
able properties, both natural generalizations are not strategyproof. Our impossibility results further
rule out the existence of mechanisms satisfying the properties that CCEA or MEA satisfies along with
strategproofness, which partially answers the open problem that [44] poses.
Apart from the paper of [44], we are aware of no positive results regarding discrete, strategyproof,
and fair algorithms even for the restricted domain of piecewise constant valuations. In this chapter we
present a proportional algorithm (MCSD) for piecewise constant valuations. If we are allowed to use
randomization, then we show that MCSD can be adapted to be strategyproof in expectation. Notice
that if we instead require our algorithm to be strategyproof ex post and proportional in expectation,
then CRSD would satify these properties. We note that [44] showed that the uniform allocation rule is
envy-free and proportional, and strategyproof in expectation. However, we argue that it is inefficient:
as it does not satisfy unanimity and its allocation is always stochastically dominated by the allocation
of MCSD. It remains an open question whether there exists a strategyproof algorithm that always
returns a proportional allocation for the piecewise constant valuation setting. In fact, the problem is
open even for the special case of piecewise constant valuation where the value density function for each
agent can take up to only two different constants. Finally, note that in the piecewise uniform case,
when one of constants is zero, we are able to leverage the free disposal property in order to obtain
strategyproofness while not incurring fairness and efficiency losses.
One difficulty that arises in coming up with strategyproof and proportional algorithm lies in that
there is no restriction on the distribution of the discontinuity points of the agents’ valuation functions.
To illustrate this point, suppose the algorithm designer knows that the discontinuity points of the
agents’ valuation functions come from a set S = {d1, . . . , dk}, where 0 ≤ d1 ≤ . . . ≤ dk ≤ 1. Con-
sequently, a mechanism that partitions [0, 1] into intervals of the form [di, di+1] and allocates 1/n of
each interval to each agent would be proportional, envy-free and strategyproof. Even if the designer
does not know such an S, but instead we require the minimum distance between any two consecutive
discontinuity points of the agent’s valuation function to be at least some ε > 0, then we can construct
a strategyproof and δ-proportional algorithm for this setting by cutting the cake into small intervals
and allocating 1/n fraction of each interval to each agent.
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Algorithm 3.5 MCSD (Mixed Constrained Serial Dictatorship)— proportional and unanimous algo-
rithm for piecewise constant valuations
Input: Cake-cutting problem with piecewise constant valuations.
Output: A robust proportional allocation.
1: for each π ∈ ΠN do
2: C ←− [0, 1] (intervals left)
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: Xππ(i) ←− maximum preference cake piece of size 1/n from C
5: C ←− C −Xππ(i).
6: i←− i+ 1.
7: end for
8: end for
9: Construct a disjoint and exhaustive interval set J ′ induced by the discontinuities in agent valuations
and the cake cuts in the n! cake allocations.
10: Yi ←− empty allocation for each i ∈ N .
11: for each Jj = [aj , bj ] ∈ J ′ do
12: for each i ∈ N do
13: Let pij =
count(i,Jj)
n! where count(i, Jj) is the number of permutations in which i gets Jj .
14: Generate Aij ⊆ Jj that is of length pij |Jj | according to a subroutine.
15: Yi ←− Yi ∪Aij
16: end for
17: end for
return Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
CHAPTER 3. CAKE CUTTING ALGORITHMS FOR PIECEWISE CONSTANT AND
PIECEWISE UNIFORM VALUATIONS 54
Algorithm 3.6 A subroutine that converts fractional allocation into subintervals via randomization
Input: Interval Jj = [aj , bj ] and a vector of fractional assignment pj = (p1j , . . . , pnj), where pij is the
fractional allocation of interval Ij to agent i.
Output: Random subintervals Xij ⊆ Jj for i = 1, . . . , n, where Xij is the subinterval allocated to
agent i
1: Generate Uj ∼ unif [aj , bj ].
2: For aj ≤ x ≤ 2bj − aj , let mod (x) = x if aj ≤ x ≤ bj and x− (bj − aj) if x > bj .
3: If mod (Uj +
∑i−1
k=1 pkj(bj − aj)) ≤ mod (U +
∑i
k=1 pkj(bj − aj)) set
Xij = [ mod (Uj +
i−1∑
k=1





Xij = [aj , mod (Uj +
i∑
k=1
pkj(bj − aj))] ∪ [ mod (Uj +
i−1∑
k=1
pnj(bj − aj)), bj ]
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Chapter 4
A Generalization of the Probabilistic
Serial Mechanism and its Relationship
to the Leximin Allocation
4.1 Introduction
We consider a resource allocation problem on a bipartite network. There are a set of buyers or agents,
each with a demand requirement, and a set of sellers or resources, each with a supply capacity. Each
buyer has preferences over the set of sellers. Moreover, each buyer’s demand can only be satisfied (if
it is satisfied at all) in its entirety by a single seller whose capacity can accommodate the demand.
The goal is to design a mechanism that assigns the buyers to the sellers in a fair and efficient manner
while respecting the sellers’ capacities. Moreover, as each buyer’s preference ordering over the sellers
is private information, we also would like our mechanism to be strategyproof. The classical random
assignment problem (see e.g. [29]) can be viewed as a special case of this problem in which each buyer
has unit demand and each seller has unit capacity. We will refer to this case as the UDC special case.
Kurokawa et al. [81] first considered this model in the context of classroom assignment. Those
authors were contacted by a representative of one of the largest school districts in California, with the
task of allocating unused classrooms in the district’s public schools to the district’s charter schools.
Each public school has a given number of unused classrooms (its capacity), and each charter school has
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a number of required classrooms (its demand). Finally, an operational constraint requires that a charter
school’s demand must be satisfied in a single public school. Kurokawa et al. [81] modeled the agent
preferences as dichotomous: every charter school lists a subset of public schools that it finds acceptable.
In such a setting, they gave a mechanism that satisfies many nice properties, including: proportionality
(for every pair of charter and public schools i and j, the probability that i’s demand is satisfied by
a school that i weakly prefers over j is above a threshold level), envy-freeness (every charter school
prefers its probabilistic allocation to that of any other school), Pareto optimality (no other feasible
probabilistic allocation is at least as good for every charter school and strictly better for some school)
and strategyproofness (no school can benefit by misreporting its preferences). The mechanism always
computes a leximin allocation: one that maximizes the lowest probability of any charter school having
its demand satisfied in an acceptable facility; subject to this constraint, it maximizes the second lowest
probability; and so on. We shall refer to this mechanism as the leximin mechanism.
The leximin mechanism was originally proposed in the seminal paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[26], who study the UDC special case. There they showed the equivalence between the probabilistic
serial mechanism and the leximin mechanism. The PS mechanism in the UDC setting was originally
proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [29] as an eating procedure in which each agent consume her
most preferred resource out of the available resources at each given point in time, assuming the agents
have strict preferences. It was later extended by Katta and Sethuraman [76] to the general preference
domain, which encompasses the dichotomous preference domain as a special case. Despite failing
to be strategyproof in the general preference domain, the PS mechanism is known to be envy-free,
proportional and ordinally efficient (a generalization of Pareto optimality). A natural question is
whether the PS mechanism can be generalized to handle more general demands and capacities.
On a separate note, Bogomolnaia [27] recently gave an alternative definition of the PS mechanism
in the spirit of a leximin allocation for the UDC setting when agents have general preferences. Given
a random allocation X, let vX be a vector such that for every agent i and her preference indifference
class l, there is a entry in vX corresponding to the probability that agent i is assigned to a seller
from indifferent class l or better. Bogomolnaia [27] showed that the PS mechanism lexicographically
maximizes vX over all feasible allocations X. We will refer to this allocation as the generalized leximin
allocation in the chapter. Note that for the dichotomous preference domain, there is only one preference
indifference class for each agent. Hence, we immediately deduce from [27] that the PS mechanism
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always computes a leximin allocation for dichotomous preferences in the UDC setting.
Research Questions: Given the equivalence results between the PS and (generalized) leximin mech-
anism established by [26] and [27] for the UDC setting, it is natural to ask if there is a suitable gener-
alization of the PS mechanism that computes a generalized leximin allocation in the arbitrary demand
and supply setting. Moreover, [81] showed that the leximin mechanism is a compelling mechanism to
use in the general supply and demand setting with dichotomous agent preferences as it satisfies many
nice properties. It is not known what properties are satisfied by the generalized leximin mechanism in
the general preference domain.
4.1.1 Our Contributions
We propose the generalized probabilistic serial (GPS) mechanism. The GPS mechanism, by definition,
computes a generalized leximin allocation as defined earlier. We extend the exponential LP, proposed
in [81] for the case of dichotomous preference, to compute such an allocation. Alternatively, we
give another algorithmic approach for computing a generalized leximin allocation that is more closely
related to the interpretation of the PS mechanism as an eating algorithm in the UDC special case.
Next, we examine the properties satisfied by the GPS mechanism in the general demand and supply
capacity setting with general preferences. It is known from [29] that even for the UDC setting, the PS
mechanism fails to be strategyproof. We show that the generalized PS mechanism fails envy-freeness
as well. Nonetheless, the mechanism remains Pareto optimal, and we conjecture that it is proportional
as well.21 Our results suggest the potential need to consider other allocation methods. A summary of
the results is provided in Table 4.1.
4.1.2 Related Work
The modern literature on fair division of indivisible goods dates back at least to the seminal paper [75],
which adapted the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) solution. The main drawbacks
of this solution are its prohibitive computational and informational requirements: it requires the solu-
tion of a fixed-point problem, and a complete knowledge of the utility functions of the agents. Budish
21We provide a proof of proportionality for dichotomous preferences. Note that our definition of proportionality is
stronger than that of [81].
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Demand \ Preference Dichotomous General
UDC PS = leximin ([26]) PS = generalized leximin ([27])
EF, Prop, PE, weak GSP ([26]) EF, Prop, OE ([76])
General leximin = GPS (Prop. 4.1) generalized leximin = GPS (Thm 4.1)
EF, Prop, PE, SP ([81], Prop 4.3) Prop (?), OE (Prop. 4.4)
Table 4.1: abbreviations: EF = envy-freeness, prop = proportionality, PE = Pareto efficiency, OE =
ordinal efficiency, GSP = group strategyproofness.
[38] later proposed an approximate CEEI solution, where the approximation guarantees are practical
as long as the supply of each good is relatively large.
In the realm of ordinal preferences, most of the academic literature focuses on the UDC special
case, also known as the random assignment problem. The two prominent mechanisms used in the
random assignment literature are the random serial dictatorship (RSD) mechanism of [1], which orders
the agents uniformly at random and lets them successively choose an available resource according
to this (random) order, and the probabilistic serial mechanism (PS) of [29], which allows agents to
“eat” (at identical rates) their shares of different resources one by one in the order in which they
rank the resources. RSD is known to satisfy weaker efficiency and fairness properties than PS, but is
strategyproof, whereas PS is not strategyproof in general. The probabilistic allocation for an agent-
resource pair in the PS mechanism can be efficiently computed, whereas this computation is difficult
for RSD [105]. The original random assignment problem involves assigning n resources to n agents.
Since the work of [29], the PS mechanism has been extended to deal with the general preference domain
involving indifference in preferences (see [76]), multi-unit demands (see e.g. [77, 99, 10]) and general
social choice settings [12]. The Birkhoff von-Neumann theorem [24, 127] enables an algorithm to output
a compact representation of a random assignment or packing by specifying its probabilistic distribution
over all pairs of buyers and sellers. Budish et al. [39] recently generalized the Birkhoff von-Neumann
theorem to handle many real-world combinatorial domains. Unfortunately, their results do not apply
to the setting where a demand must be satisfied entirely by a single seller such as the one that we are
studying.
The leximin mechanism was original proposed by [26] for the UDC setting with dichotomous agent
preferences. Kurokawa et al. [81] were the first ones to propose the leximin mechanism for the setting
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of general supply and unsplittable demand. In addition to the nice properties mentioned in [81],
Bogolmonaia and Moulin [26] also showed the Lorenz dominance of the leximin probability vector in
the UDC seting, which does not hold for general supply and demand (see [81] for a counterexample).
Bogomolnaia [27] later showed that the PS mechanism always returns a generalized leximin allocation.
Attempting to understand the connection between the PS mechanism and the leximin allocation for
the general supply and demand setting is one of the main objectives of this chapter.
4.1.3 Model and Notation
Let B = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of buyers or agents. Let S = {1, . . . ,m} denote the set of sellers or
resources. Each buyer i has a pair (di,Pi), where di denotes the number of units demanded by the buyer
and Pi is a preference ordering over a subset of sellers Ai that buyer i finds acceptable. Specifically,
Pi is a total ordering over the set Ai ⊆ S, i.e. for every pair of sellers j, j′ ∈ Ai, either j i j′ (j is
weakly preferred to j′) or j′ i j (j′ is weakly preferred to j). If both of the aforementioned relations
hold, then we say that i is indifferent between sellers j and j′ or j ∼i j′. Hence, we can partition Ai
into preference indifference classes {Ai1, . . . , AiLi} indexed in decreasing preference order such that for
every l = 1, . . . , Li and every j, j
′ ∈ Ail, j ∼i j′. Each seller j has a capacity cj . Since we are not
allowed to split the demand of a buyer across different sellers, buyer i finds seller j acceptable only if
di ≤ cj .
A deterministic allocation is a mapping X : B → S ∪ {0}, where Xi = X(i) denotes the seller
that buyer i is assigned to.22 Buyer i is not assigned to any seller if Xi = 0. We say that X is
feasible if for all j ∈ S, ∑i∈B:Xi=j di ≤ cj . A feasible random allocation is a distribution over feasible
deterministic allocations. From hereon, when we refer to the term “allocation”, we will assume that it
is feasible unless stated otherwise. A random allocation is a probability distribution over deterministic
allocations. The outcome of a random allocation can be compactly described by the following sub-
stochastic matrix P = {pij}, where pij is the probability that buyer i is assigned to seller j under the
random allocation.
Let Til = ∪ll′=1Ail′ . Let BS denote the set of buyers who find some seller s ∈ S acceptable.
In this chapter, we will focus on these desirable properties:
22If buyer i is assigned to seller j, then seller j satisfies all of buyer i’s di units of demand and no larger.
CHAPTER 4. A GENERALIZATION OF THE PROBABILISTIC SERIAL MECHANISM AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE LEXIMIN ALLOCATION 60
1. Envy-freeness: Buyer i is said to envy buyer i′ in an allocation if i′’s demand is at least that of
i, and there exists some seller j such that the total probability that i is assigned to a seller that
she weakly prefers to j is smaller than that of buyer i′. We say that an allocation is envy free if





pi′j′ , ∀i, i′ s.t. di′ ≥ di, and ∀j
2. Proportionality : An allocation is proportional if for each buyer i and for each of her preference




3. Ordinal Efficiency : Let Pi and Qi denote the probabilistic allocation vector for buyer i in
random allocation matrices P and Q respectively. We say that Pi stochastically dominates Qi






We say that i strictly prefers Pi to Qi, denoted by Pi i Qi, if at least one of the inequalities
in the above definition is strict. Finally, we say that P stochastically dominates Q, denoted by
P  Q, if Pi i Qi for all i ∈ N , with Pi i Qi for some i ∈ N .24 We say that a random allocation
P is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated by any other random allocation Q.
Note that our notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and ordinal efficiency generalize the correspond-
ing concepts defined in [81] for dichotomous preferences. In particular, ordinal efficiency coincides with
Pareto optimality for dichotomous preferences.
4.1.4 The Generalized Leximin Allocation Vector
We consider an extension of the definition of leximin allocation vector introduced by [27] for the UDC
special case. Let Li be the number of preference indifference classes in buyer i’s preference ordering. Let
L =
∑n
i=1 Li. Given a random allocation matrix P , for every buyer i and indifference class Ail indexed
in decreasing preference order, compute the L-dimensional vector of probability sums (
∑
j∈Til pij)il
23The literature on fair division such as cake cutting typical uses a weaker notion of proportionality: it only requires
each agent to receive an acceptable resource with probability at least 1/n under the allocation.
24Note that our notion of stochastic dominance defines a partial order on the set of sub-stochastic matrices.
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and sort the components of this vector in non-decreasing order (break ties arbitrarily) to obtain VP .
We say that a random allocation is leximin optimal if it lexicographically maximizes the vector VP .
We will refer to such an assignment as a generalized leximin allocation (GLS), and the mechanism that
always returns such an assignment as the generalized leximin mechanism (GLM). Note that our notion
of the leximin allocation generalizes the notion defined by [81] for the dichotomous preference domain.
4.2 Computing a Generalized Leximin Allocation
We first extend the iterative LP algorithm introduced by [81] for finding a leximin optimal allocation
for the dichotomous setting to the full preference domain. To that end, we first describe a feasibility
checking subroutine:
Feasibility check subroutine:
Let vi indicate the preference indifference class to which buyer i is assigned (we set vi = 0 if i is
unassigned). That is, buyer i can only be assigned to a seller in the set Ai,vi . The question we wish
to answer is: is there a packing satisfying the demand vector (v1, . . . , vn)? This can be answered by
solving the following integer program. Define a variable xij for every seller j ∈ Ai,vi that equals to 1
if buyer i is assigned to seller j and 0 otherwise. Then we solve the following integer program:
max 0∑
j∈Ai,vi
xij = 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , n s.t. vi > 0 (4.1)
∑
i:vi≤Li,j∈Ai,vi
dixij ≤ cj ∀j = 1, . . . ,m
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀j = 1, . . . ,m, vi = 1, . . . , Li
Given a vector v = (v1, . . . , vn), if the above integer program has a feasible solution for v, then we
include v in the set of all feasible vectors F . Once F is constructed, we define the following iterative
procedure for computing a leximin allocation.
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Iterative Allocation LP:
We let p∗il indicate the probability that buyer i is assigned to a seller in Ail in the leximin allocation
that we will iteratively compute. Initially set all p∗il = 0. Let Rt be the remaining subset of buyers at
the end of iteration t. Initialize R0 = {1, . . . n}. Let it be the index of the preference indifference class
under consideration for buyer i in iteration t of the algorithm. Initially, set i1 = 1 for all i. Now, given
that we have completed iteration t− 1 of the algorithm, we solve the following LP in iteration t with





pil ≥M ∀i ∈ Rt−1
pil = p
∗








yv ≥ 0 ∀v.
Here yv denotes the probability that packing v is chosen and pil is the probability that buyer i is
assigned to a seller in Ail.
Let (p̃il) be the optimal probabilities returned by LP (4.2) and M̃ be the optimal value of M . Let
SM̃ be the set of buyers i such that
∑it
l=1 p̃il = M̃ . To ensure that this constraint is actually tight for
buyer i in every single optimal solution (i.e. buyer i’s allocation probability cannot be further improved
without hurting the allocation of another buyer), for every b ∈ SM̃ , we solve the following LP.
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pil ≥ M̃ ∀i ∈ Rt−1
pil = p
∗








yv ≥ 0 ∀v.
Let (p̂bl) be the optimal probabilities returned by LP (4.3) for buyer b. If
∑bt
l=1 p̃bl = M̃ , then set
p∗b,bt = p̂b,bt and include it in Rt. Moreover, if bt < Lb, then set bt+1 = bt + 1. If bt = Lb, then do not
include buyer b in Rt. On the other hand, if we have
∑bt
l=1 p̃bl > M , then set bt+1 = bt and include b
in Rt. Finally, for every b 6∈ SM̃ , we set bt+1 = bt and include b in Rt.
We keep iterating the algorithm until Rt = ∅. Note that in every iteration t, at least one of the
buyers (in SM̃ ) will not be included in Rt.
25 Hence, we need to solve at most (
∑n
i=1 Li) LPs before
the algorithm terminates. Finally, it can be shown via induction that the vector p∗ returned by the
above procedure is a leximin allocation vector.
4.3 The Equivalence between the Generalized Probablistic Serial
(GPS) Mechanism and the Generalized Leximin Mechanism
In this section, we propose another way of computing a generalized leximin allocation that is reminiscent
of the eating procedure prescribed by the probabilistic serial mechanism in the UDC setting. The
probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism in the UDC setting was originally proposed by [29] when agents
(buyers) have strict preference over resources (sellers). Katta an Sethuraman [76] later extended the
25This is because if
∑bt
l=1 p̃bl > M̃ for every b ∈ SM̃ , then a strict convex combinations of the solutions (p̂bl) for b ∈ SM̃
will result in a feasible solution of LP (4.2) with objective value strictly larger than M̃ , a contradiction.
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mechanism to accommodate indifferences in agents’ preferences. At a high level, the mechanism works
as follows: in every iteration, given a subset of buyers/agents S, the union of resources OS in the
preference indifference class that each agent in S is currently consuming, as well as the probabilistic
assignment matrix P that has been allocated to agents in S so far, the mechanism computes a score
S(S,OS , P ). The mechanism then finds the subset of agents S∗ that minimizes the S(S,OS , P ) over all
subsets of agents that are still allowed to consume more resources. S∗ is commonly referred to as the
bottleneck set. Each agent in S∗ is allocated a probability of obtaining a resource from the preference
indifference class that the agent is currently consuming so that the sum of allocated probabilities
for each agent in S is S(S∗, OS∗ , P ). If S(S∗, OS∗ , P ) = 1, then agents in S∗ are removed from
consideration. Otherwise, each agent in S∗ starts consuming resources from her next level of preference
indifference class (if any).
In this section, we seek to generalize the PS mechanism to the more general setting of arbitrary
demands and supplies. The key to establishing the result is identifying the appropriate generalization
of S(S,OS , P ). In UDC setting, the score S(S,OS , P ) represents the maximum probability that each
agent in S can be assigned to a resource in a preference indifference class no worse than the one she is
currently consuming, provided that every agent in S receives the same aggregate probability whenever
possible. It turns out that this high level view of S(S,OS , P ) carries over to the general supply and
demand setting. The difference lies in that for the UDC setting, the Birkhoff von-Neumann theorem
allows us to move between a probabilistic allocation of agent-resource pairs and a distribution over
matchings. Consequently, we can treat the resources as divisible goods and S(S,OS , P ) can be com-
puted in a fairly straightforward manner by solving a parametric max flow problem (see e.g. [76]),
which can be solved in polynomial time. Nonetheless, for general demand and supply quantities, we
need to specify an explicit distribution over packings that maximizes the probabilistic assignment for
a subset of buyers S. The following subproblem checks whether a distribution over packings exists for
a given vector of probability assignments between buyer preference indifference class pairs.
Packing Subproblem:
Let S be a subset of buyers. Consider a subset of ordered pairs Q = {(i, O)}, where i ∈ S is a buyer
and O is a subset of sellers that buyer i can be matched to (O typically denotes the set of sellers from
one of buyer i’s preference indifference classes). There may be multiple ordered pairs for a given buyer
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i ∈ S. Moreover, each buyer i ∈ S participates in at least one ordered pair in Q. Let IQ = ∪O:(i,O)∈QO.
Finally, for every pair (i, Q) ∈ Q, we are given an integer q(i,Q). We also have an integer r associated
with IQ. Now, for every pair (i, O) ∈ Q, we duplicate buyer i q(i,Q) times. Each of the duplicated
buyers finds only sellers in O acceptable. We duplicate r copies of the set of sellers IQ. We say that
the duplication is feasible if, there exists a packing such that
1. Every duplicated buyer is assigned to some duplicated acceptable seller.
2. At most one copy of the same buyer can be assigned to a seller in each copy of IQ.
3. The packing respects the capacity for all duplicated sellers.
Note that if the duplication is feasible, then we know that there is a sub-distribution over packings
that achieves the probabilistic assignment such that for every pair (i, O), buyer i is matched to a seller
in O with probability
q(i,Q)
IQ
. Checking whether a duplication is feasible is a NP-hard problem, even if
there is a single seller that all buyers desire. A reduction from the partition problem nearly identical
to the hardness result for computing a leximin vector shown in [81] can be attained.
4.3.1 Dichotomous Preference Domain
We first present a generalization of the PS mechanism for the dichotomous preference setting as a
warm up. Let pi be the probability that buyer i is assigned to a seller that he finds acceptable. Let R
denote the remaining set of buyers to be considered by the algorithm. Below is the description of the
generalized PS (GPS) algorithm for the dichotomous setting:
1. Initialize pi = 0 for all buyer i. Let Ii be the set of acceptable sellers for buyer i. Set R = N .
2. While R 6= ∅, consider the following duplication. Let l be the least common multiple of all
denominators of pi for every i ∈ N\R (l = 1 if N\R is empty). Consider a packing subproblem
instance where we have cpil copies of buyer i for every i ∈ N\R for some c ∈ N, q copies of every
buyer i ∈ S ⊆ R, and cl copies of each seller that buyers in (N\R) ∪ S collectively desires. Let
OS be the set of sellers that some buyer in S finds acceptable.
26
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3. Let S(S,OS , P ) be the maximum value of qcl such that the duplication for the given parameters
is feasible.27
(a) Find S∗ = arg minS⊆R S(S,OS , P ). If there are multiple S∗’s we look for one that is a min-
imal subset. Also, among all minimal optimal subsets, we break ties using a lexicographical
ordering.
(b) Set pi = S(S∗, OS∗ , P ) for all i ∈ S∗. The distribution over packings is determined by the
duplication subproblem that yields S(S∗, OS∗ , P ).
(c) Remove buyers in S∗ from R.
4. Return the probabilistic allocation vector p = (pi).
Next, we show that the GPS mechanism indeed computes a leximin random allocation. This
establishes the equivalence between the GPS mechanism and the generalized leximin mechanism for
dichotomous preferences.
Lemma 4.1. Let pt be the probability that each of buyer is assigned to an acceptable seller in iteration
t of the algorithm. Then the sequence pt is non-decreasing with respect to time, i.e. p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pk,
where k is the last iteration of the algorithm.
Proof. It suffices to show that pt ≤ pt+1. Let St and Pt be the bottleneck set of buyers in iteration
t and probabilistic assignments matrix at the end of iteration t respectively. Since St minimizes the
value of S(S,OS , Pt−1) as a function of S, it must be the case that S(St ∪ St+1, OSt∪St+1 , Pt−1) ≥
S(St, OSt , Pt−1). Consequently, there is a distribution over packings that ensures every buyer in St ∪
St+1 is matched to one of her acceptable sellers with probability at least S(St, OSt , Pt−1). This implies
that we can match each buyer in St+1 to be matched to one of her acceptable sellers with probability
at least S(St, OSt , Pt−1) while giving the same guarantees to buyers in St. Then by definition, it must
be the case that
pt+1 = S(St+1, OSt+1 , Pt) ≥ S(St, OSt , Pt−1) = pt,
as desired.
27Note that due to the nature of the algorithm, the duplication with q = 0 is always feasible.
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Proposition 4.1. The GPS mechanism computes a leximin probabilistic allocation for the dichotomous
preference domain.
Proof. Let p be the probabilistic allocation vector computed by the PS mechanism. We will show
inductively that p is lexicographically identical to the leximin vector u entry by entry. Let vi denote
the probabilistic allocation of buyer i in an allocation vector v, and v(j) denote the j-th smallest entry
of the vector v.
Base case: the probabilistic assignment computed by PS is a feasible assignment. Hence, the value
of a minimum element is at most the value of a minimum element of the leximin probability vector,
or p(1) ≤ u(1). On the other hand, look at the subset of buyers S1, the subset of buyers who received
the minimum probabilistic assignment in p, note that this corresponds to the subset of buyers who
received an assignment in the first iteration of PS by Lemma 4.1. The PS mechanism maximizes their
average probabilistic allocation among all feasible allocations, which is no worse than the minimum
probabilistic assignment received by the buyers in S1 in any feasible allocation. Let i ∈ S1 be an buyer
who receives the minimum probabilistic allocation amongst all buyers in S1 with respect to u, then we
have that p(1) ≥ ui ≥ u(1). Hence, it is the case that p(1) = u(1). Moreover, we can assume without
lost of generality that p(1) and u(1) correspond to the utility of the same buyer, namely buyer i.
Now, conditioning on the fact that the first k minimum probabilistic entries of p and u agree, we
will show that (k+1)-st entry also agrees. Again, since p corresponds to a feasible random assignment,
and the k smallest entries of p and u agree, it must be the case that p(k+1) ≤ u(k+1). To show that
p(k+1) ≥ u(k+1), we will assume from the inductive hypothesis that the same subset of buyers are
assigned the k minimum probabilities in both p and u. Note that if we continue the PS mechanism
on the remaining set of buyers R after fixing the allocation of the buyers who received the k smallest
probabilistic assignments, then we would have the identical probabilistic allocation for all buyers as the
one we get starting from scratch. Let SR1 be the first bottleneck set computed amongst the remaining
buyers R given the allocation for the k minimum probability buyers. By the previous observation and
Lemma 4.1, every buyer in SR1 is assigned to an acceptable seller with probability p(k+1). Note that the
minimum probabilistic allocation of the buyer i in SR1 given by u is no better than the one computed
by PS, since PS maximizes their allocations over all assignments that share the k smallest entries with
that of PS. Hence, we get that p(k+1) ≥ ui ≥ u(k+1). Moreover, together with the inductive hypothesis,
we have shown that the same subset of buyers are assigned the k+ 1 minimum probabilities in both p
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and u.
4.3.2 Full Preference Domain
In this subsection, we describe the GPS mechanism over the full preference domain. Let pij be the
probability that buyer i is assigned a seller from his j-th tier of preference indifference class Aij . let
Ci be the index of the preference indifference class that buyer i is currently consuming from. Let R
denote the remaining set of buyers to be considered by the algorithm.
1. Initialize pij = 0 and Ci = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , Li. Set R = N .
2. While R 6= ∅:
(a) Create an instance of the packing subproblem as follows. Fixed a subset of buyers S, let l
be the least common multiple of all denominators of pij where pij > 0. (l = 1 if all pij = 0.)
For some c ∈ N, we create cl copies of each seller in
{s ∈ Aij for some i ∈ S, j = 1, . . . , Ci or i 6∈ S, j = 1, . . . , Ci − 1 if Ci > 1},
and pijcl copies of buyer i each of whom finds only sellers in Aij acceptable for every j < Ci
and i = 1, . . . , n. For every i ∈ S, let mi,Ci ≥ 0 be the number of copies of buyers i each
finding only sellers in Ai,Ci acceptable. We require mi,Ci to satisfy the following condition





pi′jcl +mi′,Ci′ = M (4.4)
We define the score S(S,OS , P ) = maxmi,Ci ,i∈S
M
cl , for all parameters mi,Ci ’s, c that satisfies
(4.4) and for which the duplicated packing problem has a feasible solution.28
(b) Find S∗ ∈ arg minS(S,OS , P ) over all S ⊆ R. Each buyer in i ∈ S∗ is matched to a
seller in Ai,Ci with probability S(S∗, OS∗ , P )−
∑
j<Ci
pij . The distribution over packings is
determined by the duplication subproblem that yields S(S∗, OS∗ , P ).
(c) If S(S∗, OS∗ , P ) < 1, then for every i ∈ S∗, set Ci = Ci + 1 if Ci < Li. Otherwise, remove i
from R. If S(S∗, OS∗ , P ) = 1, then remove sellers S∗ from R. Ci stays the same for every
i ∈ R\S∗.
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3. Return the probability allocation matrix P .
Next, we show that the GPS mechanism indeed computes a leximin random allocation. This
establishes the equivalence between the GPS mechanism and the generalized leximin mechanism for
general preferences.
Lemma 4.2. Let St and Pt be the bottleneck set of buyer preference indifference class pairs in iter-
ation t and probabilistic assignments matrix at the end of iteration t respectively. Then the sequence
S(St, OSt , Pt−1) is non-decreasing with respect to t.
Proof. It suffices to show that S(St, OSt , Pt−1) ≤ S(St+1, OSt+1 , Pt). Since St minimizes the value of
S(S,OS , Pt−1) as a function of S, it must be the case that S(St∪St+1, OSt∪St+1 , Pt−1) ≥ S(St, OSt , Pt−1).
Consequently, there is a distribution over packings that ensures every buyer in St ∪ St+1 is matched
to one of the sellers the preference indifference class that she is currently consuming or better with
probability at least S(St, OSt , Pt−1). This implies that buyers in St+1 can be matched to one of the
sellers from her current preference indifference class with probability at least S(St, OSt , Pt−1) while
giving the same guarantees to buyers in St. Then it must be the case that
S(St+1, OSt+1 , Pt) ≥ S(St, OSt , Pt−1),
as desired.
Theorem 4.1. The GPS mechanism computes a leximin probabilistic allocation for full preference
domain.
Proof. Let vP be the vector of probability partial sums (
∑
j∈Til pij)il computed by the PS mechanism.
We inductively show that vP is lexicographically identical to the leximin vector u entry by entry. Given
a vector of probability partial sums v, let vil be the probability that buyer i will be assigned to a seller
from one of her top l preference indifference classes computed by the PS mechanism, and let v(j) denote
the j-th smallest entry of the vector v.
Base case: the probabilistic assignment computed by PS is a feasible assignment. Hence, the value
of a minimum element is at most the value of a minimum element of the leximin probability vector, or
vP(1) ≤ u(1). On the other hand, look at S1, the subset of buyers who received the minimum probabilistic
assignment in P from their current indifference class, note that this corresponds to the subset of buyer
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preference indifference class pairs who received an assignment in the first iteration of PS by Lemma
4.2. The PS mechanism maximizes their average probabilistic allocation for being assigned to a seller
from their top preference indifference class of sellers among all feasible random allocations, which is no
worse than the minimum probabilistic assignment for the top preference indifference class received by
the buyers in S1 in any feasible random allocation. Let i ∈ S1 be an buyer who receives the minimum
probabilistic allocation from her top preference indifference class amongst all buyers in S1 with respect
to u, then we have that p(1) ≥ ui1 ≥ u(1). Hence, it is the case that vP(1) = u(1). Moreover, we
can assume without lost of generality that p(1) and u(1) correspond to the utility of the same buyer
preference indifference class pair, namely buyer (i, 1).
Now, conditioning on the fact that the first k minimum probabilistic entries of p and u agree,
we will show that the (k + 1)-st entry also agrees. Again, since p corresponds to a feasible random
assignment, and the k smallest entries of p and u agree, it must be the case that p(k+1) ≤ u(k+1).
To show that p(k+1) ≥ u(k+1), we will assume from the inductive hypothesis that the subset of buyer
preference indifference class pairs corresponding to the k minimum probabilities are the same in both p
and u. Note that if we continue the PS mechanism upon fixing the allocation of the buyers who received
the k smallest probabilistic assignments, then we would have the identical probabilistic allocation for
all buyers as the one we get starting from scratch.29 Let SR1 be the first bottleneck set computed
amongst the remaining buyers R given the allocation for the k minimum probability buyer preference
indifference class pairs. By the previous observation and Lemma 4.2, every buyer in SR1 is assigned
to a seller from the preference indifference class that the buyer is currently consuming from or better
with probability p(k+1). Note that the minimum probabilistic allocation of the buyer in S
R
1 for a seller
from the preference indifference class that the buyer is currently consuming from or better given by u
is no better than the one computed by PS, since PS maximizes their allocations over all assignments
that share the k smallest entries with that of PS. We will refer to this buyer as i. Hence, we get that
p(k+1) ≥ ui,Ci ≥ u(k+1). Moreover, together with the inductive hypothesis, we have shown that the
same subset of buyer preference indifference class pairs are assigned the k + 1 minimum probabilities
in both p and u.
29Subject to the appropriate tie breaking rule.
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Now that we have established the equivalence between the GPS mechanism and the generalized
leximin mechanism, we will use the terms “GPS mechanism” and “generalized leximin mechanism” in-
terchangeably throughout the remainder of the chapter. Bogomolnaia first established this equivalence
in the UDC special case in [27]. One can view Theorem 4.1 as a generalization of her result. Note
that the leximin allocation sequentially maximizes minimum entry of a probabilistic allocation vector,
whereas the GPS mechanism iteratively identifies a subset of agents who maximum possible allocation
is minimized. Hence, one can view our result as establishing the equivalence between a max min and
a min max allocation problem.
4.4 Properties of the Generalized Leximin Mechanism
Kurokawa et al. [81] showed that the leximin mechanism satisfies satisfies envy-freeness, proportional-
ity, Pareto optimality, and weak group strategyproofness in the dichotomous setting. The generalized
leximin mechanism is not strategyproof in the general preference domain as it coincides with the PS
mechanism in the UDC special case. Even for the special case, it is shown in [29] that the PS mech-
anism is not weakly strategyproof. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that the leximin allocation is not
envy free for the general preference domain. On the other hand, we show that the leximin allocation
satisfies ordinal efficiency (an extension of Pareto optimality) in the general preference domain, and
proportionality in the dichotomous preference domain (note that our definition of proportionality is
stronger than that of [81]. We conjecture that proportionality is satisfied by the leximin allocation in
the general preference domain as well.
Proposition 4.2. The leximin allocation is not envy-free.
Proof. Consider the following instance instance with 4 buyers (1, 2, 3, 4) and 2 sellers (a, b), with buyer
demand quantities being
d1 = 3, d2 = d3 = d4 = 2,
and seller supply quantities being
sa = 4, sb = 3.
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Buyer preferences are as follows:
1 : a
2 : a, b
3 : b, a
4 : b






The distribution over packings for the above assignment is as follows.
1− a, 3− b w.p. 1/4
1− a, 4− b w.p. 1/4
2− a, 3− b w.p. 1/4
2− a, 3− a, 4− b w.p. 1/4
Buyer 2, who is assigned to only seller a with probability 1/2, will envy the allocation of buyer 3.
The main reason that buyer 3 receives a better probabilistic assignment than buyer 2 is that seller a,
who is buyer 3’s second most preferred choice, can serve buyers 2 and 3 simultaneously. On the contrary,
seller b, who is buyer 2’s second most preferred choice, cannot serve buyers 2 and 3 simultaneously.
Next, we show that leximin allocation is proportional in the dichotomous preference domain.
Proposition 4.3. A leximin allocation is proportional when agents have dichotomous preferences.
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Proof. Let A be a leximin assignment. Let vA denote the agent to acceptable resource assignment
probability vector corresponding to A. let p1 < p2 < . . . < pk be distinct entry values of vA. Define
the j-th bottleneck set Bj to be the set of agents who receives an acceptable resource with probability
pj for j = 1, . . . , k. Note that the bottleneck sets form a partition of the set of agents. Consider the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let Rj denote the set of resources that are desired by an agent in one of the first j
bottleneck sets. Let Di be the set of resources that agent i finds acceptable. For any set of resources R,
let AjR be the set of agents from the first j bottleneck sets who desires some resource from R. Then we
have that for any j such that |AjDi | ≥ 1,
pj ≥ min





To see that this lemma implies proportionality. Let ADi be the set of agents who find some resource
in Di acceptable. Let k
i be the bottleneck set that the agent i belongs to. Applying this lemma with
j = ji (note that i ∈ AjiDi , so |A
j
Di
| ≥ 1), we get
pji ≥ min















The equality holds because Di ⊆ Rji , and the second inequality holds because Aj
i
Di
⊆ ADi . Pro-
portionality follows immediately as agent i belongs to the bottleneck set Bji . Now we prove the
lemma.
Proof. We show this via induction on the bottleneck set starting from the first j. From the inductive
hypothesis, we have that






We will assume from now on that
|Di∩Rj−1|
|Aj−1Di |



















Note that Rj\Rj−1 are resources desired only by agents in bottleneck set Bj out of all agents in
the first j bottleneck sets, and AjDi\A
j−1
Di
are the set of agents in Bj who desire some resource in Di.
Consequently, we deduce that AjDi∩(Rj\Rj−1) ⊆ A
j
Di
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. To do so, we will identify a special set of resources R̃ ⊆ Di ∩ (Rj\Rj−1) (to be defined
later). For agents in ∪jj′=1Bj′\A
j
R̃
, we fix their allocation to be the one given by a leximin allocation
A. For agents in Aj
R̃
, we will produce a distribution over matchings such that each of them receives





using only resources in R̃. The agents from all
remaining bottleneck sets will receive no resource. Call the distribution over packings that we find A′.
Then it must be the case that pj ≥ |Di∩(Rj\Rj−1)||Aj
Di∩(Rj\Rj−1)
|
. Otherwise, vA′ entry-wise dominates vA for every
agent in the first j bottleneck sets and strictly dominates vA for agents in A
j
R̃
. Then the distribution
over packing εA′ + (1− ε)A would lexicographically dominate A for ε sufficiently small.
The following lemma formally defines R̃ and demonstrates its existence. Let R(A,R) denote the
set of resources some agent in A desires among the resources in R. Since we will only use the term
R(A,Di ∩ (Rj\Rj−1)) for some A ⊆ AjDi∩(Rj\Rj−1)) in the lemma and its proof, we use R(A) to denote
R(A,Di ∩ (Rj\Rj−1)) from now on for simplicity.






Lemma 4.4 along with the generalized Hall’s marriage theorem imply that there exists a distribution





. The generalized Hall’s marriage theorem can be shown via a direct application of the
max-flow min cut theorem.
We now describe the procedure for obtaining R̃:
1. Initialize R = Di ∩ (Rj\Rj−1).
2. If AjR = minA⊆AjR
|R(A)|
|A| , then stop and set R̃ = R. Otherwise, select a set R(A
∗), where A∗ is a
maximal subset in arg min
A⊆AjR
|R(A)|
|A| , set R = R\R(A∗t ) for the next iteration and repeat.
Let Rt and A
∗
t be the set R and A
∗ in iteration t of the above procedure respectively. Note that for any
t, we can write |Rt|
|AjRt |
























. Moreover, note that AjRt+1 ⊆ A
j
Rt
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Proposition 4.4. A leximin allocation is ordinally efficient.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition. Given a leximin allocation and its probabilistic as-
signment matrix P , if there exists another feasible random allocation whose probabilistic assignment
matrix Q stochastically dominates P , then the corresponding vector vQ would also entry-wise weakly
dominate vQ and strictly dominate vQ in at least one entry, which leads to a contradiction.
4.5 Discussion
We showed that the positive results of [81] for the leximin mechanism in the dichotomous preference
domain does not carry over to the full preference domain. In particular, the leximin mechanism is no
longer envy-free or strategyproof. Numerous impossibility results (see e.g. Chapter 2 of this thesis,
[29, 76, 11]) have shown incompatibility between strategyproofness and various efficiency and fairness
notions on different preference domains in the UDC setting. Nonetheless, even setting strategyproofness
aside, our work opens up the question whether an envy-free, proportional, and ordinally efficiency
mechanism exists in this setting.
The computational complexity of the GPS mechanism is another direction that can be explored. For
the UDC setting, Katta and Sethuraman [76] showed that the bottleneck set of agents in each iteration
can be identified by solving a parametric network flow problem. On the other hand, Kurokawa [81]
showed that computing a leximin allocation in our setting is NP-hard. Hence, we cannot hope for a
polynomial time implementation of the GPS mechanism unless P = NP. Nonetheless, in the current
specification of the GPS mechanism, the packing subproblem in Section 4.3 (which is already difficult)
is computed for every subset of agents S. Perhaps one can compute the bottleneck agent set via a
single optimization problem and reduce the computational complexity as a result.
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Chapter 5
Approximately Optimal Mechanisms
for Strategyproof Facility Location:
Minimizing Lp Norm of Costs
Joint work with Itai Feigenbaum.
5.1 Introduction
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of n
agents, each of whom is located somewhere on the line as well. Each agent cares about his distance
to the facility, and incurs a disutility (equivalently, cost) that is equal to his distance to access the
facility. An agent’s location is assumed to be private information that is known only to him. Agents
report their locations to a central planner who decides where to locate the facility based on the reports
of the agents. The planner’s objective is to minimize a “social” cost function that depends on the
vector of distances that the agents need to travel to access the facility. It is natural for the planner
to consider locating the facility at a point that minimizes her objective function, but in that case the
agents may not have an incentive to report their locations truthfully. As an example, consider the case
of 2 agents located at x1 and x2 respectively, and suppose the location that optimizes the planner’s
objective is the mid-point (x1 + x2)/2. Then, assuming x1 < x2, agent 1 has an incentive to report a
location x′1 < x1 so that the planner’s decision results in the facility being located closer to his true
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location. The planner can address this issue by restricting herself to a strategyproof mechanism: by
this we mean that it should be a (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent to report his location
truthfully to the central planner. For instance, the planner could always locate the facility at agent 1’s
reported location, which is strategyproof. Even though strategyproofness is an attractive property, but
it comes at a cost: based on the earlier example, it is clear that the planner cannot hope to optimize
her objective. One way to avoid this difficulty is to assume an environment in which agents (and the
planner) can make or receive payments; in such a case, the planner selects the location of the facility,
and also a payment scheme, which specifies the amount of money an agent pays (or receives) as a
function of the reported locations of the agents as well as the location of the facility. This option gives
the planner the ability to support the “optimal” solution as the outcome of a strategyproof mechanism
by constructing a carefully designed payment scheme in which any potential benefit for a misreporting
agent from a change in the location of the facility is offset by an increase in his payment.
There are many settings, however, in which such monetary compensations are either not possible
or are undesirable. This motivated Procaccia and Tennenholtz [98] to formulate the notion of Approx-
imate Mechanism Design without Money. In this model the planner restricts herself to strategyproof
mechanisms, but is willing to settle for one that does not necessarily optimize her objective. Instead,
the planner’s goal is to find a mechanism that effectively approximates her objective function. This
is captured by the standard notion of approximation that is widely used in the CS literature: for a
minimization problem, an algorithm is an α-approximation if the solution it finds is guaranteed to have
cost at most α times that of the optimal cost (α ≥ 1).
Procaccia and Tennenholtz [98] apply the notion of approximate mechanism design without money
to the facility location problem considered here for two different objectives: (i) minisum, where the
goal is to minimize the sum of the costs of the agents; and (ii) minimax, where the goal is to minimize
the maximum agent cost. They show that for the minimax objective choosing any k-th median—
picking the kth largest reported location—is a strategyproof, 2-approximate mechanism. They design
a randomized mechanism called LRM (Left-Right-Middle) and show that it is a strategyproof, 3/2-
approximate mechanism; furthermore, they show that those mechanisms provide the optimal worst-
case approximation ratio possible (among all deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms,
respectively). For the minisum objective, it is known that choosing the median reported location is
optimal and strategyproof, see [90]. Feldman and Wilf [60] consider the same facility location problem
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on a line but with the social cost function being the L2 norm of the agents’ costs (Feldman and Wilf
actually used the sum of squares of the agents’ costs, however most of their results can be easily
converted to the L2 norm. Of course, the approximation ratios they report need to be adjusted as
well). They show that the median is a
√
2-approximate strategyproof mechanism for this objective
function, and provide a randomized (1 +
√
2)/2-approximate strategyproof mechanism. Feldman and
Wilf also generalize the median mechanism to maintain strategyproofness and a
√
2 approximation
ratio on trees; furthermore, they provide a family of randomized strategyproof mechanisms for trees,
and in particular show that a member of this family reduces the approximation ratio to strictly below
√
2. A general survey of approximate mechanism design without money for facility location problems
has been written by [45].
Aside from the recent literature on approximate mechanism design, our work is loosely related to
other strands in the literature with a much longer history. First is the classical work on social choice,
which deals with the aggregating the preferences of a set of voters over a set of alternatives, see e.g.
[92]. The location problem we consider is a special case in which the alternatives are all possible points
on the real line (the location of the facility), and agents have single-peaked preferences. An important
difference, however, is the following: a typical social choice problem is to find an aggregation rule
satisfying a desired set of properties, whereas in our case the planner wishes to optimize or approximate
a given social objective function. Nevertheless, various techniques and results from this literature
are useful in our setting as well. An important result along these lines is [90]’s characterization
of strategyproof mechanisms on the line. A parallel characterization result was developed by [109]
for general graphs. In both these papers, much like in this chapter, generalized medians play an
important role; also, despite not having a specific objective function, these characterizations assume
less specific efficiency related properties, such as Pareto efficiency and onto range. Additional papers
along these lines are [20, 50]. It is important to note that impossibility results abound in social choice
models—our focus on the simple special case enables us to avoid impossibility results such as the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (see [68, 106]), which implies the non-existence of a reasonable social
choice function. Second is the classical work in operations research on graphical location problems
that considers locating the facility at a Condorcet point (see e.g. [69, 82, 15, 16]). (A Condorcet
point is one that is preferred by a majority of agents to any other location.) This literature seeks
to establish bounds on the total cost to all the agents to access the facility divided by the minimum
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cost, with the understanding that smaller ratios are better. However, this literature does not model
individual agent incentives, and moreover does not also explore other mechanisms. Finally, there is a
rich literature on facility location problems and variations (such as the k-median and k-center problems)
where agent incentives are not taken into account. In such problems, there is typically a single objective
function (the planner’s), and agent locations are known. In this literature, one resorts to approximation
algorithms for a different reason—often, these optimization problems turn out to be computationally
intractable, and the focus is on developing computationally efficient heuristics for which a worst-case
approximation guarantee can be proved (see [128], and chapters 25-26 of [125]). To our knowledge, most
of the algorithms designed in this literature violate our (rather strong) strategyproofness requirements.
In addition, some consideration has been given in literature to the circle topology, by [5, 6]. It is
important to note that while the idea of using approximate mechanisms to induce strategyproofness
was first proposed in 2009, the problem of finding strategyproof mechanisms has received attention
beforehand. Those papers allow much more generality in the preferences of the agents, but typically
do not have a specific objective function to optimize, and thus approximation is not of relevance there.
In this chapter, we follow the suggestion of Feldman and Wilf [60] and study the problem of locating
a single facility on a line, but with the objective function being the Lp norm of the vector of agent-costs
(for general p ≥ 1). In the context of real world facility location problems, where the agents must drive
to and from the facility, the Lp norm can represent situations where travel time or other cost increases
superlinearly with the distance (as suggested in [35]). For example, when driving over larger distances,
there is an increased likelihood (depending on traffic) of the need to stop and refuel, or, in the case
of electric cars, stop and recharge–which is even more costly since such recharging can be done at
home, without wasting the driver’s time. As another example, certain hybrid cars increase their fuel
consumption in longer drives— which is relevant if the cost represents fuel consumption rather than
travel time. For such problems, our results provide strong lower bounds, robust to the topology of the
road network (since they only require a line) and the value of p. We also hope that our results regarding
the median will guide the construction of good mechanisms for more general topologies, similarly to
the case of p = 2 in [60], where the optimality of the median on the line inspires the construction of
a mechanism for tree networks using the appropriate adaptation of the median. Another use of the
Lp norm is to strike a balance between efficiency and fairness. The cases of p = 1 and p = ∞, which
were both studied in [98], can be viewed as representing the two extremes on the spectrum between
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maximizing efficiency (minimizing the total social cost) and maximizing fairness (minimizing the cost
of the agent who is worst off). Thus, our definition of social cost allows for a controlled tradeoff between
efficiency and fairness by varying the value of p. On the line, this interpretation of the Lp norm becomes
particularly interesting in the context of voting. Public opinion on many issues is considered to be on a
spectrum between political left and right, lending itself naturally to a one dimensional description. One
of the common problems in democratic societies is to balance between majority rule and respecting
minority rights; thus, the Lp measure allows for a quantitative exploration of this balance. Of course,
this interpretation of the Lp norm can be relevant to physical facility location problems as well.
We define the problem formally in section 2. In section 3, we show that the median mechanism
(which is strategyproof) provides a 2
1− 1
p approximation ratio, and that this is the optimal approxima-
tion ratio among all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We move onto randomized mechanisms
in section 4. First, we present a negative result: we show that for integer ∞ > p > 2, no mechanism—
from a rather large class of randomized mechanisms— has an approximation ratio better than that
of the median mechanism, as the number of agents goes to infinity. It is worth noting that all the
mechanisms proposed in literature so far— for minimax, minisum, and the L2 social cost functions—
belong to this class of mechanisms. Next, we consider the case of 2 agents, and show that the LRM
mechanism provides the optimal approximation ratio among all randomized strategyproof mechanisms
(that satisfy certain mild assumptions) for this special case, for every p ≥ 1. Our result for the special
case of 2 agents also gives a lower bound on the approximation ratio for all randomized mechanisms.
We briefly discuss some directions for further research in section 5. In Appendix B we discuss some
technical details omitted from the chapter, as well as an additional negative result for an alternative
definition of the agents’ cost.
5.2 Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be the set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N reports a location xi ∈ R. A
deterministic mechanism is a collection of functions f = {fn| n ∈ N, n ≥ 2} such that each fn : Rn → R
maps each location profile x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to the location of a facility. We will abuse notation and
let f(x) denote fn(x). Under a similar notational abuse, a randomized mechanism is a collection of
functions f that maps each location profile to a probability distribution over R: if f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is
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the distribution π, then the facility is located by drawing a single sample from π.
Our focus will be on deterministic and randomized mechanisms for the problem of locating a single
facility when the location of any agent is private information to that agent and cannot be observed or
otherwise verified. It is therefore critical that the mechanism be strategyproof—it should be optimal
for each agent i to report his true location xi rather than something else. To that end we assume that
if the facility is located at y, an agent’s disutility, equivalently cost, is simply his distance to y. Thus,
an agent whose true location is xi incurs a cost C(xi, y) = |xi − y|. If the location of the facility is
random and according to a distribution π, then the cost of agent i is simply C(xi, π) = Ey∼π|xi − y|,
where y is a random variable with distribution π. The formal definition of strategyproofness is now:30
Definition 5.1. A mechanism f is strategyproof if for each i ∈ N , each xi, x′i ∈ R, and for each
x−i = (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . xn) ∈ Rn−1,
C(xi, f(xi,x−i)) ≤ C(xi, f(x′i,x−i)),
where (α,x−i) denotes a vector with the i-th component being α and the j-th component being xj for
all j 6= i.
The class of strategyproof mechanisms is quite large: for example, locating the facility at agent
1’s reported location is strategyproof, but is not particularly appealing because it fails almost every
reasonable notion of fairness and could also be highly “inefficient”. To address these issues, and to
winnow down the class of acceptable mechanisms, we impose additional requirements that stem from
efficiency or fairness considerations. In this chapter we assume that locating a facility at y when the






, p ≥ 1,
which one can viewed as the Lp norm of the individual cost vector. For a randomized mechanism f
that maps x to a distribution π, we define the social cost to be31






30Note that for randomized mechanisms, we require strategyproofness in expectation, rather than ex-post.
31For this definition of social cost, an alternative option is to let the agents’ costs increase non-linearly with their
distance from the facility, in particular C(xi, y) = |xi − y|p. In Appendix B we provide an interesting result for this case.
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For this definition of social cost, our goal now is to find a strategyproof mechanism that does
well with respect to minimizing the social cost. A natural mechanism (and this is the approach
taken in the classical literature on facility location) is the “optimal” mechanism: each location profile
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is mapped to OPT (x), defined as OPT (x) ∈ arg miny∈R sc(x, y).32 This optimal
mechanism is not strategyproof as shown in the following example.
Example. Suppose there are two agents located at the points 0 and 1 respectively on the real line.
If they report their locations truthfully, the optimal mechanism will locate the facility at y = 0.5, for
any p > 1. Assuming agent 2 reports x2 = 1, if agent 1 reports x
′
1 = −1 instead, the facility will be
located at 0, which is best for agent 1.
Given that strategyproofness and optimality cannot be achieved simultaneously, it is necessary
to find a tradeoff. In this chapter we shall restrict ourselves to strategyproof mechanisms that ap-
proximate the optimal social cost as best as possible. The notion of approximation that we use is
standard in computer science: an α-approximation algorithm is one that is guaranteed to have cost
no more than α times the optimal social cost. Formally, the approximation ratio of an algorithm A is
supI{A(I)/OPT (I)}, where the supremum is taken over all possible instances I of the problem, and
A(I) and OPT (I) are, respectively, the costs incurred by algorithm A and the optimal algorithm on
the instance I.33 Our goal then is to design strategyproof (deterministic or randomized) mechanisms
whose approximation ratio is as close to 1 as possible.
5.3 The Median Mechanism
For the location profile x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), the median mechanism is a deterministic mechanism that
locates the facility at the “median” of the reported locations. The median is unique if n is odd, but not
when n is even, so we need to be more specific in describing the mechanism. For odd n, say n = 2k−1
for some k ≥ 1, the facility is located at x[k], where x[k] is the kth largest component of the location
32Strictly speaking, the mechanism is not well defined in cases where the social cost at x is minimized by multiple
locations, but we could pick an exogenous tie-braking rule to deal with such cases.
33For the case of randomized mechanisms, it should be noted that this is the approximation ratio is in expectation
rather than with high probability.
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profile. For even n, say n = 2k, the “median” can be any point in the interval [x[k], x[k+1]]; to ensure
strategyproofness, we need to pick either x[k] or x[k+1], and as a matter of convention we take the
median to be x[k]. It is well known that the median mechanism is strategyproof.
34 Furthermore, the
median mechanism is anonymous.35 Thus we may assume, without loss of generality, that each agent
reports her location truthfully.
Our main result in this section is that, for any p ≥ 1, the median mechanism uniformly achieves the
best possible approximation ratio among all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We start with
two simple observations, which will be used in the proof of this main result.
Lemma 5.1. For any real numbers a, b, c with a ≤ b ≤ c, and any p ≥ 1,
(c− a)p ≤ 2p−1[(c− b)p + (b− a)p].
Proof. For any p ≥ 1, f(x) = xp is a convex function on [0,∞), and so for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ≥ 0,
f(λx+ (1− λ)y)) ≤ λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y). (5.1)
Setting λ = 1/2, x = c− b, and y = b− a, we get:
1
2p
(c− a)p ≤ 1
2
[(c− b)p + (b− a)p]. (5.2)
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by 2p gives the result.
Lemma 5.2. For any non-negative real numbers a and b, and any p ≥ 1,
(a+ b)p ≥ ap + bp.
Proof. For integer p, the result is a direct consequence of the binomial theorem; the same argument
covers the case of rational p as well. Continuity implies the result for all p.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose there are n agents with the location profile x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Define the
social cost of locating a facility at y as (
∑n
i=1 |y − xi|p)
1
p for p ≥ 1. The social cost incurred by the
median mechanism is at most 2
1− 1
p times the optimal social cost.36
34A classical paper of [90] for a closely related model shows that all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms are essen-
tially generalized median mechanisms.
35In an anonymous mechanism, the facility location is the same for two location profiles that are permutations of each
other.
36This is a generalization of the results for p = 2 [60], p = 1 and p = ∞ [98] (when p = ∞, the median mechanism
provides a 2-approximation).
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Proof. We may assume that x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn. Let OPT be a facility location that minimizes the social
cost, and let m be the median. The inequality we need to prove is
n∑
i=1




We do this by pairing each location xi with its “symmetric” location xn+1−i and arguing that the total
cost of these two locations in the median mechanism is within the required bound of their total cost
in an optimal solution. For even n, this completes the argument; for odd n the only location without
such a pair is the median itself, which incurs zero cost in the median mechanism, and so the argument
is complete. Formally, the result follows if we can show
|m− xi|p + |xn+1−i −m|p ≤ 2p−1(|OPT − xi|p + |OPT − xn+1−i|p), ∀ i ≤ bn/2c.
We consider two cases, depending on whether OPT is in the interval [xi, xn+1−i] or not. In each of
these cases, OPT may be above the median or below, but the proof remains identical in each subcase,
so we give only one.
1. xi ≤ m ≤ OPT ≤ xn+1−i or xi ≤ OPT ≤ m ≤ xn+1−i. We will prove the first of these subcases;
the proof of the second is identical. Applying Lemma 5.1 by setting a = m, b = OPT , and
c = xn+1−i, we get
|xn+1−i −m|p ≤ 2p−1(|xn+1−i −OPT |p + |OPT −m|p).
Thus,
|m− xi|p + |xn+1−i −m|p ≤ |m− xi|p + 2p−1(|xn+1−i −OPT |p + |OPT −m|p)
≤ 2p−1(|m− xi|p + |xn+1−i −OPT |p + |OPT −m|p)
≤ 2p−1(|xn+1−i −OPT |p + |OPT − xi|p),
where the last inequality is obtained by applying Lemma 5.2 to the terms |m−xi|p and |OPT −
m|p.
2. OPT ≤ xi ≤ m ≤ xn+1−i or xi ≤ m ≤ xn+1−i ≤ OPT . Again, we prove only the first subcase.
Note that
|xn+1−i −m|p + |m− xi|p ≤ |xn+1−i − xi|p
≤ |OPT − xn+1−i|p
≤ 2p−1(|OPT − xi|p + |OPT − xn+1−i|p)
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where the first inequality follows from Lemma 5.2. (Note that Lemma 5.1 is not used in the proof
of this case.)
We end this section by showing that no deterministic and strategyproof mechanism can give a
better approximation to the social cost.
Lemma 5.3. Consider the case of two agents and suppose the location profile is (x1, x2) with x1 < x2.
For p ≥ 1, suppose the social cost of locating a facility at y is (|x1−y|p+|x2−y|p)1/p. Any deterministic
mechanism whose approximation ratio is better than 2
1− 1
p for p > 1 must locate the facility at y for
some y ∈ (x1, x2).37
Proof. The function sc(x, y) is strictly convex in y, and its unique minimizer is y∗ = (x1 + x2)/2, with
the corresponding value sc(x, y∗) = |x2 − x1|/21−
1
p . Moreover sc(x, x1) = sc(x, x2) = |x2 − x1| =
2
1− 1
p sc(x, y∗). It follows that for the deterministic mechanism to do strictly better than the stated
ratio, the facility cannot be located at the reported locations; locating the facility to the left of x1 or
to the right of x2 only increases the cost of the mechanism, so the only option left for a mechanism to
do better is to locate the facility in the interior, i.e., in (x1, x2).
Theorem 5.2. Any strategyproof deterministic mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 2
1− 1
p
for the Lp social cost function for any p ≥ 1.38
Proof. Using Lemma 5.3, we can now argue similarly to the case of p = ∞ (Theorem 3.2 in [98]).39
Suppose p > 1 (the bound holds trivially for p = 1), and suppose a deterministic strategyproof
mechanism yields an approximation ratio strictly better than 2
1− 1
p for the Lp social cost. For the
two-agent location profile x1 = 0, x2 = 1, Lemma 5.3 implies the facility is located at some y ∈ (0, 1).
Now consider the location profile x1 = 0, x2 = y. Again, by Lemma 5.3, the mechanism must locate
the facility at y′ ∈ (0, y) to guarantee the improved approximation. But if agent 2 is located at y < 1,
he can misreport his location as 1, forcing the mechanism to locate the facility at y, his true location;
this violates strategyproofness.
37Ex-post Pareto efficiency (as defined in section 4.2) requires the facility to be located in [x1, x2]; thus, this property
is stronger.
38The lower bound of 2 on the approximation ratio holds when p =∞, see [98].
39Another argument along this line can be found in the proof of Theorem 4.4 in [60].
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5.4 Randomized Mechanisms
Recall that when the social cost is measured by the L2 norm or the L∞ norm, randomization provably
improves the approximation ratio. In the former case, Feldman and Wilf [60] describe an algorithm
whose approximation ratio is (
√
2 + 1)/2; for the latter, Procaccia and Tennenholtz [98] design an
algorithm with an approximation ratio of 3/2. The mechanisms in both cases are simple and some-
what similar, placing non-negative probabilities only on the optimal location and generalized medians
(defined shortly), where these probabilities are independent of the reported location profile. In this
section we show that this is not enough in general; namely, randomizing over generalized medians
and the optimal location does not improve the approximation ratio of the median mechanism for any
integer p ∈ (2,∞). For the case of 2 agents we show that the best approximation ratio is given by the
LRM mechanism among all strategyproof mechanisms. Extending this analysis even to the case of 3
agents appears to be non-trivial.
5.4.1 Mixing Dictatorships and Generalized Medians with the Optimal Location
We begin with a definition of generalized medians.
Definition 5.2. Let x ∈ Rn, S ⊆ N , and m ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}. Let S = {s1, . . . , s|S|}, where xsi ≤ xsi+1.
Then, the mth generalized median of subset S in location profile x is x[m,S] = xsm.
40 If S = N , we
allow for the shorthand x[m] = x[m,N ].
Next, we define the class of mechanisms currently used in literature:
Definition 5.3. Let f be a mechanism which satisfied the following. For every n ∈ N, S ⊆ N , m ∈





such that for every profile (x1, x2, . . . , xn), f locates the facility at OPT with probability v
n
OPT and at
x[m,S] with probability v
Sn
m (where OPT is the optimal location for the profile (x1, x2, . . . , xn)).
41 If f
satisfies these properties, we say that f is a Mixed Generalized Medians Optimal (MGMO) mechanism.
We now show that for integer p > 2, MGMO mechanisms cannot beat the median.
40That is, x[m,S] is the mth largest location among the locations of the agents in S, allowing for repetition.
41When a location appears more than once in OPT and x[m,S] for S ⊆ N and m ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}, the probabilities add
up.
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Theorem 5.3. Let f be a strategyproof MGMO mechanism. Then, for any finite integer p > 2, the
approximation ratio of f is at least 2
1− 1
p .
Proof. Fix n = 2k, with k ∈ N. In all profiles in our proof, the relative order of agents locations
remains the same: specifically, i < j implies xi ≤ xj for all of our profiles x. For every S ⊆ N , and
every j ∈ S let S(j) be the number of agents with index weakly smaller than j in S (for example,
if S = {2, 4, 9}, then S(2) = 1, S(4) = 2, and S(9) = 3). On our profiles, the probability that the





For j = 1, . . . , k, define the profile xj as follows (where aj is a parameter to be defined shortly):
agents 1 through j are located at −aj ; agents j + 1 through k are located at 0; agents k + 1 through
2k−j+1 are located at 1; and agents 2k−j+2 through 2k are located at 1+aj (note the slight asymmetry
in the location of the agents: while k agents are at or below zero, and k agents are at or above 1, there
is an additional agent at 1 compared to zero and so one less agent at 1+aj compared to −aj). Now, aj
is chosen to be the smallest positive root of the function gj(α) = jα
p−1− (k−j+1)− (j−1)(1+α)p−1;
such an aj must exist by the intermediate value theorem, as gj(0) < 0 and gj(α) is a continuous
function of α with gj(α)→∞ as α→∞.
We show that the optimal mechanism locates the facility at zero for the profile xj , i.e., OPT = 0.
Note that the social cost for this profile, when locating the facility at z ∈ [0, 1], is j(z + aj)p + (k −
j)zp + (k − j + 1)(1 − z)p + (j − 1)(1 + aj − z)p, and when z ∈ (−aj , 0) the social cost becomes
j(z + aj)
p + (k − j)(−z)p + (k − j + 1)(1 − z)p + (j − 1)(1 + aj − z)p. Note that the social cost
function is differentiable for z ∈ (0, 1) and for z ∈ (−aj , 0). The left and right derivatives at 0 are both
pjap−1j −p(k− j+1)−p(j−1)(1+aj)p−1, and thus the social cost function is differentiable on (−aj , 1)
with its derivative at z = 0 equal to zero (by our choice of aj). The fact that this is a global minimum
now follows from strict convexity of the social cost function ||xj − z(1, . . . , 1)||p (for all z ∈ R). Thus,
indeed, OPT = 0.
We now attempt to bound vOPT . For each profile x
j , consider the profile x′j that differs only
in the location of agent j: namely, x′jj = 0 instead of −aj . Note that on this profile, OPT = 0.5
by symmetry. Strategyproofness implies that a deviation from profile x′j to profile xj should not be
beneficial for agent j, namely ajv
n
j − 12vnOPT ≥ 0 (where aj is the increase in agent j’s cost caused
by that deviation when the facility is built in his reported location, and 12 is the decrease in his cost
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for j = k + 1, . . . , 2k in a symmetric fashion, it follows that the same inequality holds for j in that


























Now, we claim it is enough to show that as n → ∞ (or equivalently, as k → ∞), ∑kj=1 1aj → ∞.
The inequality then implies that vnOPT → 0. Consider the profile which locates k agents at 0 and k
agents at 1. The social cost of locating the facility at OPT on this profile is p
√
n/2, while the social















p − 1)vnOPT . Thus, as n → ∞, the approximation
ratio on these profiles approaches 2
1− 1
p , completing the proof.





=∞ . To do so, we first show that for
j ≥ k
1
p−1 + 1, 2p−1(j − 1) > aj . Recall that aj was defined as the smallest positive root of gj(α), and
that gj(0) < 0. Thus, it is enough to show that for j in the appropriate range, gj(2
p−1(j − 1)) > 0.
For notational convenience, we denote Q = 2p−1.
gj(Q(j − 1)) = jQp−1(j − 1)p−1 − (k − j + 1)− (j − 1)(1 +Q(j − 1))p−1







































> Qp−1(j − 1)p−1 − (j − 1)(Q(j − 1))p−22p−1 = 0.
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p− 1) ln k)− 0) =∞
which completes our proof.
5.4.2 Optimality of the LRM Mechanism for 2 Agents
Procaccia and Tennenholtz [98] defined the mechanism Left-Right-Middle (LRM) as follows: place the
facility with probability 12 at OPT , and with probability
1
4 at each of x[1] and x[n]. They have shown
that it is strategyproof, and that it provides a best-possible approximation ratio of 32 when p = ∞.
Our next result shows that the LRM mechanism provides the best possible approximation ratio among
all shift and scale invariant (defined below) strategyproof mechanisms for the case of 2 agents for all
Lp social cost functions for p ≥ 1.
We begin with some definitions: we say that a mechanism f is shift and scale invariant if for every
location profile x = (x1, x2) and every c ∈ R, the following two properties are satisfied:42
1. Shift Invariance: the random variables Y ′ ∼ f(x1 + c, x2 + c) and Y + c s.t. Y ∼ f(x) are equal
in distribution.
42While these two properties are natural and reasonable to expect, it should be noted that they are not implied by
strategyproofness- one example is the constant mechanism, which always locates the facility at the same point regardless
of the reports. Requiring unanimity in addition to strategyproofness is also not sufficient to guarantee these properties;
for example, the mechanism that runs LRM if x[1] = 0, and otherwise locates the facility at x[1] and x[2] with probability
1/2 each, is easily seen to be strategyproof and unanimous but neither shift nor scale invariant.
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2. Scale Invariance: the random variables Y ′ ∼ f(cx1, cx2) and cY s.t. Y ∼ f(x) are equal in
distribution.43
A convenient notation for a given location profile x is to denote its midpoint as mx =
x1+x2
2 . We say
that a mechanism f is symmetric if for any location profile x and for any y ∈ R, P(f(x) ≥ mx + y) =
P(f(x) ≤ mx − y).
The structure of the proof is as follows. Our goal is to show that within the class of strategyproof,
shift invariant and scale invariant mechanisms, we can further limit ourselves to symmetric mechanism
that locate the facility always at the agents’ locations or the midpoint; within this further restricted
class, it becomes easy to prove that LRM is optimal. We achieve this goal gradually. First we show that
we may restrict ourselves to symmetric (and anonymous) mechanisms. We then provide a characteriza-
tion of strategyproofness for such mechanisms, and use it to show that we can further restrict ourselves
to mechanisms which, for each profile x, do not locate the facility both at (min {x1, x2},max {x1, x2})
and at (−∞,min {x1, x2}) ∪ (max {x1, x2},∞) with positive probability. We then show that we can
restrict ourselves to mechanisms that locate the facility always at the agents’ locations or the midpoint.
The following lemma allows us to focus on symmetric mechanisms.
Lemma 5.4. Given any strategyproof, shift and scale invariant mechanism, there exists a symmetric,
strategyproof, shift and scale invariant mechanism with the same worst-case approximation ratio.
Proof. Given a mechanism f , we define the mirror mechanism of f , fmirror, to be such that for every
profile x, we have that P(fmirror(x) ≥ mx + b) = P(f(x) ≤ mx − b) for all b ∈ R.44
We will need the following notation: For each profile x = (x1, x2), let Yx1,x2 ∼ f(x), and Y ′x1,x2 ∼
fmirror(x). We claim that fmirror is shift invariant, scale invariant and strategyproof (all of the equal-
ities below are in distribution):
1. Shift invariance: let c ∈ R. Then Y ′x1+c,x2+c = 2mx1+c,x2+c−Yx1+c,x2+c = 2mx +2c−Yx1,x2−c =
Y ′x1,x2 + c.
43It is possible to replace shift invariance with symmetry in our assumptions, and preserve our results; see Appendix
B.
44Equivalently, the mirror mechanism can be thought of as follows: whenever f locates the facility at y ∈ R (that is,
the single sampling of f(x) yields y), fmirror ”mirrors” that location about mx, meaning it locates the facility at 2mx−y.
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2. Scale invariance: let c ∈ R. Then Y ′cx1,cx2 = 2cmx1,x2 − Ycx1,cx2 = c(2mx1,x2 − Yx1,x2) = cY ′x1,x2 .
3. Strategyproofness: assume fmirror is not strategyproof, and assume without loss of generality
that agent 2 has a profitable misreport: there exist profiles (w1, w2) and (w1, w2 + α) for some
α ∈ R such that E[|w2 − Y ′w1,w2 |] > E[|w2 − Y ′w1,w2+α|]. However, note that w2 − Y ′w1,w2+α =
−w1−α+Yw1,w2+α = Yw1−α,w2−w1 (the second equality follows from shift invariance), and that
w2 − Y ′w1,w2 = Yw1,w2 −w1. Thus, it follows that E[|w1 − Yw1,w2 |] > E[|Yw1−α,w2 −w1|], violating
strategyproofness for f . Thus fmirror must be strategyproof.
Therefore, the mechanism g that picks f with probability 1/2 and fmirror with probability 1/2 is a
strategyproof mechanism that is also symmetric; g trivially satisfies shift and scale invariance. Finally,
note that g has the same approximation ratio as f for all location profiles, since fmirror has the same
approximation ratio as f .
Mechanisms which satisfy shift and scale invariance as well as symmetry also satisfy anonymity:
Lemma 5.5. If a mechanism f is shift invariant, scale invariant and symmetric, it is also anonymous.
Proof. Again, all equalities are in distribution. Let x be a location profile. We need to prove Yx1,x2 =
Yx2,x1 . Shift and scale invariance gives Yx2,x1 = −Yx1,x2 +x1+x2; thus, P(Yx2,x1 ≤ b) = P(x1+x2−b ≤
Yx1,x2). But P(x1 + x2 − b ≤ Yx1,x2) = P(Yx1,x2 ≤ b) by symmetry about mx, thus Yx2,x1 = Yx1,x2 .
The next lemma deals with an equivalent condition for strategyproofness for symmetric, shift and
scale invariant mechanisms.
Lemma 5.6. A symmetric, shift and scale invariant mechanism f is strategyproof if and only if for
any profile x ∈ R2 with x1 = 0 < x2, the following conditions hold:
1. −
∫
(−∞,x2) ydF (y) +
∫





(x2,∞) ydF (y) + x2P(Y = x2) ≥ 0
where Y ∼ f(x) with c.d.f. F .
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.
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Given a strategyproof, shift invariant, scale invariant and symmetric mechanism, the upcoming
results demonstrate how to find another strategyproof, shift invariant, scale invariant and symmet-
ric mechanism that restricts the probability assignment to x1, x2, and mx for every profile x and
simultaneously gives a weakly better approximation than the original mechanism.
Lemma 5.7. Let f be a strategyproof, shift invariant, scale invariant and symmetric mechanism.
There exists another strategyproof, shift invariant, scale invariant and symmetric mechanism g with a
weakly smaller expected social cost on every profile, such that at least one of the following two properties
holds:
(1) For every two-agent profile x, P(g(x) ∈ (x1, x2)) = 0 for every two-agent profile x. (Doesn’t
utilize interior)45
(2) For every two-agent profile x, P(g(x) ∈ (−∞, x1) ∪ (x2,∞)) = 0 for every two-agent profile x.
(Ex-post Pareto efficiency)
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.
Lemma 5.8. Let f be a strategyproof, shift invariant, scale invariant, symmetric mechanism. Assume
that f is either ex-post Pareto efficient or doesn’t utilize interior. Then there exists another strate-
gyproof mechanism g with a weakly smaller expected social cost on every profile, such that P(g(x) ∈
{x1, x2,mx}) = 1 for every location profile x. Furthermore, g satisfies shift invariance, scale invariance
and symmetry.
Proof. We break the proof into two cases.
1. Assume f is ex-post Pareto efficient. Let g be the mechanism that satisfies P(g(x) = x1) =
P(f(x) = x1), P(g(x) = x2) = P(f(x) = x2), P(g(x) = mx) = 1−P(g(x) = x1)−P(g(x) = x2).
Note that since mx minimizes the social cost function for the profile x, g certainly provides a
weakly better approximation ratio than f . Furthermore, symmetry, shift and scale invariance
are preserved.
Let us prove that condition 1 in Lemma 6 holds for g; the proof for condition 2 is similar. Since
f is a strategyproof mechanism, the condition implies that for any profile x = (x1, x2) with
45Note that it is possible for such a mechanism to still be ex-post Pareto efficient, if P(g(x) ∈ {x1, x2}).
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ydF (y) + x2P(f(x) = x2)
= −E[f(x)1
(
f(x) ∈ (x1, x2)
)
] + x2P(f(x) = x2)
= −mxP(f(x) ∈ (x1, x2)) + x2P(f(x) = x2)




ydG(y) + x2P(g(x) = x2).
The third equality holds because the distribution is symmetric around mx. Hence, the condition
is satisfied for the mechanism g.
2. Assume f doesn’t utilize interior. Let g be the mechanism which, for every profile x, locates
P(g(x) = x1) = P(g(x) = x2) = 0.5, which is clearly strategyproof, shift invariant, scale invari-
ant, and symmetric. sc(x, x2) minimizes sc(x, y) among y ≥ x2 and sc(x, x1) minimizes sc(x, y)
among y ≤ x1. Hence, E[sc(x, g(x))] ≤ E[sc(x, f(x))].
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 5.4. The LRM mechanism gives the best approximation ratio among all strategyproof mech-
anisms that are shift invariant, scale invariant and ex-post Pareto efficient.
Proof. By the previous lemma, it suffices to search among the class of strategyproof shift invariant,
scale invariant and symmetric mechanisms where any element f of the class satisfies the property
that P(f(x) ∈ {x1, x2,mx}) = 1 for every location profile x. Clearly, for such mechanisms, the
approximation ratio increases as P(f(x) ∈ {x1, x2}) increases. Assume P(f(x) ∈ {x1, x2}) < 0.5. Then
P(f(x) = mx) > 0.5, and by symmetry, P(f(x) = x2) < 0.25. But this gives, when x1 = 0 and x2 > 0,
that −mxP(f(x) = mx) + x2P(f(x) = x2) = −x22 P(f(x) = mx) + x2P(f(x) = x2) < 0, violating
strategyproofness by Lemma 6. Thus we must have that P(f(x) ∈ {x1, x2}) ≥ 0.5, which implies that
among all such mechanisms, LRM provides the best approximation ratio of 0.5(2
1− 1
p + 1).
An immediate consequence of Theorem 5.4 is the following corollary.
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Corollary 5.1. Any strategyproof shift and scale invariant mechanism has an approximation of at
least 0.5(2
1− 1
p + 1) in the worst case.
5.5 Discussion
The most important open question in our view is whether or not randomization can help improve the
worst-case approximation ratio for general Lp norm cost functions. The case of p = 1 is uninteresting
because there is an optimal deterministic mechanism; for p = 2 and p = ∞ we already saw that
randomization improves the worst-case approximation ratio, but we do not know if this is simply a
happy coincidence, or if one can obtain similar results for all p > 2. Our negative result in Section 4
implies that any improvement by randomization would require a different approach than the existing
mechanisms.
There are many other natural questions as well: for instance, what happens for more general topolo-
gies such as trees or cycles? Is it possible to characterize all randomized strategyproof mechanisms on
specific topologies?
Finally, we believe it is of interest to consider more general cost functions for the individual agents.
The properties established for LRM and many other randomized mechanisms depend on the assumption
that agents incur costs that are exactly equal to the distance to access the facility. Clearly, this is a
very restrictive assumption, and working with more general individual agent costs is an interesting
direction to broaden the applicability of this class of models (see Appendix B.1 for a result regarding
this direction).46
46For deterministic mechanisms, our result continues to hold for arbitrary single peaked cost functions, as long as the
social cost remains an Lp measure of the distances.
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Chapter 6
Approximation Algorithms for the
Incremental Knapsack Problem
6.1 Introduction
Traditional optimization problems often deal with a setting where the input parameters are static.
However, the static solution that we obtain from such a problem may be inadequate for a system
whose parameters change over time. We consider one special case of this dynamic environment in
which we have a maximization problem subject to certain capacity constraints. All of the inputs to
the optimization problem are static except the capacities, which increase weakly over time. The goal
is to find a sequence of compatible feasible solutions over time that maximizes a certain aggregate
objective function. We will call such an optimization problem an incremental optimization problem.
Unlike online and stochastic optimization problems, all input parameters are known with certainty
from the outset.
In this chapter we consider the incremental knapsack problem, a special case of the incremental
optimization problem. In the discrete incremental knapsack problem, we are given a knapsack whose
capacity grows as a function of time. There is a time horizon of T periods and the capacity of the
knapsack is Bt in period t for t = 1, . . . , T . We are also given a set of n items to be placed in the
knapsack. Item i has a weight wi > 0 that is independent of the time period, and a value at time
t of the form vi∆t where vi > 0 and ∆t > 0 (this particular functional form will allow us to model
discounting). At any time period t, we require that the sum of the weights of the items in the knapsack
CHAPTER 6. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR THE INCREMENTAL KNAPSACK
PROBLEM 96
cannot exceed the knapsack capacity Bt. Moreover, once an item is placed in the knapsack, it cannot
be removed from the knapsack at a later time period. Finally, we are interested in maximizing the
total discounted knapsack values47 over time.
To put it formally, for any X ⊆ S, define V (X) to be ∑i∈X vi and W (X) to be ∑i∈X wi. Then we
are interested in finding a feasible solution F = {S1, S2, . . . , ST } with S1 ⊆ S2 . . . ⊆ ST ⊆ S, where St
represents the subset of items in the knapsack in period t, that maximizes the quantity
∑T
t=1 V (St)∆t
subject to the constraints W (St) ≤ Bt for t = 1, . . . , T . The special case where ∆t = 1 for all t will be
called time-invariant. For brevity, in what follows we will denote the incremental knapsack problem
as DIK, and its time-invariant version as DIIK.
One can also consider a continuous version of the problem. Here we assume that there is a con-
tinuous time parameter s ∈ [0, S] for some S > 0. We are given a knapsack capacity function B(s),
weakly increasing in s, and a set K of n items to be placed in the knapsack. Item i has a value of vi
and a weight of wi, both time-independent. At any time s, the sum of the weights of the items in the
knapsack cannot exceed the knapsack capacity B(s). Moreover, once an item is placed in the knapsack,
it cannot be removed from the knapsack at a later time. We are interested in finding a feasible solution
F = {K(s)}s∈[0,S] that maximizes the quantity
∫ S
1 ∆(s)V (K(s))ds, where V (K(s)) is the total value
of the items found in the knapsack at time s, under F and ∆ is a discounting function. If one allows
for any arbitrary capacity function B, then one can embed any instance of the discrete problem as a
corresponding instance of the continuous problem with time horizon S = T + 1 by keeping the same
item size and value while setting B(s) = Bi for i − 1 ≤ s < i for i = 1, . . . , T (with B0 = 0). Since
the continuous version of the problem is more general, we will denote it as IK and its time invariant
case as IIK.
IK can be used to model an investment problem over a time horizon where the set of project costs
and rewards are known in advance. We get additional funds in each time period and unused funds
roll over from one period to the next. Consequently, B(s) represents the budget at time s. Projects
that we have invested in generate a reward (think of it as a benefit to society or to the investor) at
each time point and we assume that the total reward is additive across projects and time (taking
discounting into account). Like the standard knapsack problem, having a limited budget prevents us
from investing in all of the projects. The additional complication lies in the fact that we may not
47By knapsack value at time t, we mean the sum of item values that are packed into the knapsack by time t.
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have enough budget to invest in some projects (that generate high reward) initially. Hence, there is
trade-off between investing in the affordable projects now versus saving budget in order to invest in
more valuable projects later.
Since the single period knapsack problem is already known to be NP-hard, we look for polynomial
time approximation algorithms for different special cases of IK. For a maximization problem, a k-
approximation algorithm (for some k ≤ 1) is a polynomial time algorithm that guarantees, for all
instances of the problem, a solution whose value is within k times the value of an optimal solution.
Moreover, we say that the maximization problem has a (fully) polynomial time approximation scheme,
or a PTAS (FPTAS respectively), if for every 0 ≤ ε < 1, the algorithm guarantees, for all instances of
the problem, a solution whose value is within 1− ε times the value of an optimal solution. Moreover,
the algorithm should run in time that is polynomial in the size of the inputs and ε.
6.1.1 Scheduling Interpretation
The incremental knapsack problem can also be interpreted as a special case of a single machine schedul-
ing problem with the objective max
∑n
i=1 vig(Ci), for some non-increasing function g. We treat the
weight of an item as its processing time in the corresponding scheduling problem. Given a sequence σ
for which the items are packed into the knapsack, let Ci denote the completion time of job i under σ.











Contrary to the well studied problem of minimizing
∑n
j=1 vjf(Cj), where f is an arbitrary non-
decreasing function f , the maximization version of the problem has not been widely explored. Finally,
exact algorithms that maximize
∑n





this equivalence does not preserve approximation guarantees, and we are not aware of any way to uti-
lize the existing literature (on the scheduling problem) to construct a good approximation algorithm
for the incremental knapsack problem.
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6.1.2 Related Work
The special case of DIIK where vi = wi for all i has been examined in the literature. This problem
is known as the incremental subset sum problem. Hartline [71] gave a 1/2-approximation algorithm
for the incremental subset sum problem via dynamic programming. Sharp [113] gave a PTAS for
the incremental subset sum problem for a fixed T . This algorithm uses a variant of the dynamic
programming algorithm for the standard (i.e., 1-period) knapsack problem, and runs in time O((V nε )
T ),
where V = maxi{vi}. In Section 6.2, we will show that this problem is in fact strongly NP-hard
when T is taken to be an input. Consequently, the classic result of [66] rules out an FPTAS for
the incremental subset sum problem (and its generalizations) unless P = NP . Hartline [70] gave a
O(1/ log T )-approximation algorithm for DIIK.
A well-studied problem related to DIK is the generalized assignment problem (GAP). In the gen-
eralized assignment problem, we are given a set of m knapsacks and n items, with knapsack j having
a capacity bj . Further, placing item i in knapsack j consumes wij units of capacity of knapsack j, and
generates a value of vij . Notice that a variant of DIK where one is only allowed to pack an additional
Bt+1−Bt units at each time t, is a special case of the generalized assignment problem: here, we would
set bt = Bt+1 − Bt and wit = wi for all i and vit = vi
∑T
t ∆t for all i and t. However, DIK is not
a special case of GAP because in DIK we are allowed to pack more than Bt+1 − Bt units at time t,
assuming the knapsack has spare capacity from earlier time periods. Approximation algorithms for
GAP have been studied by [114, 43, 56, 61], starting with the work of Shmoys and Tardos [114]. They
presented an LP-based algorithm for the minimization version of the problem. Chekuri and Khanna
[43] later observed that their algorithm can be modified into a 1/2-approximation algorithm for the
maximization version of the problem. The authors also identified a few APX-hard special cases of
generalized assignment. Fleischer et al. [61] gave an algorithm with approximation ratio of 1 − 1/e.
The best known constant factor algorithm is due to [56], who improved the approximation factor of
[61] by a small ε. Chekuri and Khanna [43] presented a PTAS for the special case of GAP where item
weights and values do not depend on the knapsack in which they are placed. Unfortunately, these
results are not directly applicable to DIK, because the knapsack capacities cannot be decomposed
over time.
The objective of minimizing the sum of some function of the job-competition times on a single
machine is a well studied problem in machine scheduling. A comprehensive literature review of the
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subject can be found in surveys such as [42, 74]. Two relevant works are the paper of Cheung and
Shmoys [46], who gave a 2-approximation algorithm for the problem 1‖∑ fj(Cj) for any non-negative,
non-decreasing function fj , and the work of Megow and Verschae [86], who developed a PTAS for the
problem 1‖∑ vjf(Cj), where f is any non-decreasing function. As we observed earlier, the scheduling
interpretation of IK is a maximization version of sum of non-increasing function of completion times.
Even though an exact algorithm for solving the problem 1‖∑ vjf(Cj) can also solve a transformed
version of IK, the transformation does not preserve approximation guarantees. Hence, the existing
algorithms cannot be applied directly to solve our problem. Recently, Gamzu and Segev [65] proposed
a PTAS for the problem 1‖max∑ vj/Cj , a special case of IK with S =∞, B(s) = s and ∆(s) = 1s2 .
Their approach does not immediately generalize to other important special cases of IK such as DIK
because the capacity function in the discrete setting is a step function rather than a simple linear
function. One notable difference is that the special case of DIK where item weight/processing time
equals its value is strongly NP-hard (see Proposition 6.1), whereas the corresponding special case of
1‖max∑ vj/Cj can be solved via a simple index rule (see [65]).
6.1.3 Our Contributions
We give a (12(1 − 1e ) − O(ε))-approximation algorithm for the special case of DIK when the discount
factors are weakly increasing with respect to time (which DIIK is a special case of). With the
assumption on the discount factors, we only lose a factor of ε in the approximation even if we pack
items in at most logε T time periods. This enables us to enumerate all possible time sequences of when
items are packed into the knapsack (there are O(T 1/ε) such time sequences). For each time sequence,
our algorithm makes use of a novel reduction to the general assignment problem.
Our second result provides a PTAS for the special case of DIK when the discount factors are
non-decreasing with respect to time. This LP-based approximation scheme involves a disjunctive
formulation (background and details, below) that can be rounded to obtain the desired approximation.
Specifically, we construct a disjunction over O(N((log T/ε)O(log(log T/ε)/ε
2))) LPs (which is polynomial
in T and n), each with nT variables and O(nT ) constraints. This improves on the result of [113]. This
PTAS also extends the earlier work of [21] and [22] on the disjunctive approach for the single period
knapsack problem.
Our second result relies on the classical approach of disjunctive programming [14]. Suppose we
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want to find an approximate solution to max{wTx : x ∈ P} (P ⊆ Rn, possibly non-convex), with
approximation factor α. Moreover, suppose no good convex relaxation of P is known. In this case,
we may still be able to leverage the idea of disjunctive programming to give us a good approximation
guarantee. The idea is to find a set of polyhedra Q1, Q2, . . . QL in Rn such that P ⊆ ∪Li=1Qi and for
each i we can compute, in polynomial time, xi ∈ P with wTxi ≥ αmax{wTx : x ∈ Qi}. Taking x? =
argmaxi{wTxi} yields a factor α approximate solution to the original optimization problem. As stated,
this approach simply constitutes a case of enumeration (polynomially-bounded if L is polynomial in
n and T ). Further, wTx? ≥ αmax{wTx : x ∈ conv(∪iQi)}, and this last maximization problem can
be formulated as a single linear program (polynomial-sized if L is), and, as will be the case below, we
obtain an approximation algorithm based on rounding.
For the continuous incremental knapsack problem IK, we focus on the special case where the
knapsack capacity grows linearly with time, or LIK. Moreover, we consider discounting functions
that are order inducing, meaning that once we have decided the subset of items to pack into the
knapsack by the time horizon S, an optimal order in which to pack the items can be computed via
a simple index rule. We observe that common discounting functions such as ∆(s) = 1, ∆(s) = e−rs,
and ∆(s) = (1 + r)−s for some constant r > 0 are all order inducing discounting functions. We then
show that LIK with any order inducing discounting function admits an FPTAS.48 We also show that
the continuous incremental subset sum problem with linear knapsack capacity and no discounting,
denoted by LIIS, can be solved easily via a simple greedy algorithm. Our result also implies that the
special case of LIK with no discounting and a constant number of value to weight ratio item-classes
can also be solved in polynomial time. Finally, we present an NP-hardness result for the piecewise
linear incremental knapsack problem (PLIK for short) with two pieces.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first part of the chapter focuses on DIK. We
show that the problem is strongly NP-hard and demonstrate that some common approaches will not
yield a good approximation algorithm. We then move on to our algorithmic results for various special
cases of DIK. We first discuss the constant factor algorithm via a reduction to GAP, followed by our
PTAS via disjunctive programming. Finally, we consider LIK, where we present an FPTAS and a
linear time greedy algorithm for LIIS. We end with the NP-hardness result for PLIK.
48Since the linear functional form can be compactly specified, we require the running time of our FPTAS to be
polynomial in n and log T .
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6.2 Hardness Results for DIK
We first show that the incremental subset sum problem, a special case of DIIK, is already strongly
NP-hard. Further, we demonstrate that some common approach will not provide a good approximation
ratio.
Proposition 6.1. The incremental subset sum problem is strongly NP hard.
Proof. We show that 3-partition can be reduced to incremental subset sum. In the 3-partition problem,
we are given a set S of 3m integers a1, . . . a3m, and we want to decide whether S can be partitioned
into m triples that all have the same sum B, where B = (1/m)
∑3m
i=1 ai. It is known that 3-partition is
strongly NP-hard even if all the integers take values between B/4 and B/2. Given a set S of 3m integers
a1, . . . , a3m, let ai be the weight and value of item i. Suppose the knapsack capacity is Bt = tB in
period t for t = 1, . . . , T = m. Lastly, we ask whether there exists a packing that achieves an objective
value of BT (T + 1)/2. Notice that since every item’s weight equals to its value, a feasible solution can
achieve an objective value of BT (T + 1)/2 if and only if it saturates the knapsack capacity in every
time period. It is clear that if a 3-partition exists, then such a packing exists. Conversely, if such a
packing exists and since the value of the items are strictly between B/4 and B/2, three additional
items must be packed in every time period in order for the knapsack to be at full capacity. Hence, if
such a packing exists, then a 3-partition exists.
We now show that the optimal solution to a DIIK instance may not exhibit a “nested structure”,
that is, constructing a feasible solution to a T period problem from an optimal solution to its T − 1
period subproblem may be very sub-optimal. To see this, suppose there are n = T items. Items 1
through T − 1 each have unit weight and value 1/T 2, whereas item T has weight T and value T . The
knapsack capacity is t in period t. It is easy to see that the optimal solution for time periods 1 through
T − 1 is to pack one additional unit weight item in every period, giving us an objective value of O(1),
whereas the optimal solution for time periods 1 through T is to wait till period T to pack the weight T
item, giving us an objective value of T . An alternative idea is to solve first for an optimal packing S∗
for the knapsack with capacity BT and restrict ourselves to pack items from S
∗ in periods 1 through
T − 1. We show that this approach may be very sub-optimal as well. Consider T items. Items 1
through T − 1 each have unit weight and value, whereas item T has weight T and value T + ε. The
CHAPTER 6. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR THE INCREMENTAL KNAPSACK
PROBLEM 102
knapsack capacity is again t in period t. The optimal solution for the knapsack with capacity T is to
pack the weight T item, giving us an objective value of T + ε. Nonetheless, doing so will not enable
to us to pack anything in periods 1 through T − 1, whereas the overall optimal solution is to pack one
additional unit weight item each of the periods 1 through T −1, giving us an objective value of O(T 2).
To contrast DIK with the standard knapsack problem further, recall that the LP relaxation of the
standard knapsack problem has an integrality gap of two when every individual item can fit into the
knapsack. This is because the greedy algorithm that packs items in value-to-weight ratio order yields
a 1/2-approximate solution. The approximation result of the greedy algorithm extends when all items
can fit into the knapsack initially.
Proposition 6.2. If every item can fit into the knapsack initially, then the greedy algorithm is a
1/2-approximation algorithm for DIK.
The proof of Proposition 6.2 can be found in Appendix C.1.
Unfortunately, the story is more complicated when some items cannot fit into the knapsack initially.
To illustrate the underlying difficulty, we consider a natural generalization of the knapsack IP here.
Let xi,t = 1 if item i is placed in the knapsack at time t and 0 otherwise. In order to prevent an item
those size is larger than the knapsack capacity Bt to be fractionally packed into the knapsack by an











wixi,t ≤ Bt ∀t
xi,t−1 ≤ xi,t ∀i, and t = 2, 3, . . . , T
xi,t = 0 for any i, t such that wi > Bt
xi,t ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, t.
Proposition 6.3. The LP relaxation of (6.1) has an unbounded integrality gap, even when there is no
discounting and has item have the same value as its weight.
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Proof. Fix a k ≥ 2 and let T = nk. Consider a set of n items, where vi = wi = ki for i =
1, . . . , logk(T ) = n. The knapsack capacities follow the following pattern:
Bt = k
i if T (1− 1
ki−1
) + 1 ≤ t ≤ T (1− 1
ki
) for i = 1, . . . , logk(T ) and BT = BT−1.
Since the LP can fractional pack the items, the knapsack capacity is saturated in every time period.
Moreover, since all items have weight equal to value, the optimal value of the LP solution is the sum






(1− 1/ki)− (1− 1/ki−1)
)
= T (k − 1) logk(T ) + T = O(Tk logk(T )).
Let ti = T (1−1/ki−1)+1 denote the first time when the knapsack capacity increases to ki. Notice that
any integer feasible solution to the IP only packs at times ti. The only items that fit in the knapsack
at time ti are items 0 through i. If we decide to pack item i in period ti, then the total revenue we get
for packing i over times ti ≤ t ≤ ti+1 − 1 is T (1/ki − 1/ki+1)ki+1 = T (k − 1). Since we cannot pack
any item before time ti if we pack item i in time ti, the total revenue we get up to time ti+1− 1 would
be T (k − 1). For every i > 1, this is clearly suboptimal since we would get more revenue up to time
ti+1 − 1 had we just packed item 1 in period 1 (since kT (1 − 1/ki+1) > kT (1 − 1/k) = T (k − 1) for
i > 1). Hence, no integer optimal solution would pack item i at time ti for every i > 1.
If we do not pack item i at time ti, then the optimal packing of the knapsack in period i is items 1
through i− 1 for every i. This is feasible as we can pack items j at time tj+1 for every j = 1, . . . , i− 1.
Hence, this is an optimal integer packing the sub-problem over time periods 1 through ti for every





ki(T − ti+1 + 1) = kT +
n−1∑
i=2
ki(T − T (1− 1/ki)) ' kT + T (logk T − 1)
≤ 2T max(k, logk(T )).
Hence, the integrality gap is at least 0.5 min(logk(T ), k). For every k, we can choose T = k
k so
that 0.5 min(logk(T ), k) = k/2. Letting k go to infinity and we have the desired result.
This result implies that any constant factor approximation algorithm must do something more
clever than simply solving the above LP relaxation and rounding the fractional solutions to a feasible
integral solution. It also suggests that our LP relaxations needs to be tightened.
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6.3 A Constant Factor Approximation Algorithm
In the introduction section, we drew a connection between DIK and the generalized assignment prob-
lem (GAP). We mentioned that a variant of DIK where unused capacity from the previous period
cannot roll over to the next period is equivalent to a special case of GAP. Nonetheless, in the event
that unused capacity does roll over from one period to the next, we need to balance the use of cur-
rent capacity to pack more items versus saving additional capacity to pack more valuable items later.
Suppose we know the exact capacity required for an optimal packing in each time period, then we
can easily obtain a corresponding instance of GAP and make use one of the known approximation
algorithms. The main ideas behind our approximation algorithm lies in
1. making a polynomial number of guesses on the set of time periods when a near optimal solution
packs additional item(s).
2. identifying a relationship between the total capacity of items packed after the k-th packing step
and the knapsack capacity during the (k − 1)-st packing step that enables the reduction to a
GAP instance.
These two observations enable us to come up with a good solution after making a polynomial number of
calls to a constant factor approximation algorithm, such as that of [56], for some transformed instance
of GAP.
We now discuss the first idea in detail. Fix 0 < ε ≤ 1. Define tj for j = 1, . . . ,K, where K is the
largest value such that d(1 + ε)Ke ≤ T as follows. Note that K = O( log Tε ). The set of time periods
that we will consider is
Tε = {tε0, tε1, . . . , tεK+1}, (6.2)
where tε0 = T , and t
ε
j = T − d(1 + ε)j−1e for j = 1, . . . ,K + 1. Now take any feasible solution x of an
instance of DIK, we will construct a corresponding feasible solution xε that only packs items in periods
from Tε with a small loss in objective value, provided that the discounted factors are non-decreasing
with respect to time. Whenever an item i is first packed in the knapsack in time period t by x, where
tj < t ≤ tj−1, then it will be first packed in period tj−1 by xε. Note that xε is a feasible solution as
knapsack capacity is non-decreasing over time.
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Proposition 6.4. The objective value of xε is within a factor of 1/(1 + ε) of the optimal value if the
discounting factors are non-decreasing over time.
Proof. Suppose item i is packed by x in time tj < t ≤ tj−1 for some j. Then the contribution of item i
to the objective in x is vi
∑T
t′=t ∆t′ compared to vi
∑T
t′=tj−1











≤ 1 + ε.
Hence, the objective value of xε is at least 1/(1 + ε) fraction of the objective value of x.
For all feasible solutions that only pack items in time periods from Tε, we focus on the one that
achieves the highest objective value x∗ε . Let s1 < . . . < sk ∈ Tε be consecutive times when at least one
additional item is packed into the knapsack. Then:
Lemma 6.1. For 1 < j ≤ k, the total size of items packed into the knapsack by x∗ε up to period sj is
at least Bsj−1.
Proof. If this claim does not hold for some j, then the items that are packed into the knapsack in
period sj can all fit into the knapsack in period sj−1, giving us higher objective value in doing so,
which contradicts the optimality of x∗ε .
Now, let’s divide the packing periods dictated by x∗ε into two sets: those with even index Ie versus
those with odd index Io, i.e. Ie = {s2, s4, ..., s2bk/2c} and Io = {s1, s3, ..., s2dk/2e−1}. Clearly, items
packed into the knapsack by x∗ε during one of the aforementioned set of times will achieve at least 1/2
fraction of the objective value of x∗ε . Finally, by Lemma 6.1, for every sj ∈ Ie, the total size of items
packed during period sj by x
∗
ε is upper bounded by Bsj − Bsj−2 , as the total size of items packed up
to period sj−1 is at least Bsj−2 . The same holds for every sj ∈ Io. Now we are ready to describe the
algorithm:
1. Fix 0 < ε < 1. For every subset S of Tε:
(a) Index the time periods s1, . . . , sk of S in increasing order and divide them into Io and Ie.
Construct a GAP instance w.r.t the packing in time periods Io (Ie respectively).
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(b) For every period sj ∈ Io and (Ie respectively), create a knapsack with capacity Bsj −Bsj−2
(with B0 = 0). Items in the GAP instance have the same data as the incremental knapsack




(c) Apply the algorithm of [56] on the two GAP instances and return the better of the two
solutions.
2. Take the best solution over all subset S.
Note that since Tε has O( log Tε ) elements, the size of the enumeration is O(T 1/ε). Since our guess
contains the packing of x∗ε with respect to both subsets of periods Io and Ie, our algorithm is guaranteed
to return a 12(1− 1e )−O(ε) approximate solution, where 1/2 comes from taking the better of the solutions
produced by packing using Io versus Ie, 1− 1/e comes from the performance of the algorithm of Feige
and Vondrák, and the O(ε) comes from using a subset of periods from Tε for packing.
6.3.1 Improving the Approximation Guarantee
There are two potential methods for improving the constant following our algorithmic approach. First
is to obtain more accurate guesses of the size of additional items packed into the knapsack in each time
period for the reduction to GAP. Working with time periods from Tε and observing that at most one
item will straddle two or more consecutive time periods (i.e. its packing requires the saving of residual
capacity over one or more periods), the number of such guesses can be polynomially bounded in T .
However, to ensure that a feasible packing of additional items in a given time period translates to a
feasible packing of the corresponding knapsack in the GAP instance, we may need to blow up the size
of each knapsack in the GAP instance by a factor of 1+ε. The difficulty lies in arguing that the reverse
mapping from a GAP feasible solution to the corresponding feasible packing of incremental knapsack
incurs an objective loss of O(ε), since the increment in knapsack capacity is non-homogeneous across
time and an ε fractional increment of a knapsack in an earlier time period may have a large effect
compared to the same incremental in a later time period.
Another direction through which we can potentially improve the approximation ratio is to come
up with a better approximation algorithm for the special case of GAP that we manage reduce to.
Chekuri and Khanna [43] showed that even certain special cases of GAP are APX-hard, including a
special case where all items have the same weight across knapsacks but different values. Nonetheless,
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the instance of GAP that enables them to perform the reduction requires the existence of items i and
i′ and knapsack k and k′, where item i is more valuable when placed in knapsack k versus k′ and vice
versa for item i′. On the contrary, in the reduced GAP instance, an item will give us higher value
when it is placed in a knapsack corresponding to an earlier time period. Chekuri and Khanna gave a
PTAS for the special case of GAP where all items weight and values are identical across knapsacks.
Whether the GAP instances that we obtained from DIK admits a PTAS remains an open question.
6.4 A PTAS for DIIK
Now we are ready to present the PTAS for DIIK. This algorithm can be extended to the case of
DIK with monotonically nondecreasing ∆t. Consider an instance of DIIK and let ε ∈ (0, 1). Without
loss of generality, we can assume that the vi’s are integral. Moreover, we will only pack in periods
Tε = {s1, . . . , s|Tε|} and lose a factor of O(ε) in the process (see Proposition 6.4).49 Let T ′ = |Tε|. To
ease the notation, from hereon we will simply refer to period st as period t for t = 1, . . . , T
′. Fixing an
optimal solution OPT , and let h be a the maximum valued item that is ever placed in the knapsack
by OPT . Then it suffices to optimize over the set of items Sh = {i ∈ S|vi ≤ vh}. We partition Sh into
K + 1 subsets X = {S1,h, S2,h, . . . , SK,h, T h}, where
Sk,h = {j ∈ S, j 6= h : (1− ε)k−1vh ≥ vj > (1− ε)kvh} for k = 1, . . . ,K,
and
T h = {j ∈ S : (1− ε)Kvh ≥ vj}.
In order to attain the approximation ratio, we will choose K large enough so that (1− ε)K < ε/T ′ or
equivalently, K > log(T
′/ε)
ε .
Consider a modified instance of the problem where items have identical weights as the original
instance and item i has a modified value of v′i = (1 − ε)k−1vh if i ∈ Sk,h and v′i = vi otherwise.
Let OPTm denote an optimal solution to the modified instance of the problem. Let V (SOL) and
Vm(SOL) be the objective value with respect to a solution SOL of the original instance and the
modified instance respectively. As we did not change the item weights, OPTm is a feasible solution to
49Tε here is defined in the same way as in expression (6.2)
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the original instance. Moreover,
V (OPTm) ≥ (1− ε)Vm(OPTm) ≥ (1− ε)Vm(OPT ) ≥ (1− ε)V (OPT ),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that vi ≥ (1−ε)v′i for every item i, the second inequality
follows from the fact thatOPTm is an optimal solution to the modified instance, and the third inequality
follows from the fact that vi ≤ v′i for every item i.
Now, since all items within each Sk,h have equal value in the modified instance, it is clear that con-
ditioning on the number of items chosen by OPT within each Sk,h, OPT would choose the items within
the same value class in the order of non-decreasing weight (breaking ties arbitrarily). Thus, it suffices
to enumerate feasible solutions that can be described by a collection of vectors {σ1, . . . , σK}, where
σkt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |Sk,h|} denotes the number of items chosen from Sk,h in time period t ∈ Tε, in order to
find an optimal solution. Nonetheless, the number of potential solutions that we have to enumerate
would be exponential in n if we attempt to enumerate all possible configurations of {σ1, . . . , σK}. Con-
sequently, we will only explicitly enumerate σkt taking values from {0, 1, . . . , min(d1/εe, |Sk,h|)}. For
σkt taking values larger than J = d1/εe, we will instead let the feasible region of an LP capture these
feasible points and let the LP choose the optimal value for us and subsequently round this value down
to an integer. Lastly, since we don’t know the most valuable item h taken by OPT in the original
instance of the problem, we will have to guess such an item by enumeration.
Our disjunctive procedure is as follows. First, we guess the most valuable item h ∈ S packed by
an optimal solution. Subsequently, we only consider choosing items from Sh and round the values of
the items in Sh to obtain the modified instance of the problem. We will then focus on solving the
modified instance of the problem. Let ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , |Sk,h|, be the i-th lightest weight item in Sk,h
(break ties arbitrarily). Let xki,t be the variable indicating whether item ki is placed in the knapsack
in time period t. Let σ = {σ1, . . . , σK} ∈ {0, . . . , J}T ′K and define the following polyhedron:
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Qσ,h = {x ∈ [0, 1]T ′n : xi,t = 0 ∀(i, t) s.t. vi > vh (6.3)
xh,T ′ = 1 (6.4)
xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xk|Sk,h|,t = 0 ∀(k, t) s.t. σ
k
t = 0 (6.5)
xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xkσkt
,t = 1, xk
σkt +1
,t = . . . = xk|Sk,h|,t = 0 (6.6)
∀(k, t) s.t. 1 ≤ σkt < J and σkt < |Sk,h| (6.7)
xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xkσkt
,t = 1 ∀(k, t) s.t. σkt = J and σkt < |Sk,h| (6.8)
xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xk|Sk,h|,t = 1 ∀(k, t) s.t. σ
k









wixi,t ≤ Bt ∀t (6.10)
xki,t−1 ≤ xki,t ∀(k, i), and t = 2, 3, . . . , T ′ (6.11)
xi,t−1 ≤ xi,t ∀i ∈ T h, and t = 2, 3, . . . , T ′}. (6.12)
Equation (6.3) ensures that all items more valuable than h are never packed in the knapsack.
Equation (6.4) ensures that item h is packed into the knapsack at some point over the time horizon.
Equations (6.5) - (6.9) encodes our guesses on how many items from each value class to pack at each
time period. Inequality (6.10) is the knapsack capacity constraint and inequalities (6.11) and (6.12)
are precedence constraints. Note that the optimal solution x∗ to the DIIK IP (6.1) with T ′ and the
time horizon and v′i as the item values is contained in some Q
σ∗,h∗ , where h∗ is the most valuable item
ever packed by x∗ and σ∗ denotes the number of items packed by x∗ from each value class in each time
period. Hence, as long as we can solve the LP {max∑T ′t=1 ∆t∑ni=1 v′ixi,t : x ∈ Qσ,h} for every (σ, h),
round the optimal LP solution to a feasible integer solution with an objective loss bounded by (1− ε),
and take the best solution over all values of (σ, h), we would obtain a (1 − O(ε)) for this special case
of DIK. Before diving into the details of how to convert an LP optimal solution to a feasible integer
solution with small loss in objective value, we first upper bound the number of LPs that need to be
solved.





LPs in our disjunctive procedure.
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Proof. Let us first count the number of LPs for a fixed guess of h. For a fixed k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},








2 , . . . , σ
k













≤ J(J+T ′)J feasible T ′-tuples (σk1 , σk2 , . . . , σkT ′).





in the disjunctive procedure for











= O(N( log Tε )
O(log(log T/ε2)/ε2)), which is
polynomial in T and n.
Now, we are ready to present our rounding procedure.
Theorem 6.1. For every non-empty polyhedron Qσ,h, there exists a polynomially computable point














v′ixi,t : x ∈ Qσ,h}.
Proof. Let x̄ be an optimal solution of max{∑T ′t=1 ∆t∑i∈Sh v′ixi,t : x ∈ Qσ,h}. We will decompose the
objective into value classes and show that our rounding procedure gives a small loss in objective for






























v′ix̄i,t −∆T ′εvh, (6.14)
in Lemma C.2.
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Recall that x̄h,T = 1. Proofs of Lemma ?? and ?? can be found in the Appendix C.2.
Putting everything together, we have our approximation theorem.








i,t , where x
σ,h is a feasible point for I I K,






v′iyi,t ≥ (1− ε)Vm(OPTm) ≥ (1− ε)2V (OPT ).
6.4.1 Discussion
Proposition 6.4 buys us a lot of leverage in both of the constant factor algorithm and the PTAS that
we presented, as it allows us to consider and enumerate through just logarithmically many time periods
and only lose an approximation factor of ε in the process. Nonetheless, when the discounting factors
are decreasing with respect to time, then the proposition does not hold, as one may need to keep
a constant fraction of the T time periods in order to ensure a 1 − O(ε)-approximate solution. New
algorithmic ideas that balance two competing forces are needed: items packed in later time periods may
not contribute much to the objective when discounting factors decrease with time, but there could be
large increases in knapsack capacities during later time periods, which enables us to pack very valuable
items. Finding an algorithm that results in a good approximation ratio for this case is an intriguing
open problem.
6.5 Continuous Knapsack with Linear Capacity
In the remainder of this chapter, we will consider the incremental knapsack problem when the knapsack
capacity grows continuously with time, or IK for short. It suffices to think of a solution of an instance
of IK as an ordering of the items σ1, . . . , σn. Once the ordering is given, then we will pack item σi at
time tσi = inf{t |
∑
j≤iwσj ≤ B(t)}, i.e. the earliest time that the item can fit into the knapsack, given
the order. Item σi is not packed into the knapsack by the end of the time horizon if
∑
j≤iwσj > B(T ).
We start with LIK, the case where the capacity of the knapsack grows linearly with time, i.e.
B(t) = ct for some constant c > 0. Moreover, we will consider order inducing discounting functions
where it suffices to decide which maximal subset of the n items to pack by time T . We say that S is
a maximal subset to pack by time T if
∑
i∈S wi ≤ T and
∑
i∈S∪j wi > T for any j ∈ N\S. It is clear
CHAPTER 6. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR THE INCREMENTAL KNAPSACK
PROBLEM 112
that any optimal packing will pack a maximal subset of items by time T . Once the subset is decided,
then the optimal ordering of the items can be decided via a simple index rule. We will show that the
following common discounting functions ∆(s) = 1, ∆(s) = e−rs, and ∆(s) = (1 + r)−s for some value
r > 0 are all order inducing discounting functions.
Proposition 6.5. Let ri be an index asssociated with job i. Given any maximal subset S to pack by
time T, then any optimal packs the items in decreasing order of their indices, where
• ri = vσiwσi if ∆(s) = 1;
• ri = vσie
−rwσi
1−e−rwσi
if ∆(s) = e−rs, for any r > 0;
• ri = vσi (1+r)
−wσi
1−(1+r)−wσi
for any r > 0.
Proof of the proposition can be found in Appendix C.3.
Hence, given an order inducing discounting function, the problem boils down to choosing an optimal
subset S? of items to pack by time T . This problem can be formulated as the following math program.

















xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Here xi = 1 if and only if i belongs to the subset chosen. Moreover, we will assume without lost of
generality from here on that c = 1, as we can scale the item weights appropriately.
Now we develop an FPTAS for solving the math program in (6.15) using an idea inspired by
Chapter 5 of [110]. Let Sk denote a set of vectors in 2 dimensions, where each vector v corresponds to
a feasible solution to the subproblem of (6.15) where one is only allowed to pack items 1 through k,
for k = 1, . . . , N . In particular, v stores the objective value and w stores the sum of the weights of the
feasible solution that it corresponds to. Notice that one can enumerate through the elements of Sk via
the following recursion.
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1. For k = 1, we have that S1 = {(0, 0), (v1
∫ T
w1
∆(s)ds, w1)} if w1 ≤ T , else S1 = {(0, 0)}.
2. For k = 2, . . . , n, we construct Sk from Sk−1 as follows: for every (v, w) in Sk−1, include (v, w)
in Sk. Also include (v + vk
∫ T
w+wk
∆(s)ds, w + wk) in Sk if w + wk ≤ T .
Upon scaling, for every k, the vectors in Sk (except (0, 0)) lies in a rectangle [1, V T ] × [1,W ] in R2,
where V =
∑
i vi and W =
∑
iwi. Given a ε > 0, set δ = 1 +
ε
2n . Define the following set of rectangles
that covers [1, V T ]× [1,W ]
R = {[δi−1, δi]× [δj−1, δj ]|i = 1, . . . , L1, j = 1, . . . , L2},
where L1 = dln(TV )/ ln(δ)e ≤ d2nε (lnT + lnV )e and L2 = dln(W )/ ln(δ)e ≤ d2nε (lnW )e. Hence, the
number of rectangles is bounded by O(n
2
ε2
(log T + log V )(logW )), which is polynomial in the size of
the inputs.50 To get an FPTAS, we would like to define S′k for k = 1, . . . , n recursively as we did for
Sk such that
1. S′k ⊆ Sk for all k = 1, . . . , n.
2. For every k fixed, every rectangle in R contains at most one element of S′k.
3. For every k and every element (v, w) ∈ Sk, there exists an element (v′, w′) ∈ S′k that is “close”
to (v, w). The precise notion of “closeness” will be specified later.
S′k is constructed as follows.
1. For k = 1, set S′1 = S1. For every rectangle containing two or more elements of S
′
1, we keep the
one with the smallest w coordinate and delete the rest from S′1.
2. For k = 2, . . . , n, we construct S′k from S
′
k−1 as follows: for every (v, w) in S
′
k−1, include (v, w)
in S′k. Also include (v + vk
∫ T
w+wk
∆(s)ds, w + wk) in S
′
k if w + wk ≤ T . For every rectangle
containing two or more elements of S′k, we keep the one with the smallest w coordinate and delete
the rest from S′k.
50Note that since we are no longer explicitly specifying the capacity of the knapsack in every time period in the
continuous case, a polynomial time algorithm needs to have a running time that is polynomial in log T .
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This construction of S′k satisfies criteria 1 and 2 above by definition. Moreover, the construction can
be done in O(nL1L2) time, which is polynomial in the size of the inputs. The following lemma specifies
what we meant by the points in S′k being ”close to” the points in Sk.
Lemma 6.3. For every k and for every vector (v, w) ∈ Sk, there exists a vector (v′, w′) ∈ S′k such that
δkv′ ≥ v and w′ ≤ w
Proof. We prove this via induction on k. The base case k = 1 holds by the definition of S′1. Now for the
inductive step. Take any (v, w) ∈ Sk, if (v, w) ∈ Sk−1, then we are done by the inductive hypothesis.




Moreover, by the inductive hypothesis, there exists (ṽ, w̃) ∈ S′k−1 such that δk−1ṽ ≥ v̂ and w̃ ≤ ŵ.
















The first inequality follows from the fact that δv′ ≥ ṽ + vk
∫ T
w̃+wk
∆(s)ds because the two vectors lie
in the same rectangle. The second inequality follows from the fact that δk−1ṽ ≥ v̂ and that w̃ ≤ ŵ.
Moreover, we have that
w′ ≤ w̃ + wk ≤ ŵ + wk = w.
Now, take the vector (v?, w?) ∈ Sn corresponding an optimal solution of (6.15), then there exists a
solution (v′, w′) ∈ S′n such that (1 + ε)v′ ≥ δnv′ ≥ v?, which is the optimal objective value. Hence, if
we search through S′n for the vector with the highest v component, then we would obtain an 1−O(ε)
approximate solution to the optimal solution of (6.15), as desired. The running time of the algorithm is









takes O(L1L2) time. Since L1L2 = O(
n2
ε2
(log T + log V )(logW )), our algorithm runs in polynomial of
the size of the inputs and 1/ε. Hence, we have a bona fide FPTAS. The existence of an FPTAS also
implies that the problem is at most weakly NP hard.
Theorem 6.3. There exists a FPTAS for LIK with order inducing discounting functions.
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6.5.1 Incremental Subset Sum with Linear Capacity
Now we consider a special case of incremental knapsack with a linear capacity growth function, no
discounting, and where the weight of each item equals to its value, which we denote by LIIS for
short. We will show that the problem can be solved in linear time via a greedy algorithm. This result
contrasts that of the discrete incremental subset sum problem, which is shown to be stronly NP-hard
in Proposition 6.1 (even the standard subset sum problem is weakly NP-hard). Let B(t) = ct being the
capacity function of the knapsack for some constant c > 0. Since the discounting function ∆(s) = 1
is order inducing, once we have decided on a subset S of items to pack into the knapsack on [0, T ].
The optimal ordering is to pack items in non-increasing order of value-to-weight ratio. However, since
every item’s weight equals its value, every ordering of the items in S yield the same revenue. If we
compare the loss in revenue of this solution to that of the LP relaxation of the problem, where items
















compared to the total revenue cT
2
2 of an optimal fractional packing. From here on we will assume that
c = 1 by scaling the item weights appropriately.
Now we are ready for the main theorem.
Theorem 6.4. Sorting the items in non-decreasing order of item weights and greedily packing them
until packing any more item would exceed the knapsack capacity of T is optimal for LIIS.
Proof. Let S? and Sg denote an optimal set of items to pack and the set of items packed by greedy







Hence, it suffices to show that
∑
i∈Sg\S?
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If S?\Sg = ∅, then we are done, since greedy packs everything OPT packs and potentially more.




otherwise greedy would have packed item k before an item in arg maxi∈Sg\S? wi. Moreover, we also
have that for every k ∈ S?\Sg,




because if it weren’t the case, then item k would have been packed by greedy. Now consider the
following lemma.












Now suppose the lemma holds, then letting p = |S?\Sg|+ 1, q = |Sg\S?|+ 1, {ai}pi=1 = (S?\Sg)∪{T −∑
i∈S? wi} with ap = T −
∑
i∈S? wi, and {bi}
q
i=1 = (Sg\S?)∪{T −
∑
i∈Sg wi}. Then one can check that
{ai}pi=1 and {bi}
q










Hence, equation (6.16) follows directly from an application of Lemma 6.4. The proof of Lemma 6.4
can be found in Appendix C.4.
Note that Theorem 6.4 does not immediately generalize to other discounting functions because the
cumulative loss in revenue while we are waiting to save up enough capacity to pack item i does not
just depend on its weight but also the time at which we pack the item.
Corollary 6.1. Any incremental knapsack instance with linear capacity function and no discounting
in which there are at most k value-to-weight ratio classes can be solved exactly in O(nk) time.
Proof. We first guess the number of items from each of the value-to-weight ratio classes packed by the
optimal solution. Then we pack items in non-increasing order of the ratio and within each ratio class,
we pack the items with the smallest weight first.
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6.5.2 Discussion
Whether there exists a polynomial time algorithm for LIK with no discounting remains an open
question. Theorem 6.3 gives an FPTAS for solving a slight generalization of the problem (for any
order inducing discounting function). Nonetheless, we are unable to derive an NP-hardness result to
complement our FPTAS. We conjecture that some reduction from the partition problem or its variants
exists. By Corollary 6.1, such a reduction (if one exists) will require us to construct an instance of the
incremental knapsack problem where there are a non-constant number of value-to-weight ratio classes.
The ratio classes should be constructed in a delicate fashion so that neither a non-decreasing weight
ordering greedy solution dominates (which would happen if the ratios are nearly identical) nor does a
non-increasing value-to-weight ratio ordering solution (which would happen if the ratios are far apart
from each other) dominate.
6.6 Piecewise Linear Capacity function
We say that the capacity function is piecewise linear if the time horizon can be partitioned into p
subintervals such that the capacity function is linear within each subinterval. We first show that IK is
NP-hard when we have a monotone piecewise capacity function with two pieces. The rough intuition
behind the hardness reduction is that the problem is very similar to the standard knapsack problem if
the slope of the first linear piece is large while the slope of the second linear piece is close to zero.
Theorem 6.5. PLIK with a two linear pieces and no discounting is NP-hard.




i=1 ai, the partition problem asks if there exists a subset that sums to a. Given an instance of the
partition problem {a1, . . . , an}, we construct an instance of incremental knapsack as follows. There are
n items with vi = wi = ai. The capacity function is the following 2-piecewise linear function: B(t) = t
for 0 ≤ t ≤ a, and B(t) = a for T ≥ t ≥ a. There is a time horizon T to be specified.
Suppose there exists a partition S. Then we can pack the items in S into the knapsack by time a.
Moreover, the order in which the items are packed will not change the objective value since item weight
equals to item value. Hence, let us assume that the items in S are packed in increasing order of their
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(T − a)ai = a(T − a).
Hence, if there exists a partition S. Then the optimal value of the correspondingly incremental knapsack
instance is at least a(T − a). On the other hand, suppose there does not exist a partition. Let S?
be an optimal subset to pack by time T in the corresponding incremental knapsack instance. Then,













aiaj ≤ T (a− 1),
since
∑
i∈S? ai < a and ai’s are integers. We choose T so that a(T − a) > T (a − 1). One candidate
would be T = a2 + 1. Consequently, we have a valid polynomial size reduction: given any set of n
positive integers {a1, . . . , an}, there exists a partition if and only if one can attain an objective value
of at least a(T − a) = a(a2 − a+ 1) in the corresponding incremental knapsack problem.
6.6.1 Discussion
As is the case for linear capacity growth, it is clear that once an ordering for the items to be packed
by time T is determined, one would pack the items as early as possible with respect to that ordering.
However, it is no longer the case that once a subset to pack by time T is chosen, the optimal packing
follows the non-increasing value-to-weight ratio. Nonetheless, it remains true via Proposition 6.5 that
the items are packed in decreasing value-to-weight ratio ordering within each linear piece.
It seems plausible to extend the FPTAS for LIK to obtain an FPTAS for PLIK with a constant
number of linear pieces, if the discounting function is order inducing. This is because, with these
pseudo-polynomial number of guesses on the time at which the last (straddling) item is packed into
each linear capacity segment, the problem essentially decouples into an instance of p knapsacks each
with linear capacity and an interval during which items can be packed into the knapsack. Since items
packed within each knapsack will be arranged in value-to-weight ratio order, the problem again boils
down to guessing the subset that will be completely packed within each knapsack. Nonetheless, Lemma
6.3 does not easily generalize for this case. Generalizing Lemma 6.3 and turning the pseudo-polynomial
number of guesses of the packing epoch of straddling items into an approximation scheme are the two
challenges that we are currently trying to overcome so as to obtain an FPTAS for this setting.
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Chapter 7
Capacity Constrained Assortment
Optimization under the Markov Chain
based Choice Model
Joint work with Antoine Désir.
7.1 Introduction
Assortment optimization problems arise widely in many practical applications such as retailing and
online advertising. In these problems, the goal is to select a subset from a universe of substitutable
items to offer to customers in order to maximize the expected revenue. The demand of any item
depends on the substitution behavior of the customers that is captured mathematically by a choice
model. The choice model specifies the probability that a random consumer selects a particular item
from any given offer set. The objective of the decision maker is to identify an offer set that maximizes
expected revenue.
Many parametric choice models have extensively been studied in the literature in diverse areas
including marketing, transportation, economics, and operations management. The Multinomial logit
(MNL) model is by far the most popular model in practice due to its tractability [122]. However, some
of the simplifying assumptions behind this model, such as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
property, make it inadequate for many applications. Consequently, more complex choice models have
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been developed to capture a richer class of substitution behaviors. Such models include the nested
logit model [129] and the mixture of Multinomial logit model [85]. Nonetheless, the increase in model
complexity makes their estimation and assortment optimization problems significantly more difficult.
Hence, one of the key challenges in assortment planing is choosing a model that strikes a good balance
between its predictability and tractability, as there is a fundamental tradeoff between these desirable
properties.
In a recent paper, Blanchet et al. [25] consider a Markov chain based choice model. Here, customer
substitution is captured by a Markov chain, where each item (including the no-purchase option) corre-
sponds to a state, and substitutions are modeled using transitions in the Markov chain. The authors
show that this model provides a good approximation in choice probabilities to a large class of exist-
ing choice models, allowing it to circumvent the model selection problem. In particular, the Markov
chain choice model is a generalization of several known choice models in the literature including MNL,
Generalized Attraction Model (GAM) ([62]), and the exogenous demand model ([79]). Furthermore,
Blanchet et al. [25] show that the unconstrained assortment optimization problem under the Markov
chain model is polynomial time solvable. Zhang and Cooper [130] also consider the Markov chain
model in the context of airline revenue management, and present a simulation study. In a recent pa-
per, Feldman and Topaloglu [58] study the network revenue management problem under the Markov
chain model and give a linear programming based algorithm.
In this chapter, we consider the capacity constrained assortment problem under the Markov chain
model. In this problem, every item i is associated with a weight wi, and the decision maker is restricted
to selecting an assortment whose total weight is at most a given bound, W . Therefore, we can formulate










where N denotes the universe of substitutable items and R(S) denotes the expected revenue for any
assortment S ⊆ N under the Markov chain model. For the special case of uniform item weights
(i.e. wi = 1 for all i), the capacity constraint reduces to a constraint on the number of items in the
assortment. We refer to this setting as the cardinality constrained assortment optimization problem:
max
S⊆N
{R(S) : |S| ≤ k} . (Cardinality-Assort)
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The cardinality and capacity constraints on assortments arise naturally in many applications, allowing
one to model practical scenarios, such as a shelf space constraint or budget limitations. Capacity con-
strained assortment optimization has been studied in the literature for many parametric choice models.
Davis et al. [51] give an exact algorithm for MNL under cardinality constraint, and more generally,
under totally-unimodular constraints. Gallego and Topaloglu [63] propose an exact algorithm for the
cardinality constrained problem for a special case of the nested logit model. More recently, Feldman
and Topaloglu [59] present an exact algorithm for the latter model when the cardinality constraint is
across different nests. Rusmevichientong et al. [104] devise a polynomial-time approximation scheme
(PTAS) for the cardinality constrained assortment problem under a mixture of MNL choice model.
Désir and Goyal [52] propose a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the capacity
constrained assortment problem under both the nested logit and the mixture of MNL models.
7.1.1 Our Contributions
Hardness of Approximation. We show that the capacity constrained assortment optimization
problem under the Markov chain model is NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than some
given constant, even when all items have uniform prices and unit weights. In this case, the capacity
constraint reduces to a bound on the number of items, i.e. to a cardinality constraint. It is interesting
to note that, while the unconstrained assortment optimization problem under the Markov chain choice
model can be solved optimally in polynomial time, the cardinality constrained problem is APX-hard.
In contrast, in both the MNL and Nested logit models, the unconstrained assortment optimization and
the cardinality constrained assortment problems have the same complexity.
We also consider the case of totally-unimodular (TU) constraints on the assortment. Note that
a cardinality constraint is a special case of TU constraints. These capture a wide range of practical
constraints such as precedence, display locations, and quality consistent pricing constraints ([51]). We
show that the assortment optimization problem under general totally-unimodular (TU) constraints for
the Markov chain choice model is hard to approximate within a factor of O(n1/2−ε) for any fixed ε > 0,
where n is the number of items. This result drastically contrasts that of Davis et al. [51], who prove
that the assortment optimization problem with TU constraints for the MNL model can be solved in
polynomial time.
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Approximation Algorithms: Uniform Prices. The above hardness results motivate us to consider
approximation algorithms for the capacity constrained assortment optimization problem under the
Markov chain choice model. For the special case, when all item prices are equal, we show that the
revenue function is submodular and monotone. Therefore, we can obtain a (1 − 1/e)-approximation
for the cardinality constrained problem using a greedy algorithm ([94]). In fact, for this special case of
uniform prices, we can get a (1− 1/e)-approximation for more general constraints such as a constant
number of capacity constraints ([80]) and matroid constraint ([40]).
It is worth mentioning that, from a practical point of view, the uniform-price setting turns the
objective function into that of maximizing sales probability. This scenario is very common when
products are horizontally-differentiated, i.e., differ by characteristics that do not affect quality or price,
such as iPads coming in a variety of colors, or yogurt with different amounts of fat-content.
Approximation Algorithms: General Prices. For the general case of non-uniform item prices,
the revenue function is neither submodular nor monotone. Moreover, the performance of the greedy
algorithm can be arbitrarily bad even for the cardinality constrained problem. Our main contribution
in this chapter is to present a “local-ratio” based algorithm to obtain a (1/2 − ε)-approximation for
the cardinality constrained assortment optimization problem under the Markov chain model. The
running time of our algorithm is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε. The algorithm is based on a
“local-ratio” paradigm that builds the solution iteratively. In each iteration, the algorithm makes an
appropriate greedy choice and then constructs a modified instance such that the final objective value
is the sum of the objective value of the current solution and the objective value of the solution in
the modified instance. Therefore, the local-ratio paradigm allows us to capture the externality of our
action in each iteration on the remaining instance by constructing an appropriate modified instance;
thereby, linearizing the revenue function even though the original objective function is non-linear. This
technique may be of independent interest. We also obtain a (1/3 − ε)-approximation for the general
capacity constrained assortment optimization problem using the local-ratio paradigm. Our approach
also provides an alternative strongly-polynomial exact algorithm for the unconstrained assortment
optimization problem under the Markov chain model.
Computational Results. We conduct a computational study to compare the numerical performance
of our algorithm. We focus on two particular issues: performance and computational efficiency. We
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present an exact mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation of the problem to compute the exact
optimal solution for comparison. In the numerical experiments, we observe that the practical perfor-
mance of our algorithm is significantly better than its worst-case theoretical guarantee. Specifically,
although the theoretical guarantee is (1/2 − ε) for the cardinality constrained problem, we observe
that the approximation ratio is 0.97 on average and at least 0.77 across all instances considered in our
experiments. With respect to computational efficiency, our algorithm is scalable and terminates in a
few seconds, and in fact, within one minute in the worst case over all large instances tested. On the
other hand, the MIP does not terminate even within a time limit of 2 hours on most of these large
instances (n = 200).
7.1.2 The Markov Chain Model and Notations
We denote the universe of n products by the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and the no-purchase option by 0,
with the convention that N+ = N ∪{0}. We consider a Markov chainM with states N+ to model the
substitution behavior of customers. This model is completely specified by initial arrival probabilities
λi for all states i ∈ N+ and the transition probabilities ρij for all i ∈ N+, j ∈ N+. If a retailer chooses
to offer a subset of products S to consumers, then the corresponding states in S of the Markov chain
become absorbing states. A customer arrives in state i with probability λi if the state is absorbing.
Otherwise, the customer transitions to a different state j 6= i and the process continues until the
customer reaches an absorbing state. In other words, the probability of a random customer purchasing
product i with S being the offer set of products is the probability that the customer reaches state i
before any other absorbing states in the underlying Markov chain.
Following [25], we assume that for each state j ∈ N , there is a path to state 0 with non-zero
probability. For a given offer set S ⊆ N , let π(i, S) be the choice probability that item i is chosen
when the assortment S is offered. Let pi denote the price of item i. For any assortment S, the expected




π(i, S) · pi.
For any (possibly empty) pairwise-disjoint subsets U, V,W ⊆ N+, let Pj(U ≺ V ≺ W ) denote the
probability that starting from j, we first visit some state in U before visiting any state in V ∪W ,
and subsequently visit some state in V before visiting any state in W , with respect to the transition
probabilities of M. Let P(U ≺ V ≺W ) = ∑nj=1 λjPj(U ≺ V ≺W ). Note that with this notation, we
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can write π(i, S) = P(i ≺ S+\{i}) where S+ = S ∪ {0} for all S ⊆ N (in this case, W = ∅).
7.1.3 Outline
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we present the hardness results
for the constrained assortment optimization problem under the Markov chain model. We present the
special case of uniform price items in Section 7.3. We also illustrate why several greedy algorithms,
including the one that is provably good for uniform prices, do not provide good approximations for
arbitrary prices. In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, we present the local-ratio paradigm and our algorithm for the
cardinality constrained problem. We present the generalization to the capacity constrained problem
in Section 7.6. Finally, the computational study is presented in Section 7.7.
7.2 Hardness of Approximation
In this section, we present our hardness of approximation results for the constrained assortment opti-
mization problem under the Markov chain choice model.
7.2.1 APX-hardness for Cardinality Constraint with Uniform Prices
We show that Cardinality-Assort is APX-hard, i.e., it is NP-hard to approximate within a given constant.
In particular, we prove this result even when all items have uniform prices.
Theorem 7.1. Cardinality-Assort is APX-hard, even when all items have equal prices.
Our proof is based on gap preserving reduction from the minimum vertex cover problem on 3-regular
(or cubic) graphs, to which we refer to as VCC. This problem is known to be APX-hard (see [3]). In
other words, for some constant α > 0, it is NP-hard to distinguish whether the minimum-cardinality
vertex cover is of size at most k or at least (1 + α)k for cubic graphs. Given any instance I of the
VCC problem with a cubic graph G = (V,E) and k > |E|/3, we construct an instance M(I) of
Cardinality-Assort as follows. We consider a Markov chain with states corresponding to each vertex in
G and an additional state 0 corresponding to the no-purchase item 0. Each state has a transition to
state 0 with probability 1/4. In addition, each state has transitions to the states corresponding to
their neighbors in G with probability 1/4 each (since G is a 3-regular graph, the sum of transition
probabilities out of any state is one).
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To prove the hardness result, we establish the following two properties: i) if the minimum vertex






, and ii) if the minimum vertex cover of instance I has size at least (1 +α)k, then the optimal







. Therefore, there is a constant gap
between the optimal objective value for instance M(I) of Cardinality-Assort for the two cases. Since
it is NP-hard to distinguish between the two cases for instance I, this implies that it is NP-hard to
approximate Cardinality-Assort better than some constant (strictly smaller than 1); thereby, proving the
APX-hardness of Cardinality-Assort. We would like to note that Cardinality-Assort is APX-hard even
for the special case of uniform item prices. Furthermore, our hardness reduction provides interesting
insights towards the structure of difficult instances of the problem.
We present a detailed proof of Theorem 7.1 in Appendix D.1.
7.2.2 Totally-Unimodular Constraints
We consider the assortment optimization under the Markov chain model for the more general case
of totally-unimodular constraints. Let xS ∈ {0, 1}|N | denote the incidence vector for any assortment
S ⊆ N where xSi = 1 if i ∈ S and xSi = 0 otherwise. The assortment optimization problem subject to




R(S) : AxS ≤ b
}
. (TU-Assort)
Here, A is a totally-unimodular matrix, and b is an integer vector. Note that the cardinality constraint
in Cardinality-Assort is a special case of TU-Assort. We show that TU-Assort is NP-hard to approximate
within factor O(n1/2−ε), for any fixed ε > 0 for the Markov chain model. This result drastically
contrasts that of [51], who proved that the assortment optimization problem with totally-unimodular
constraints can be solved in polynomial time when consumers choose according to the MNL model.
To establish our inapproximability results for TU-Assort, we demonstrate that totally-unimodular
constraints in the Markov chain model capture the distribution over permutations model as a special
case. Aouad et al. [7] show that even unconstrained assortment optimization under a general distribu-
tion over permutations (or rankings) model is hard to approximate within factor O(n1−ε) for any fixed
ε > 0 (n is the number of substitutable items). In an instance of the assortment optimization problem
over the distribution over permutations model, we are given a collection of items N = {1, . . . , n} with
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prices p1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn, respectively. In addition, we are given an arbitrary (known) distribution on K
preference lists, L1, . . . , LK , each of which specifies a subset of the items listed in decreasing order
of preference. A customer with a given preference list selects the most preferred item that is offered
(possibly the no-purchase item) according to his/her list. The goal is to find an assortment such that
the expected revenue is maximized.
Theorem 7.2. TU-Assort cannot be approximated in polynomial-time within a factor O(n1/2−ε), for
any fixed ε > 0, unless P = NP .
We present the proof in Appendix D.1.
7.3 Special Case: Uniform Price Items
In this section, we consider a special case of Cardinality-Assort when item prices are uniform, and prove
that this setting can be efficiently approximated within factor 1− 1/e.
7.3.1 Constant Factor Approximation Algorithm
When all prices are equal, we show that the revenue function is submodular and monotone. Using
the classical result of [94], we have that a greedy algorithm guarantees a (1 − 1/e)-approximation for
Cardinality-Assort for this special case of uniform prices. We start with a few definitions.
Definition 7.1. A revenue function R : 2N → R+ is monotone when for all S ⊆ N and i ∈ N , we
have R(S ∪ {i}) ≥ R(S).
Definition 7.2. A revenue function R : 2N → R+ is submodular when for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N and
i ∈ N\T , we have R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) ≥ R(T ∪ {i})−R(T ).
Theorem 7.3. When all items have uniform prices, the revenue function R(·) is submodular and
monotone.
Proof. Let p be the price of every item in N . Since item prices are identical, for every subset S and
item i ∈ N\S, we have
R(S ∪ {i}) = R(S) + p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S).
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Recall that P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S) is the probability that the Markov chain visits state i and then visits state 0
without visiting any state in S. When all prices are equal, the marginal increase in revenue by adding
item i is only due to the additional demand that item i is able to capture. Consequently, R(·) is
monotone as the quantity p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S) is non-negative. Moreover, the submodularity of R follows
from the fact that for all S ⊆ T , we have
R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) = p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ S) ≥ p · P(i ≺ 0 ≺ T ) = R(T ∪ {i})−R(T ).
Therefore, from the classical result of [94] for maximizing a monotone submodular function subject
to a cardinality constraint, we know that the greedy algorithm gives a (1− 1/e)-approximation bound
for Cardinality-Assort with uniform prices. Algorithm 7.1 describes this procedure in detail. Note that
Algorithm 7.1 Greedy Algorithm
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: While |S| < k and there exists i ∈ N\S such that R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) ≥ 0,
(a) Let i∗ be the item for which R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) is maximized, breaking ties arbitrarily.
(b) Add i∗ to S.
3: Return S.
for uniform prices, when |S| < k < n, the condition in Step 2 that there exist i ∈ N\S such that
R(S ∪ {i})−R(S) ≥ 0 is redundant as the revenue function is monotone, which is not necessarily true
for the case of arbitrary prices. Therefore, we include this condition to describe the greedy algorithm
for the general case to discuss implications for arbitrary prices.
More General Constraints for Uniform Prices. For the special case of uniform prices, since the
revenue function is monotone and submodular, we can exploit the existing machinery for approximately
maximizing submodular monotone functions subject to a wide range of constraints (see, for instance,
[83, 37, 80, 40]). This way, constant-factor approximations can be obtained for the assortment opti-
mization under the Markov chain model for more general constraints. For instance, Kulik et al. [80]
give a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm for maximizing a monotone submodular function under a fixed
number of knapsack (capacity) constraints, and Calinescu et al. [40] give a (1 − 1/e)-approximation
for maximizing a monotone submodular function under a matroid constraint.
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7.3.2 Bad Examples for Arbitrary Prices
The approximation guarantees we establish for uniform prices do not extend to the more general setting
with arbitrary prices, even for Cardinality-Assort. In what follows, we point out the drawbacks of the
natural greedy heuristics, including Algorithm 7.1, in approximating Cardinality-Assort for arbitrary
prices. Intuitively, the performance of Algorithm 7.1 for general prices can be bad since it can make
a low-price item absorbing that subsequently blocks all probabilistic transitions going into high price
items. We formalize this intuition in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. For arbitrary instances of Cardinality-Assort with a cardinality constraint of k, Algo-
rithm 7.1 can compute solutions whose expected revenue is only O(1/k) times the optimum.
Proof. Consider the following instance of Cardinality-Assort with n = k+ 1 items, where k is the upper
bound specified by the cardinality constraint. We have a state s and states i = 0, . . . , k. The arrival
rates are all equal to 0, except for λs which is equal to 1. Moreover
pi =
 (1/k) + ε if i = s1 if i = 1, . . . , k, ρij =

1/k if i = s and j = 1, . . . , k
1 if i = 1, . . . , k and j = 0
0 otherwise,














Figure 7.1: A bad example for Algorithm 7.1.
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picks item s as R({s}) = (1/k)+ ε while R({i}) = (1/k), for i = 1, . . . k. Once s is selected, adding any
other state cannot increase the revenue. Therefore, the greedy algorithm gives a revenue of (1/k) + ε.
However, the optimal solution is to offer items 1 to k, which gives a revenue of 1 in total. When ε
tends to 0, the approximation ratio goes to 1/k.
In fact, we can show that the above example is the worst possible and Algorithm 7.1 gives a
1/k-approximation for Cardinality-Assort.
Lemma 7.2. Algorithm 7.1 guarantees a 1/k-approximation for Cardinality-Assort.
We present the proof of the above lemma in Appendix D.2.
Modified Greedy Algorithm. The bad instance for Algorithm 7.1 shows that the algorithm may
focus too much on local improvements in each iteration, without taking into account the information of
the entire network induced by the probability transition matrix or the number of remaining iterations.
Therefore, we consider a modified greedy algorithm that accounts for the Markov chain structure by
using the optimal solution to the unconstrained assortment problem, where there is no restriction on
the number of items picked. This solution can be computed via an algorithm proposed by Blanchet et
al. [25] (we also give an alternative strongly-polynomial algorithm for the unconstrained problem in
Section 7.4.4). Intuitively, the items picked by the unconstrained optimal assortment should not block
each other’s demand too much. Let U∗ be the optimal unconstrained assortment whose associated




P(i ≺ U∗+\{i}) · pi. (7.1)
A natural candidate algorithm takes the k states with the largest P(i ≺ U∗+\{i}) · pi value within an
unconstrained optimal solution, and sets these states to be absorbing. Algorithm 7.2 describes this
procedure.
Algorithm 7.2 Greedy Algorithm on Optimal Unconstrained Assortment
1: Let U∗ be an optimal solution to the unconstrained problem.
2: Sort items of U∗ in decreasing order of P(i ≺ U∗+\{i}) · pi.
3: Return S = {top k items in the sorted order}.
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We show in the following lemma that even Algorithm 7.2 performs poorly in the worst case. In
fact, we present an example where every subset of k items of the optimal solution U∗ has revenue a
factor k away from the optimal.
Lemma 7.3. There are instances where the revenue obtained by Algorithm 7.2 is far from optimal by
a factor of k/|U∗| where k is the upper bound in the cardinality constraint.
Proof. Consider the following instance of the problem with n+ 2 items (or states). We have a state s
and states i = 1, . . . , n and state 0 corresponding to the no-purchase option. The arrival rates are all
equal to 0, except for λs which is equal to 1. Moreover
pi =
 1− ε if i = s1 if i = 1, . . . , n, ρij =

1/n if i = s and j = 1, . . . , n
1 if i = 1, . . . , n and j = 0
0 otherwise,












Figure 7.2: A bad example for Algorithm 7.2.
unconstrained optimal assortment is U∗ = {1, . . . , n}, and the greedy algorithm on U∗ selects k items
among U∗, meaning that a total revenue of k/n is obtained. However, the optimal solution of the
constrained problem is to only offer item s, which gives a revenue of 1 − ε. As ε tends to 0, the
approximation ratio goes to k/|U∗|.
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The poor performance of Algorithm 7.2 on the above example illustrates that an optimal assortment
for the constrained problem may be very different from that of its unconstrained counterpart. Hence,
searching within an unconstrained optimal solution for a good approximate solution to the constrained
problem can be unfruitful in general. It is worth noting that the lower bound of k/|U∗| for Algorithm
7.2 is tight, as stated in the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix D.3.
Lemma 7.4. Algorithm 7.2 guarantees a k/|U∗|-approximation algorithm to Cardinality-Assort.
The analysis of the two greedy variants for the cardinality constrained assortment optimization
under the Markov chain model provides important insights that we use towards designing a good
algorithm for the problem.
7.4 Local Ratio based Algorithm Design
In this section, we present the general framework of our approximation algorithm for the cardinality
and capacity constrained assortment optimization under the Markov chain model.
7.4.1 High-Level Ideas
As the example in Figure 7.1 illustrates, Algorithm 7.1 could end up with a highly suboptimal solution
due to picking items that cannibalize, i.e. block, the demand for higher price items. Picking the
highest price item will eliminate such a concern. However, a high price item might only capture very
little demand, and therefore, generate very small revenue as illustrated in the example in Figure 7.2.
When there is a capacity constraint on the assortment, picking such items may not be an optimal use
of the capacity. This motivates us to choose the highest price item in an appropriate consideration
set. Intuitively, the consideration set will consist of items that generate sufficiently high incremental
revenue.
We first give a high-level description of our algorithm that builds the solution iteratively. Let Mt
denote the problem instance in any iteration t. The algorithm (ALG) considers the following two steps
in each iteration t:
1. Greedy Selection. Define an appropriate consideration set Ct of items, and pick the “highest
price” item from Ct.
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2. Instance Update. Construct a new instance, Mt+1, of the constrained assortment optimization
problem with appropriately modified item prices and transition probabilities such that
ALG(Mt) = ∆t + ALG(Mt+1),
where ALG(·) is the revenue of the solution obtained by the algorithm on a given instance, and
∆t is the incremental revenue in the objective value from the item selected in iteration t.
The instance update step linearizes the revenue function even though the original revenue function
is non-linear, which is crucial for our iterative solution approach. We can also view the update rule as
a framework to capture the externality of our actions in each iteration of the algorithm. To completely
specify the algorithm, we need to provide a precise definition for the consideration set in the greedy step
and for the instance update step. For both cardinality and capacity constrained assortment optimiza-
tion problems, the instance update step is similar, as explained in Section 7.4.2. The consideration set,
however, depends on the particular optimization problem being considered and will be defined later on.
The intuition is to include items whose incremental revenue is above an appropriately chosen threshold.
Our algorithm can be viewed in a local-ratio framework (see, for instance, [18, 17, 19]). Therefore,
we will interchangeably refer to the instance updates as local-ratio updates. However, we would like
to note that the local-ratio framework does not provide a general recipe for designing an update rule
or analyzing the performance bound. In most algorithms in this framework, the update rule follows
from a primal-dual algorithm. However, for the capacity constrained assortment optimization problem
under the Markov chain model, we do not even know of any good LP formulation and the instance
update rule requires new ideas.
7.4.2 Instance Update in Local Ratio Algorithm
Notation. Given an instance M of the Markov chain model, we define an updated instance M(S)
given that S is made absorbing by modifying the item prices as well as the probability transition
matrix. Note that we index the updates by a set S. Therefore, the instance Mt introduced in the
preceding discussion is going to be thought of asM(St−1), where St−1 denotes the set of items picked
up to (and including) step t − 1. For an instance M(S), we will denote by pSi the updated price of
item i, and by ρSij the updated transition probabilities for every i ∈ N , j ∈ N+. Note that we do not
change the arrival rate to any state, i.e., λSi = λi for all i ∈ N . We also denote by RS : 2N → R the
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revenue function associated with the instance M(S) and by PS(·) the probability of any event with
respect to the instance M(S).
Price update. First, we introduce the price updates, such that when S is made absorbing, we
account for the revenue generated by every state j ∈ S. To this end, consider a unit demand at state
i /∈ S. This unit demand generates a revenue of pi when i is made absorbing. On the other hand,
when i is not absorbing, this unit demand at i generates a revenue of
∑
j∈S
Pi(j ≺ S+\{j}) · pj .
The above revenue (which was already accounted for by S) is lost when i is also made absorbing in
addition to S. Hence, the net revenue per unit demand at i when we make it absorbing, provided that




Pi(j ≺ S+\{j})pj ,
which we denote as the adjusted price pSi . Note that the adjusted prices can be negative, corresponding
to the situation where adding an item decreases the overall revenue. The price update is explicitly
described in Figure 7.3.
Transition probabilities update. Since the subset of states S is set to be absorbing, we will simply












1 if i ∈ S and j = 0
0 if i ∈ S and j 6= 0
ρij otherwise.
Figure 7.3: Instance update in local-ratio algorithm.
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We would like to note that the probabilities Pi(j ≺ S+\{j}), needed for our price updates, can
be interpreted as the choice probability π(j, S) for a modified instance with λi = 1 and λ` = 0 for
` 6= i. Therefore, these quantities can be efficiently computed via traditional Markov chain tools (see,
for instance, [25]).
7.4.3 Structural Properties of the Updates
We first show that the local-ratio updates allow us to linearize the revenue function.
Lemma 7.5. R(S1 ∪ S2) = R(S1) +RS1(S2) for every S1, S2 ⊆ N .
Proof. Assume without lost of generality that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, since the items in S1 ∩ S2 all have 0 as






















PS1(i ≺ S2+\{i})Pi(j ≺ S1+\{j})pj .
With the definition of ρS1 , note that all items of S1 are redirected to 0. This, together with the fact

























P(j ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pj +
∑
i∈S2
P(i ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{i})pi
=R(S1 ∪ S2),
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where the second equality holds since
∑
i∈S2
P(i ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{i})Pi(j ≺ S1+\{j}) = P(S2 ≺ j ≺ S1+\{j}),
as by the Markov property, both the left and right terms in the above equality denote the probability
that we will visit some state in S2 before any state in S1+, followed by state j ∈ S1 before any other
state in S1+.
The next lemma shows that the composition of two local ratio updates over subsets S1 and S2 is
equivalent to a single local ratio update over S1 ∪ S2. This property is crucial for repeatedly applying
local-ratio updates.
Lemma 7.6. Let S1 ⊆ N be some assortment, and let M1 =M(S1). For any S2 with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅,
the instance M1(S2) is identical to the instance M(S1 ∪ S2) in terms of item prices and transition
probabilities.
It suffices to verify that (pS1i )
S2 = pS1∪S2i for all S1,S2 and i /∈ S1 ∪S2, as the above identity clearly
holds for the transition matrix updates. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 7.5, and is presented
in Appendix D.4. Putting the previous two lemmas together gives the following claim.
Lemma 7.7. RS1(S2 ∪ S3) = RS1(S2) +RS1∪S2(S3) for any pairwise-disjoint sets S1, S2, S3 ⊆ N .
7.4.4 Warm-up: Exact algorithm for the Unconstrained Problem
As a warmup, we first present an alternative exact algorithm for the unconstrained assortment opti-
mization problem under the Markov chain model by using the local-ratio framework. Our algorithm is
based on the observation that it is always optimal to offer the highest price item for the unconstrained
problem, as it does not cannibalize the demand of other items. The latter property is implied by a
slightly more general claim, formalized as follows. For any x ∈ R, let [x]+ = max(x, 0).
Lemma 7.8. Let S ⊆ N . For any item i /∈ S with price pi ≥ [maxj∈S pj ]+, we have R(S∪{i}) ≥ R(S).
Proof. From Lemma 7.5, we have that
R(S ∪ {i}) = R(S) +RS({i}) = R(S) + PS(i ≺ 0) · pSi .
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Now, pi ≥ [maxj∈S pj ]+ and
pSi = pi −
∑
j∈S
Pi(j ≺ S+ \ {j}) · pj ≥ 0,
which implies R(S ∪ {i}) ≥ R(S).
The Algorithm. Based on the above lemma, we present an alternative exact algorithm for the
unconstrained assortment optimization problem under the Markov chain model. In particular, we
define the consideration set in each iteration to be the set of all items. Therefore, we select the highest
adjusted price item in every iteration (breaking ties arbitrarily) and update the prices and transition
probabilities according to the local ratio updates described in Figure 7.3. This selection and updating
process is repeated until all adjusted prices are non-positive, as explained in Algorithm 7.3.
Algorithm 7.3 Local Ratio for Unconstrained Assortment
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: While there exists i ∈ N\S such that pSi ≥ 0,
(a) Let i∗ be the item for which pSi is maximized, breaking ties arbitrarily.
(b) Add i∗ to S.
3: Return S.
Theorem 7.4. Algorithm 7.3 computes an optimal solution for the unconstrained assortment opti-
mization problem under the Markov chain model.
Proof. The correctness of Algorithm 7.3 is based on the observation that it is always optimal to offer
the highest adjusted price item, as long as this price is non-negative. Suppose item 1 is the highest
price item. From Lemma 7.8, we get R(S ∪ {1}) ≥ R(S) for any assortment S. Therefore, we can
assume that item 1 belongs to the optimal assortment. From Lemma 7.5, we can write
max
S⊆N
R(S) = R({1}) + max
S′⊆N\{1}
R{1}(S′).
It remains to show that, when we get to an iteration where our current absorption set is X, and the
adjusted price of every state in the modified instance M(X) is non-positive, then X is an optimal
solution to M. To see this, by repeated applications of Lemmas 7.5 and 7.6, we have
max
S⊆N
R(S) = R(X) + max
S′⊆N\X
RX(S′).
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However, since the adjusted price of every state in the instance M(X) is non-positive, we must have
RX(S′) ≤ 0 for all S′ ⊆ N\X. Hence, it is optimal not to make any state in M(X) absorbing, which
implies that X is an optimal solution to M.
Implications. Our algorithm for the unconstrained assortment optimization over the Markov chain
model provides interesting insights for some known results about the optimal stopping problem and
the assortment optimization over the MNL model. Blanchet et al. [25] relate the unconstrained
assortment problem to the optimal stopping time on a Markov chain (see [47]). In this problem, we
need to decide at each state i whether to stop and get the reward pi, or transition according to the
transition probabilities of the Markov chain. Moreover, there is an absorbing state 0 with price p0 = 0.
Algorithm 7.3 for the unconstrained assortment optimization problem gives an alternative strongly
polynomial time algorithm for the optimal stopping problem.
Blanchet et al. [25] prove that the MNL choice model is a special case of the Markov chain based
choice model. Therefore, by analyzing Algorithm 7.3 to solve the assortment optimization over the
MNL model, we can recover the structure of the optimal assortment being nested by prices, i.e., the
optimal assortment consists of the ` top-priced items for some `. We give an explicit expression for
our local ratio updates when the underlying choice model is MNL in Appendix D.5. Talluri and Van
Ryzin [122] prove that under the MNL choice model, the optimal assortment to the unconstrained
assortment optimization problem is nested by prices. From our derived expression, it is not difficult
to verify that these updates do not change the ranking of the adjusted item prices. Hence, combining
the correctness of Algorithm 7.3 with the latter observation provides an alternative way of showing
that the optimal assortment is nested by price under the MNL model.
7.5 Cardinality Constrained Assortment Optimization for General
Case
In this section, we present a (1/2 − ε)-approximation for the cardinality constrained assortment op-
timization under the Markov chain model, for any fixed ε > 0. Following the local-ratio framework
described in Section 7.4, our algorithm for the cardinality constrained case also selects a state with
high adjusted price in each step from an appropriate consideration set. The consideration set is defined
CHAPTER 7. CAPACITY CONSTRAINED ASSORTMENT OPTIMIZATION UNDER THE
MARKOV CHAIN BASED CHOICE MODEL 138
to avoid picking states that have a high adjusted price but capture very little demand. In particular,
the consideration set includes only items whose incremental revenue is at least a certain threshold.
The Algorithm. Our algorithm is iterative and selects a single item in each step. Let St be the set
of selected items by the end of step t, starting with S0 = ∅. We use σt to denote the item picked in
step t, meaning that St = {σ1, . . . , σt}. At every step t ≥ 1, we select the highest adjusted price item
(with respect to pSt−1 , breaking ties arbitrarily) among items in the following consideration set:
Ct =
{





where S∗ is the optimal solution, k is the cardinality bound, and α ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter whose value
will be optimized later. Note that Ct is defined at the beginning of step t, whereas St is defined at the
end of step t, and includes the item selected in this step. Once the item σt is selected, we recompute
the adjusted prices via the local ratio update described in Figure 7.3, and update the consideration set
to get Ct+1. The algorithm terminates when either k items have already been picked (i.e., upon the
completion of step k), or when the consideration set Ct becomes empty.
Guessing the value of R(S∗). Since the optimal revenue R(S∗) is not known a-priori, we need
to describe how the value of R(S∗) is approximately guessed to complete the algorithm’s description.
A natural upper bound for R(S∗) is R(U∗), when U∗ is the optimal unconstrained solution. From




∗)(1 + ε)j , j = 1, . . . , J
J = min {j ∈ N : Bj ≥ R(U∗)} .
(7.2)
Note that J = O(1ε log k). For each guess Bj for the true value of R(S
∗), we run the algorithm, and
eventually return the best solution found over all runs. Algorithm 7.4 describes the resulting procedure
for a particular choice of Bj and threshold α for the consideration set. Algorithm 7.5 describes the full
procedure for any given ε > 0.
7.5.1 Technical Lemmas
Prior to analyzing the performance guarantee of our algorithm, we present two technical lemmas. We
start by arguing that the revenue function is sublinear for general item prices.
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Algorithm 7.4 Algorithm with guess Bj and threshold α
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.
2: For all S, let C(S) = {i ∈ N\S : RS({i}) ≥ α·Bjk }.
3: While |S| < k and C(S) 6= ∅,
(a) Let i∗ be the item of C(S) for which pSi is maximized, breaking ties arbitrarily.
(b) Add i∗ to S.
4: Return S.
Algorithm 7.5 Local-ratio Algorithm for Cardinality-Assort with threshold α
1: Given any ε > 0, let J and Bj , j ∈ [J ] be as defined in (7.2).
2: For all j ∈ [J ], let Sj be the solution returned by Algorithm 7.4 with guess Bj and threshold α
3: Return argmaxj∈[J ]R(Sj).
Lemma 7.9. For all S1, S2 ⊆ N consisting only of non-negative priced items, R(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ R(S1) +
R(S2).
Proof. We have that
R(S1 ∪ S2) =
∑
j∈S1
P(j ≺ (S1 ∪ S2)+ \ {j}) · pj +
∑
j∈S2\S1




P(j ≺ (S1)+ \ {j}) · pj +
∑
j∈S2
P(j ≺ (S2)+ \ {j}) · pj
= R(S1) +R(S2),
where the first inequality follows as for any j ∈ Si (i = 1, 2), P(j ≺ (S1 ∪ S2)+ \ {j}) ≤ P(j ≺
(Si)+ \ {j}).
Next, we establish a technical lemma that allows us to compare the revenue of the optimal solution
R(S∗) with the revenue of the set returned by our algorithm, R(St). First, note that the consideration
sets along different steps are nested (i.e., C1 ⊇ C2 ⊇ · · · ). Therefore, once an item disappears from
the consideration set, it never reappears. This allows us to partition the items of S∗ according to the
moment they disappear from the consideration set (since either their adjusted revenue becomes too
small or they get picked by the algorithm). More precisely, let Z0 = S
∗ and for all t ≥ 1, we define the
following sets:
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• Zt = S∗ ∩ Ct denotes the items of S∗ which are in the consideration set Ct.
• Yt = Zt−1\Zt denotes the items of S∗ which disappear from the consideration set during step
t− 1.
• Y +t = {i ∈ Yt : p
St−1
i ≥ 0} denotes the items of Yt which have a non-negative adjusted price at
step t.
Note that these sets are all defined at the beginning of step t. The following lemma relates the adjusted
revenue of items in Zt−1 and Zt in terms of the marginal change in revenue, R(St)−R(St−1).
Lemma 7.10. For all t ≥ 1, R(St)−R(St−1) ≥ RSt−1(Zt)− (RSt(Zt+1) +RSt(Y +t+1)).
Proof. Recall that, by definition, Zt contains the items of S
∗ that are in the consideration set at the
beginning of step t. Since our algorithm picks the highest adjusted price item, σt, in the consideration
set Ct, we have p
St−1
σt ≥ pSt−1i ≥ 0 for all items i ∈ Zt. Therefore, by Lemma 7.8,
RSt−1(Zt) ≤ RSt−1(Zt ∪ {σt}). (7.3)
We now consider two cases, depending on whether the item σt appears in the optimal solution S
∗ or
not.
Case (a): σt /∈ S∗. From Lemma 7.7, RSt−1(Zt∪{σt}) = RSt−1({σt})+RSt(Zt). Consequently, from
inequality (7.3), we have
RSt−1(Zt) ≤ RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt)
= RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt+1 ∪ Yt+1)
≤ RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt+1 ∪ Y +t+1)
≤ RSt−1({σt}) +RSt(Zt+1) +RSt(Y +t+1),
where the second inequality holds since removing all negative adjusted price items can only increase
net revenue, and the last inequality follows from Lemma 7.9. Adding R(St−1) on both sides of the
inequality yields the desired inequality by Lemma 7.5.
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Case (b): σt ∈ S∗. From Lemma 7.7, RSt−1(Zt) = RSt−1({σt}) + RSt(Zt\{σt}). Then, similar to
the previous case, we have
RSt(Zt\{σt}) ≤ RSt((Zt+1 ∪ Y +t+1)\{σt}) ≤ RSt(Zt+1) +RSt(Y +t+1\{σt}).
Note that RSt(Y +t+1\{σt}) = RSt(Y +t+1) since pStσt = 0 and σt is an absorbing state in M(St). Adding
R(St−1) on both sides of the inequality concludes the proof.
From the above result, we obtain the following claim.











Since every item in S∗ must have non-negative price and S∗ = Z1 ∪ Y1 by definition, we have
R(S∗) ≤ R(Z1) + R(Y1) by sublinearity of the revenue function (see Lemma 7.9). Combining these
two inequalities concludes the proof.
7.5.2 Analysis of the Local-Ratio Algorithm
We show that the local-ratio algorithm gives a (1/2 − ε)-approximation for Cardinality-Assort for any
fixed ε > 0. In particular, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.5. For any fixed ε > 0, Algorithm 7.5 gives a (1/2−ε/2)-approximation for Cardinality-Assort.
Moreover, the running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Proof. For a fixed ε > 0, let j∗ be such that R(S
∗)
1+ε ≤ Bj∗ ≤ R(S∗). Let B = Bj∗ and consider the
solution returned by Algorithm 7.4 with guess B and threshold α. We consider two cases based on the
condition by which the algorithm terminates.
Case 1. If the algorithm stops after completing step k, then by linearity of the revenue when using the




RSt−1({σt}) ≥ αB ≥
α
1 + ε
·R(S∗) ≥ (1− ε)αR(S∗),
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where the above inequality holds since the item σt belongs to the consideration set Ct, and
therefore RSt−1({σt}) ≥ αB/k.
Case 2. Now, suppose the algorithm stops at the end of step k′ < k, after discovering that Ck′+1 = ∅.
From Lemma 7.11, we get
R(Sk′) +R




Now, since Ck′+1 = ∅, this implies that Zk′+1 = ∅. Moreover, from Lemma 7.9, we also have
RSj−1(Y +j ) < |Y +j | · α ·B/k for all j = 1, . . . , k′ + 1. Therefore,
k′+1∑
j=1






|Y +j | ≤ αB ≤ αR(S∗),
where the second inequality holds since
∑k′+1
j=1 |Y +j | ≤ k and the last inequality holds as B ≤
R(S∗). Therefore,
R(Sk′) ≥ R(S∗)− αR(S∗) = (1− α) ·R(S∗).
This shows that the approximation ratio attained by our algorithm is
min {(1− ε)α, 1− α} .
Picking α = 1/2 we obtain a (1/2− ε/2)-approximation for Cardinality-Assort.
Running time. Algorithm 7.5 considers J = O(1ε log n) guesses for R(S
∗). For any given guess Bj ,
the running time of Algorithm 7.4 is polynomial in the input size. Therefore, the overall running time
of Algorithm 7.5 is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Tight example. We show that Algorithm 7.5 is tight in the following sense: consider Algorithm 7.4
with input guess as the true value of R(S∗) and threshold α = 1/2, then there are instances for which
the approximation ratio is 1/2. In particular, we consider an instance with 3 items. The Markov chain
has 4 states N+ = {s, 1, 2, 0}. The prices are: ps = 1, p1 = p2 = 2. The arrival rate for state s is λs = 1
and all other states have an arrival rate of zero. The transition probabilities are given in Figure 7.4.
Consider the cardinality constrained assortment problem with cardinality bound, k = 1. The optimal
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assortment is S∗ = {s} with R(S∗) = 1. With guess R(S∗) and α = 1/2, the consideration set in the
first step is {s, 1, 2}, and therefore Algorithm 7.4 picks either 1 or 2, obtaining a revenue of R(S∗)/2.
We would like to note that our algorithm runs Algorithm 7.4 for different guesses Bj , j = 1, . . . , J
and returns the best solution across all runs. Therefore, the performance bound of our algorithm is
at least (1/2 − O(ε)) and possibly better. In fact, in our computational study, we observe that the
empirical performance of our algorithm is significantly better than the theoretical bound of (1/2−O(ε)).
We describe the computational study in Section 7.7. It is an interesting open question to provide a
tighter analysis of the approximation bound for Algorithm 7.5 that returns the best solution among










Figure 7.4: A tight example for Algorithm 7.5.
7.6 Capacity Constrained Assortment Optimization for General Case
In this section, we show how to approximate the capacity constrained problem under the Markov chain
model within factor 1/3− ε, for any fixed ε > 0. Recall that, unlike the simpler cardinality case, now
each item i has an arbitrary weight wi, and we have an upper bound W on the available capacity.
We assume without loss of generality that each item individually satisfies the capacity constraint, i.e.,
wi ≤W for all i ∈ N .
The Algorithm. We describe a local-ratio based algorithm, similar in spirit to the one for the
cardinality constrained problem, by suitably adapting the way consideration sets are defined. For
this purpose, instead of considering items whose incremental absorption revenue exceeds a certain
threshold, we only consider items whose incremental absorption revenue per unit of weight exceeds a
certain threshold.
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Again, our algorithm selects a single item in each step. Let St be the set of selected items by the
end of step t, starting with S0 = ∅. We use σt to denote the item picked in step t, meaning that
St = {σ1, . . . , σt}. At every step t ≥ 1, we select the highest adjusted price item (with respect to pSt−1 ,
breaking ties arbitrarily) among items in the following consideration set:
Ct =
{








where S∗ is the optimal solution, W is the capacity bound, and α ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter whose value
will be optimized later. Once the item σt is selected, we recompute the adjusted prices via the local
ratio update described in Figure 7.3. This selection and update process is repeated in every step until
either the consideration set becomes empty or adding the current item violates the capacity constraint.
Let t′ be such a step. In the former case, we stop and return St′−1. In the latter case, we take either
St′−1 or {σt′}, depending on which of these sets has a larger total revenue.
Guessing R(S∗). As in the case of cardinality constraints, since the value of R(S∗) is unknown,
we need to approximately guess the value R(S∗). We will use a procedure similar to the one given
in Section 7.5, with the exception of utilizing 1|U∗|R(U
∗) as a lower bound (see proof of Lemma 7.2
in Appendix D.2), where U∗ is the optimal unconstrained solution. In particular, we consider the




∗)(1 + ε)j , j = 1, . . . , J
J = min {j ∈ N : Bj ≥ R(U∗)} .
(7.4)
Note that J = O(1ε log n). Algorithm 7.6 provides a description of our approximation algorithm for
Capacity-Assort, given a particular guess Bj for R(S
∗) and threshold α, while Algorithm 7.7 describes
the complete procedure.
7.6.1 Analysis
To analyze the above algorithm, it is convenient to have a technical lemma similar to Lemma 7.11. By
defining the same sets Yt and Zt with respect to the optimal assortment S
∗ to Capacity-Assort and the
adapted consideration sets Ct, the exact same lemma holds. We therefore do not restate this claim
and its proof, as these are identical to those of Lemma 7.11. The following theorem shows that the
local-ratio algorithm gives a (1/3− ε)-approximation for Cardinality-Assort for any fixed ε > 0.
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Algorithm 7.6 Algorithm with guess Bj and threshold α
1: Let S be the set of states picked so far, starting with S = ∅.





i∈S wi < W and C(S) 6= ∅,
(a) Let i∗ be the item of C(S) for which pSi is maximized, breaking ties arbitrarily.
(b) If
∑
i∈S∪{i∗}wi < W , add i
∗ to S.
(c) Else return the highest revenue set among {i∗} and S.
4: Return S.
Algorithm 7.7 Local-ratio Algorithm for Capacity-Assort with threshold α
1: Given any ε > 0, let J and Bj , j ∈ [J ] be as defined in (7.4).
2: For all j ∈ [J ], let Sj be the solution returned by Algorithm 7.6 with guess Bj and threshold α
3: Return argmaxj∈[J ]R(Sj).
Theorem 7.6. For any fixed ε > 0, Algorithm 7.7 gives a (1/3−ε/3)-approximation for Capacity-Assort.
Moreover, the running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Proof. For a fixed ε > 0, let j∗ be such that R(S
∗)
1+ε ≤ Bj∗ ≤ R(S∗). Let B = Bj∗ and consider the
solution returned by Algorithm 7.6 with guess B and threshold α. We consider two cases based on the
condition by which the algorithm terminates. Let t′ be the step at which the algorithm terminates.
Case 1. Suppose we stop the algorithm since adding the item σt′ violates the capacity constraint, that
is,
∑t′
t=1wσt > W . In this case, we return either St′−1 or {σt′}, depending on which of these sets
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has a larger revenue. We argue that this choice guarantees a revenue of at least αR(S∗)/2, since





























≥ α · R(S
∗)
2(1 + ε)




where the third to last inequality holds since max{∑t′−1t=1 wσt , wσt′} ≥ W/2 and the second to
last inequality follows as B ≥ R(S∗)/(1 + ε).
Case 2. On the other hand, suppose the algorithm terminates since Ct′+1 = ∅. Using Lemma 7.11 adapted
to the capacitated case, we have
R(St′) +R




Since Ct′+1 = ∅, this implies that Zt′+1 = ∅. Moreover, from Lemma 7.9, for all j = 1, . . . , t′+ 1,
we have















Sj−1(Y +j ) < αB ≤ αR(S∗), and therefore,
R(St′) ≥ R(S∗)− αR(S∗) = (1− α)R(S∗).








By setting α = 2/3, we obtain an approximation factor of (1/3− ε/3).
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Running Time . Algorithm 7.7 considers J = O(1ε log n) guesses of R(S
∗). Each run of Algo-
rithm 7.6 for a given guess is polynomial time. Therefore, the overall running time of Algorithm 7.7 is
polynomial in the input size and 1/ε.
Tight example. Our analysis is tight in the following sense. When Algorithm 7.7 is run with the
true value of R(S∗), there are instances for which the approximation ratio is 1/3. For example, consider
the instance given in Figure 7.5. For a capacity bound of W = 1, the optimal assortment is S∗ = {b, c}.
Initially, all the items are in the consideration set and the algorithm picks item a, the highest price
item. In the next step, no item can be added to the assortment. The algorithm therefore returns
S = {a} since R({a}) > R({d}) and yields a revenue of R(S∗)/3 + O(ε). When ε goes to 0, the


































Figure 7.5: A tight example for Algorithm 7.7.
7.7 Computational Experiments
In this section, we present our results from a computational study to test the performance of Algo-
rithm 7.5 for the cardinality constrained assortment optimization for the Markov chain choice model.
In particular, we focus on testing: i) the performance of our algorithm with respect to an optimal
algorithm, and ii) the running time of this algorithm. We first present a mixed-integer programming
(MIP) formulation of Cardinality-Assort.
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7.7.1 A Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation





s.t. αi + βi −
n∑
j=1
ρjiβj = λi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n




αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, yi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
(7.5)
Lemma 7.12. The mixed-integer program (7.5) is an exact reformulation of Cardinality-Assort.





s.t. αi + βi −
n∑
j=1
ρjiβj = λi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
αi ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
(7.6)
Let (α, β) be an extreme point solution to the above LP, and let S = {i : αi > 0}. Feldman and
Topaloglu [58] show that αi is the choice probability π(i, S) when the assortment S is offered under
the Markov chain choice model. Hence, the objective value
∑n
i=1 αiri equals to R(S). By adding the
indicator variables yi, we are restricting ourselves to the subset of feasible solutions where at most k of
the αi-s are allowed to be strictly positive. Note that the extreme points of this polytope, corresponding
to the projection of the feasible space of the MIP down to the (α, β) coordinates, are exactly the set of
assortments S with cardinality at most k. Hence, (7.5) is a mixed-integer formulation of the cardinality
constrained assortment optimization problem.
7.7.2 Settings Tested
We proceed by describing the families of random instances being tested in our computational experi-
ments. Here, each item’s price pi is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. Note that since we
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present statistics regarding approximation factors, any constant here will give identical results, so the
choice of 1 is arbitrary. In each instance, we compute the optimal unconstrained assortment U∗ using
the LP given by [25]. We then choose the cardinality constraint k uniformly between 1 and |U∗|/2.
For the transition probabilities ρij and the arrival rates λi, we test our algorithm on three different
settings:
1. We generate n2 independent random variables Xij , each picked uniformly over the interval [0, 1].
We then set ρij = Xij/
∑n
j=0Xij for all i, j such that i 6= j. Since we do not allow self-loops
(i.e. ρii = 0), the number of random variables needed is n
2. For the arrival rates, we then
generate n independent random variables Yi, each picked uniformly over the interval [0, 1], and
set λi = Yi/
∑n
j=1 Yj for all i 6= 0.
2. In this setting, we sparsify the transition matrix of setting 1. More precisely, we additionally gen-
erate n2 independent random variable Zij , each following a Bernoulli distribution with parameter
0.2. For all i, j such that i 6= j, we set ρij = ZijXij/
∑n
j=0 ZijXij , where Xij are generated as
in setting 1. This is equivalent to eliminating each transition (i, j) with probability 0.8 and then
renormalizing. The arrival rates are generated similarly to setting 1.
3. The transition matrix in this last setting is one of a random walk. More precisely, we generate
n2 independent random variable Xij , each following a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.5.
We then set ρij = Xij/
∑n
j=0Xij for all i, j such that i 6= j. We also generate n random variables
Yi, each following a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.5, and set λi = Yi/
∑n
j=1 Yj for all
i 6= 0.
7.7.3 Results
We examine how our algorithm performs in term of both approximation and running time. Table 7.1
shows the approximation ratio of Algorithm 7.5 (with ε = 0.1) for the different settings and the
different values of n. We use the MIP formulation given in (7.5) to compute the optimal assortment.
As can be observed, the actual performance of our algorithm is significantly better than its worst case
theoretical guarantee. Indeed, in all settings tested, the average approximation ratio is always above
0.97. Moreover, the worst approximation ratio over all instances is above 0.77.
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Setting n
Approximation Ratio # instances within x% of OPT
# instances
Average Minimum 2% 5% 10% 20%
1 30 0.9783 0.7771 664 812 972 998 1,000
2 30 0.9784 0.7734 662 858 956 995 1,000
3 30 0.9830 0.7693 708 884 976 998 1,000
1 60 0.9803 0.8671 622 838 997 1,000 1,000
2 60 0.9796 0.8094 621 888 982 1,000 1,000
3 60 0.9854 0.8885 693 941 998 1,000 1,000
1 100 0.9763 0.9132 52 79 100 100 100
2 100 0.9782 0.8882 59 91 99 100 100
3 100 0.9848 0.9142 70 97 100 100 100
Table 7.1: Performance of Algorithm 7.5 for Cardinality-Assort.
The running time of our algorithm also scales nicely. Table 7.2 shows the performance of Algo-
rithm 7.5 in terms of running time for setting 2. The running times are very similar for the other
settings. On the other hand, while the MIP running time can be competitive in some cases, it blows
up when the number of products n gets large (see Table 7.2). Note that for n = 100, 12 out of the 100
n
Average Running Time Maximum Running Time
# instances
Algorithm 7.5 MIP Algorithm 7.5 MIP
30 0.18 0.17 0.67 0.25 1,000
60 0.74 0.67 1.25 29.34 1,000
100 3.18 278.20 9.16 10,226.98 100
200 31.98 ** 47.38 ** 20
Table 7.2: Running time of Algorithm 7.5 and the MIP for setting 2. ** Denotes the cases when we
set a time limit of 2 hours.
instances had a running time of at least 30 minutes. For n = 200, we set a time limit of 2 hours for the
MIP. Out of the 20 random instances generated, 16 reached the time limit without terminating. These
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numerical experiments suggest that Algorithm 7.5 is computationally efficient and that its numerical
performance is significantly better than the theoretical worst-case guarantee.
We also compare the performance of Algorithm 7.5 with the best solution found by the MIP
solver within a time limit that is equal to the running time for Algorithm 7.5 for the corresponding
instance. Table 7.3 shows the ratio between the performance of Algorithm 7.5 and that of the best
feasible solution found by the MIP within the allowed time limit as well as the duality gaps for the
best feasible solution. We observe that although the solver might not even terminate, it finds good
solutions within the time limit allowed. On average, the best MIP solution computed within the time
limit is slightly better than the solution computed by Algorithm 7.5. Although, for several instances,
Algorithm 7.5 outperforms the best MIP solution within the time limit (about 20% instances for n = 30
and 10% for n = 60). Therefore, the MIP solver spends a significant fraction of the time in reducing
the duality gap and proving optimality for large instances. It is interesting open question to find a
stronger LP formulation for the problem.
n




Average Maximum Average Maximum
30 0.9800 1.0851 200 2.64 % 34.85 % 1,000
60 0.9805 1.0108 101 10.42 % 69.68 % 1,000
100 0.9787 1.0100 6 15.21 % 52.18 % 100
200 0.9821 1.0029 4 19.06 % 99.60 % 100
Table 7.3: Comparison of Algorithm 7.5 with the best MIP solution when we allow the solver the same
time limit.
7.8 Discussion
As mentioned in Section 7.4, the unconstrained assortment problem to the optimal stopping time on a
Markov chain. In this problem, we need to decide at each state i whether to stop and get the reward
pi, or transition according to the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. Moreover, there is an
absorbing state 0 with price p0 = 0. The optimal stopping problem can be viewed as a special case
of Markov Decision Process (MDP). A standard methodology for solving a MDP is by solving a set
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of optimality equations, whose solution dictates the optimal action to take when in each state (in our
case, to stop or to continue transitioning). Solving the optimality equations is a well studied problem
in the MDP literature. The value iteration algorithm as well as the linear program used in [25] are
related to some of the standard algorithms used for solving the optimality equations (see e.g. Chapters
6 and 7 of [124]). It is worth mentioning that Algorithm 7.3 gives an alternative procedure to solve
the optimal stopping problem. Our algorithm is fundamentally different than the existing algorithm
as it is sequential in nature: it first decides on a state that it will stop at according to prices, and
subsequently modifies the problem in response to its decision and iteratively solve the subproblem.
This sequential exact algorithm resembles in spirit the Elimination algorithm presented in [115]. The
main difference is that the Elimination algorithm selects states that it will not optimal to stop at.
Whether there exists a sequential algorithm (building on our work and that of [115]) for solving a
general class of MDP is an interesting open question.
Building on our established connection further, the cardinality constraint assortment optimization
problem under the Markov Chain model is analogous to an optimal stopping problem where we impose
a constraint on the total number of states we can choose to stop at. To our knowledge, such a restriction
on the policy space has not been studied in the optimal stopping literature, and the tractability of
such problems is unknown until our work. For instance, the linear programming formulation given by
[25] turns into an integer program whose integrality gap is not bounded by any constant. On the other
hand, the approximation algorithms we present in Sections 7.5 and 7.6 can be adapted to solve optimal
stopping problems involving certain coupling constraints on the actions that a policy can take. Hence,
these algorithms are by no means limited to assortment planning problems, and may be of interest to
a much broader audience. Perhaps some of the ideas of our algorithms can be extended to solve other
MDPs with certain restriction on the policy space.
Another open research direction is to improve the approximation constant of Algorithms 7.5 and
7.7. For instance, our current algorithms use the same threshold α in constructing our consideration
set. One potential improvement would be to consider a threshold function that varies from iteration
to iteration. Unfortunately, we show in Appendix D.6 that no iteration varying implementation of
Algorithm 7.5 can improve the approximation constant using our current lines of analysis. Broadly
speaking, the criteria our sequential algorithm to select a new item in each iteration is a combination of
the incremental revenue that it brings (which indirectly incorporates the popularity of an item) versus
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its (adjusted51) profitability per unit of sale. Right now our algorithms account for this trade-off by
using the incremental revenue as a screening process to construct our consideration set and the adjusted
per unit profitability as the selection criteria. Note that we can potentially improve the approximation
ratio by considering other functions forms to address the trade-off between the two aforementioned
criteria.
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submodular function subject to a matroid constraint. SIAM Journal on Computing, 40(6):1740–
1766, 2011.
[41] Christopher P. Chambers. Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model. Journal of Math-
ematical Economics, 40(8):953 – 962, 2004.
[42] Chandra Chekuri and Sanjeev Khanna. Approximation algorithms for minimizing average
weighted completion time. Handbook of Scheduling: Algorithms, Models, and Performance Anal-
ysis, 2004.
[43] Chandra Chekuri and Sanjeev Khanna. A polynomial time approximation scheme for the multiple
knapsack problem. SIAM Journal on Computing, 35(3):713–728, 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 159
[44] Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Truth, justice, and cake
cutting. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1):284–297, 2013.
[45] Yukun Cheng and Sanming Zhou. A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design Without
Money for Facility Games, pages 117–128. Springer International Publishing, 2015.
[46] Maurice Cheung and David B. Shmoys. A primal-dual approximation algorithm for min-sum
single-machine scheduling problems. In Leslie Ann Goldberg, Klaus Jansen, R. Ravi, and José
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[83] Jon Lee, Maxim Sviridenko, and Jan Vondrák. Submodular maximization over multiple matroids
via generalized exchange properties. Mathematics of Operations Research, 35(4):795–806, 2010.
[84] Avishay Maya and Noam Nisan. Incentive compatible two player cake cutting. In Proceedings
of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), pages 170–183,
2012.
[85] Daniel McFadden, Kenneth Train, et al. Mixed mnl models for discrete response. Journal of
applied Econometrics, 15(5):447–470, 2000.
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Appendix A
Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise
Constant and Piecewise Uniform
Valuations
Proof of Proposition 3.2
We begin with some notations. Let len(X) denote the length of X ⊆ [0, 1]. Since the value density
function is piecewise uniform, it suffices to consider the length of pieces of the cake that are desired by
each agent.
Let S ⊆ N be a coalition of agents who misreport their value density function.
Let I denote the instance where every agent reports truthfully and I ′ denote the instance where agents
in S misreport.
Let D1, . . . , Dn ⊆ [0, 1] denote the pieces of cake that are truly desired by each agent.
Let D′1, . . . , D
′
n ⊆ [0, 1] denote the desired pieces of cake that are reported by each agent. In other
words, D′i = Di if and only if i /∈ S.
Let X1, . . . , Xn ⊆ [0, 1] denote the allocation received by each agent under truthful reports.
Let X ′1, . . . , X
′
n ⊆ [0, 1] denote the allocation received by each agent when the agents in S misreport.
Let B1, . . . , Bk be the bottleneck sets of agents arranged in the order that they are being allocated by
the algorithm in instance I.
Let B′1, . . . , B
′
p be the bottleneck sets of agents arranged in the order that they are being allocated by
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the algorithm in instance I ′.
Moreover, since every agent belonging to the same bottleneck set receives an allocation of the same
length under CCEA for this special case. We let len(Bi) denote the length of the allocation each agent
receives in the bottleneck set Bi. Let
B+l = {i ∈ Bl | len(X ′i ∩Di) ≥ len(Xi ∩Di) = len(Xi)}52,
and
B−l = {i ∈ Bl | len(X ′i ∩Di) ≤ len(Xi)}.
In other words B+l is the subset of agents of Bl who weakly gain in utility when the agents in S
misreport, and B−l is the subset of agents of Bl who weakly lose in utility when the agents in S
misreport. We will show that for all l = 1, . . . , k, Bl = B
−
l . This would then directly imply that no
one in coalition S can strictly benefit by misreporting.
We will prove this result via induction on l. In order to carry on with the induction, we will show
that no agent in B1 appears in the coalition S. We begin with a lemma.
Lemma A.1. For every agent i, len(X ′i ∩Di) ≥ len(B1).
Proof. Suppose not, let i be an agent such that len(X ′i ∩ Di) < len(B1). It must be the case that i
reported his valuation truthfully. Consequently, the following set of inequalities hold for agent i:
len(X ′i) = len(X
′
i ∩D′i) = len(X ′i ∩Di) < len(B1),
where the first equality follows the free disposal assumption. The second equality follows from Di = D
′
i.
Let B′l be the bottleneck set that i belongs to in the instance I
′. Then we have len(B′1) ≤ len(B′l) =
len(X ′i) < len(B1). This is because, the length of allocation of agents is non-decreasing with respect
to the index of bottleneck sets. We refer the readers to Lemma 3.4 of [44] for a proof of this fact. It
is clear that B′1 cannot contain an agent who misreports in I
′, since a misreporting agent in B′1 only
receives a piece of cake with length len(B′1) < len(B1), which is strictly less than what he would’ve
gotten had he reported truthfully. Hence, every agent in B′1 must report his true preference in I
′.
52The fact that len(Xi ∩Di) = len(Xi) makes use of the free disposal property, i.e. the allocation that the mechanism
gives agent i is a subset of the pieces desired by agent i under truthful reports.
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On the other hand, since B′1 is the first bottleneck set in I




j) ∩ [0, 1])
|B′1|
=
len((∪j∈B′1Dj) ∩ [0, 1])
|B′1|
≥ len((∪j∈B1Dj) ∩ [0, 1])|B1|
= len(B1),
which leads to a contradiction.
Lemma A.2. It is the case that B1 = B
−
1 . In other words, no agent in B1 is strictly better off when
some subset of agents misreport their preference.
Proof. Suppose not, then there exists some j ∈ X1 such that len(X ′j ∩ Dj) > len(Xj). We also
established in the previous lemma that len(X ′i ∩ Di) ≥ len(B1) = len(Xi) for all i ∈ B1. Summing
over i ∈ B1, we get that
len(∪i∈B1(X ′i ∩Di)) =
∑
i∈B1
len(X ′i ∩Di) >
∑
i∈B1
len(Xi) = len(∪i∈B1Xi) = len(∪i∈B1Di),
where the first two equalities follow from the fact that the Xi’s and X
′
i ∩Di’s are disjoint subsets and
the third equality follows from the way the algorithm allocates to the agents in the smallest bottleneck
set. But this set of inequalities contradict the fact that ∪i∈B1(X ′i ∩Di) ⊆ ∪i∈B1Di, which implies that
len(∪i∈B1(X ′i ∩Di)) ≤ len(∪i∈B1Di). Hence, it must be the case that for every i ∈ B1, we have that
len(X ′i ∩Di) = len(Xi), which implies that i ∈ B−1 .
Lemma A.3. No agent in B1 appears in the coalition S and B1 is also the first bottleneck set for I
′.
Proof. By the previous lemma, no agent in B1 is strictly better off by misreporting his preference.
Thus, if any agent in B1 is in S, then he makes himself no worse off and simultaneously make some
other agent in S strictly better off. Let’s examine the collective allocation of agents in B1 in the
instance I ′. We get that
len(∪i∈B1X ′i) ≥ len(∪i∈B1(X ′i ∩Di)) ≥ len(∪i∈B1Xi),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1. This implies that the agents in B1 collectively obtain
an allocation that is no smaller than the allocation they would get had they reported truthfully. Thus,
having a subset of agents in X1 misreport will not benefit the other agents in the coalition S. Hence,
without lost of generality, we may assume that no agent in B1 appears in the coalition S. Provided
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that every agent in B1 also reports truthfully in I
′, there is no incentive for an agent that belongs to
a subsequent bottleneck set in I to misreport and prevent B1 from being the first bottleneck set in I
′
since that would make the misreporting agent strictly worse off.53
Since no agent in B1 appears in the coalition S and B1 is also the first bottleneck set for I
′, we
can remove B1 from N and ∪i∈B1Xi from [0, 1] and induct on the set of remaining agents N\B1 and
the remaining piece of cake [0, 1]\ ∪i∈B1 Xi to be allocated. The proof is complete by invoking the
inductive hypothesis with B2 being the first bottleneck set in the new instance.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 The first impossibility result assumes that the algorithm disposes the
intervals desired by no agent. Consider the following two agent profiles.
Profile 1:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.2, 1]
v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 0.6], v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ (0.6, 1]











[0, 0.2] ∪ 1
2
(0.6, 1]
where p[a, b] for some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 denotes a subinterval of [a, b] with length p times that of [a, b]. Let
A ⊂ (0.6, 1] be the allocation that agent 2 receives in this case.
Now consider profile 2:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.2, 1]
53Note that the lexicographical tie breaking rule for bottleneck sets is needed in this case.
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v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, 1]\A, v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ A
In this case, all intervals other than [0, 0.2] and A are discarded because no agent desires them.The










[0, 0.2] ∪ 1
2
A
Hence, agent 2 in profile 2 would misreport so that the reported profile is profile 1.
The second impossibility result assumes that the algorithm does not dispose the intervals desired
by no agent. Consider the following two agent profiles.
Profile 1:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2], v1(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.2, 1]
v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.2, 1]










[0, 0.2] ∪ 1
2
(0.2, 1]
Let A ⊂ (0.2, 1] be the allocation that agent 1 receives in this case.
Now consider profile 2:
v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2] ∪A, v1(x) = 0 otherwise
v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ [0, 0.2], v2(x) = 0 if x ∈ (0.2, 1]
The uniform allocation rule gives us the allocation:
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Hence, agent 1 in profile 2 would misreport so that the reported profile is profile 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
We first prove that MCSD is well-defined and results in a feasible allocation in which each agent
gets 1/n size of the cake. Let J ′ = {J1, . . . , J`} be a partitioning of the interval [0, 1] induced by the
discontinuity points in agent valuations and the cake cuts in the n! cake allocations. We make a couple
of claims about J ′ that following from the way J ′ is constructed.
Claim A.1. An agent is completely indifferent over each subinterval in J ′.
Claim A.2. Let Xπi denote a maximum preference cake piece of size 1/n chosen by agent i in the
serial order π. For each J ∈ J ′ either Xπi contains J completely or it does not contain any part of J .
Now consider a matrix of dimension n! × `: B = (bij) such that bij = 1 if Jj ⊂ Xπi and bij = 0 if
Jj 6⊂ Xπi . Since for each π ∈ ΠN , each agent i ∈ N gets 1/n of the cake in Xπi , then it follows that∑n!
i=1
∑`











Also consider a matrix of dimension n× `: P = (pij) such that pij denotes the fraction of Jj that
agent i gets in Yi. From the algorithm MCSD, we know that pij =
count(i,Jj)
n! where count(i, Jj) is the
number of permutations in which i gets Jj . It is immediately seen that each column sums up to 1.
Hence each Jj is complete allocated to the agents. We now prove that each agent gets a total cake
piece of size 1/n. We do so by showing that
∑`
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Hence X = (X1, . . . , Xn) the allocation returned by MCSD is a proper allocation of the cake in
which each agent gets a total cake piece of size 1/n.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Define v̄i = vi for a ≤ x ≤ b and v̄i(x) = v̄i(x + (b − a)) recursively for x outside of [a, b] (i.e.








b− adx = α
∫ b
a
v̄i(x)dx = αVi([a, b]).



















which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3.8
a = [0, 0.25], b = (0.25, 0.5], c = (0.5, 0.75], d = (0.75, 1]
Consider the following two profiles of valuations.
Profile 1:
v1(x) = 4 if x ∈ a, v1(x) = 3 if x ∈ b, v1(x) = 2 if x ∈ c, v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ d
v2(x) = 3 if x ∈ a, v2(x) = 4 if x ∈ b, v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ c, v2(x) = 2 if x ∈ d






















v1(x) = 4 if x ∈ a, v1(x) = 2 if x ∈ b, v1(x) = 3 if x ∈ c, v1(x) = 1 if x ∈ d
APPENDIX A. CAKE CUTTING ALGORITHMS FOR PIECEWISE CONSTANT AND
PIECEWISE UNIFORM VALUATIONS 175
v2(x) = 2 if x ∈ a, v2(x) = 4 if x ∈ b, v2(x) = 1 if x ∈ c, v2(x) = 3 if x ∈ d
Running MCSD gives us the allocation:
X1 = a ∪ c
X2 = b ∪ d
Note that agents with true valuation in profile 1 would misreport together to profile 2, which gives
them a higher utility of 1.5 each as opposed to 1.25 had they reported truthfully. This means that
MCSD is not group strategyproof even for 2 agents. MCSD is not strategyproof because its allocation
in profile 1 is Pareto dominated by its allocation in profile 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.9
Consider a profile of three agents, each with piecewise uniform valuation function.
v1(x) = 1.5 if x ∈ [0, 2/3], 0 otherwise
v2(x) = 1.5 if x ∈ [0, 1/3] ∪ (2/3, 1], 0 otherwise
v3(x) = 1.5 if x ∈ (1/3, 1], 0 otherwise
Let a = [0, 1/3], b = (1/3, 2/3], c = (2/3, 1].
We adopt the following implementation of MCSD: when it is agent i’s turn to pick, out of the pieces
of the remaining cake that he likes, he takes the left-most such piece with length 1/n, where n is the
number of agents.
If the priority ordering were 1, 2, 3, then a feasible assignment that respects the preferences is 1 ←
a, 2 ← c, 3 ← b.
If the priority ordering were 1,3,2, then a feasible assignment that respects the preferences is 1← a,
3← b, 2← c.
If the priority ordering were 2, 1, 3, then a feasible assignment that respects the preferences is 2← a,
1← b, 3← c.
If the priority ordering were 2, 3, 1, then a feasible assignment that respects the preferences is 2← a,
3← b, 1← c.
If the priority ordering were 3, 1, 2, then a feasible assignment that respects the preferences is 3← b,
1← a, 2← c.
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If the priority ordering were 3, 2, 1, then a feasible assignment that respects the preferences is 3← b,
2← a, 1← c.




[0, 1/3] ∪ 1
6












(1/3, 2/3] ∪ 1
6
(2/3, 1]
Clearly, agent 1 envies agent 3 in this case.
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Appendix B
Approximately Optimal Mechanisms
for Strategyproof Facility Location:
Minimizing Lp Norm of Costs
B.1 An Alternative Definition of Individual Cost
Let g be a strictly increasing and convex C1 function on [0,∞) with g(0) = g′(0) = 0. Note that
g(x) = xp satisfies this description for all p > 1. We consider a scenario where the cost of agent i
is C(xi, y) = g(|xi − y|) when the mechanism is deterministic and locates the facility at y. Similarly
C(xi, π) = Ey∼π[g(|xi − y|)] when the mechanism is randomized and locates the facility according to
distribution π. The social cost function h(|x1 − y|, |x2 − y|) is only assumed to be (1) anonymous
(h(d, d′) = h(d′, d)) and (2) satisfy that for all a ∈ (min {x1, x2},max {x1, x2}) where x1 6= x2, h(|x1 −
a|) + h(|x2 − a|) < h(|x2 − x1|). Note that for p > 1, the Lp norm of the distances and the Lp norm
of the costs (for the general g above) both satisfy these conditions. We show that in this case, no
randomized strategyproof mechanism satisfying shift invariance, scale invariance and ex-post Pareto
efficiency for n = 2 can help us improve the approximation ratio relatively to the median mechanism.
Theorem B.1. Let f be a randomized mechanism satisfying shift invariance and scale invariance,
and ex-post Pareto efficiency for n = 2. Assume f is strategyproof with respect to the individual cost
function C(xi, y) = g(|xi − y|), where g is a strictly increasing and convex C1 function on [0,∞) with
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g(0) = g′(0) = 0. If the social cost function satisfies (1) and (2), then the approximation ratio of f is
at least as large as the median’s.
Proof. Using a proof similar to that of Lemma 4, we may assume without loss of generality that f is
symmetric. Consider a profile where n = 2 and x1 = 0, x2 = 1. Let Y = f(0, 1). We would like that
P(Y ∈ (0, 1)) = 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there there exists x ∈ (0, 12) such that
P(Y ∈ (x, 1 − x)) = q > 0. Now suppose agent 2 now misreports his location to 1 + ε for some small
ε > 0 such that 11+ε > 1− x. By shift and scale invariance, f(0, 1 + ε) = (1 + ε)Y . Then the difference
in cost for agent 2 between the two profile of reports is
E[g
(















(g((1 + ε)y − 1)− g(1− y))dF (y)




g(1− x∗)− g(1− (1 + ε)x∗)
)
where x∗ ∈ arg miny∈[x,1−x] g(1− y)− g(1− (1 + ε)y). The inequality follows from the fact that g((1 +
ε)y−1)−g(1−y) ≤ g(ε) for all y ∈ [ 11+ε , 1] and that g(1−y)−g(1−(1+ε)y) ≥ g(1−x∗)−g(1−(1+ε)x∗)




















− q g(1− x
∗)− g(1− (1 + ε)x∗)
ε
≤ P(Y = 1)g′(0)− qg′(1− x∗)x∗ < 0
The third inequality follows from g′(0) = 0 and g′(1−x∗) > 0 (since g is strictly convex). This implies
that E[g
(






] < 0 for ε sufficiently small, implying that there is a profitable
deviation for agent 2.
B.2 Omitted Proofs from Section 4.2
Proof of Lemma 6. First, let us prove that the two conditions imply strategyproofness. By shift in-
variance and anonymity, it suffices to check strategyproofness for profiles where x1 = 0 and x2 ≥ 0.
Moreover, any scale invariant mechanism is trivially strategyproof with respect to the profile (0, 0)
since scale invariance implies f(0, 0) = 0, which means that no agent has incentive to misreport his
location.54 Thus, we can assume that x2 > 0. It suffices to show that agent 2 cannot benefit by
54f(0, 0) = 0 follows from, say, f(0, 0) = f(0 · 1, 0 · 1) = 0 · f(1, 1) = 0, where the second equality is by scale invariance.
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deviating from his true location if the two aforementioned conditions hold. Since x2 > 0, we can
denote agent 2’s deviation x′2 as cx2 for some c ∈ R. Moreover, we can assume that c ≥ 0. This
can be justified as follows. Assume c < 0. Note that by symmetry, in any fixed profile z, the closer
a point is to mz, the smaller the expected distance of the facility is from that point. In particu-
lar, this implies that C(x2, f(0,−cx2)) ≤ C(−x2, f(0,−cx2)). But also note that by scale invariance,
C(−x2, f(0,−cx2)) = C(x2, f(0, cx2)). Thus, C(x2, f(0,−cx2)) ≤ C(x2, f(0, cx2)). Consequently, if
reporting cx2 is a profitable deviation for agent 2 for some c < 0, then reporting −cx2 is also a prof-
itable deviation for the agent.
When agent 2 reports his location to be cx2, where c > 1, the change in cost incurred by agent 2
is (where Corig is the expected cost of agent 2 under truthful reporting and Cdev is the expected cost
of agent 2 under misreporting):

































ydF (y) + (c− 1)
∫
(x2,∞)
ydF (y) + (c− 1)x2P(Y = x2).
Hence, when condition 1 holds, we have that −(c − 1)
∫
(−∞,x2) ydF (y) + (c − 1)
∫
(x2,∞) yF (y) + (c −
1)x2P(Y = x2) ≥ 0, which means that Cdev − Corig ≥ 0.
Similarly, when 0 ≤ c < 1, the change in cost incurred by agent 2 is:


































ydF (y)− (1− c)
∫
(x2,∞)
ydF (y) + (1− c)x2P(Y = x2).
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Hence, when condition 2 holds, we have that (1− c)
∫
(−∞,x2) ydF (y)− (1− c)
∫
(x2,∞) ydF (y) + (1−
c)x2P(Y = x2) ≥ 0, which means that Cdev − Corig ≥ 0. Hence, the mechanism is strategyproof for
any profile x with x1 = 0 < x2.
To prove the other direction, suppose condition 1 does not hold for some profile x with x1 = 0 < x2.




(x2,∞) ydF (y)+x2P(Y = x2) ≤ −ε
for some x2 > 0. We choose c > 1 s.t. P(Y ∈ [x2c , x2)) < ε4x2 , then we have that


























ydF (y) + x2P(Y = x2))
< −(c− 1) ε
2
< 0,
which contradicts strategyproofness of the mechanism.
Similarly, suppose condition 2 does not hold for some profile x with x1 = 0 < x2. Then there exists




(x2,∞) ydF (y) + x2P(Y = x2) ≤ −ε for some x2 > 0.
We choose 0 < c < 1 s.t. P(Y ∈ (x2, x2c ])) < ε4x2 , then we have that


























ydF (y) + x2P(Y = x2))
< −(1− c) ε
2
< 0,
which contradicts strategyproofness of the mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let f be as given above. Assume f violates both (1) and (2) on some profile
x (otherwise, there is nothing to prove: we can take g = f). By shift invariance we may assume
without loss of generality that x1 = 0. We may assume by anonymity and shift invariance that
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x1 = 0 < x2. Let Y ∼ f(x). Let p1 = P(Y ∈ (mx, x2)) + P(Y=mx)2 = P(Y ∈ (x1,mx)) +
P(Y=mx)
2 ,
p2 = P(x2,∞) = P(−∞, x1), z1 = E[Y 1(Y ∈(x1,mx))]+mxP(Y=mx)/2p1 , and z
′




, z′2 = E[Y |Y ∈ (x2,∞)].55
Consider a random variable Y ′′ obtained from Y as follows: P(Y ′′ ∈ {z′1, x1, z1, z2, x2, z′2}) = 1,
P(Y ′′ = z′1) = P(Y
′′ = z′2) = p2, P(Y
′′ = z1) = P(Y
′′ = z2) = p1, and P(Y
′′ = x1) = P(Y
′′ = x2) =
P(Y = x1) = P(Y = x2). Clearly, Y
′′ is symmetric about the midpoint mx. Since the social cost
function is convex, it follows that E[sc(x, Y ′′)] ≤ E[sc(x, Y )].
Now, consider a random variable Y ′ obtained from Y ′′ as follows. We construct Y ′ from Y ′′ by
shifting parts of the probability mass at z1 and z
′
1 to x1 as well as by shifting parts of the probability
mass at z2 and z
′
2 to x2 while ensuring that E[Y ′] = E[Y ′′]. Specifically, since z1 < x1 < z′1, we
can write x1 = λz1 + (1 − λ)z′1 for some 0 < λ < 1. One way to shift the probability mass is to
subtract probability λp and (1 − λ)p from z1 and z′1 respectively and add probability p to x1 for p
sufficiently small (do the same transformation for points z2, z
′
2, and x2). This transformation ensures
E[Y ′] = E[Y ′′] because
(p1 − λp)z1 + (p2 − (1− λ)p)z2 + (P(Y ′′ = x1) + p)x1 = p1z1 + p2z2 + P(Y ′′ = x1)x1.
In order to maximize the shift in probability mass, we choose the largest p possible or p = min(p1λ ,
p2
1−λ).
If p = p1λ , then P(Y
′ ∈ {z′1, x1, x2, z′2}) = 1, as P(Y ′ = z′1) = P(Y ′ = z′2) = p2 − (1 − λ)p, and
P(Y ′ = x1) = P(Y
′ = x2) = P(Y
′′ = x1) + p. Else if p =
p2
1−λ , then P(Y
′ ∈ {x1, z1, z2, x2}) = 1,
P(Y ′ = z1) = P(Y
′ = z2) = p1 − λp, and P(Y ′ = x1) = P(Y ′ = x2) = P(Y ′′ = x1) + p. It is clear
from construction that Y ′ is symmetric about mx. Convexity implies E[sc(x, Y ′)] ≤ E[sc(x, Y ′′)], and
so E[sc(x, Y ′)] ≤ E[sc(x, Y )].
Now, let g be a mechanism that locates the facility according to Y ′ given profile x. Note that there
is a unique way to extend the definition of g to all other two-agent profiles such that g is shift and scale
invariant as well as symmetric; let us extend the definition of g that way. Furthermore, this extension
is easily seen to imply the following:
55Note that if P(Y = mx) = 0, then z1 is the conditional expectation of Y given that Y ∈ (x1,mx). When P(Y =
mx) > 0, imagine that whenever Y = mx, we flip a fair coin; then z1 is the conditional expectation of Y given that
Y ∈ (x1,mx) or Y = mx and the coin lands on heads. z2 can be defined in a similar manner (replace (x1,mx) with
(mx, x2) and heads with tails). From this description it is clear that z1 ∈ (x1,mx], z2 ∈ [mx, x2), and that they are
symmetric about mx.
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1. Since E[sc(x, g(x))] ≤ E[sc(x, f(x))] for the profile x, the social cost obtained by mechanism g
via the extension is no more than the one obtained by mechanism f for all two-agent profiles.
2. If P(g(x) ∈ (x1, x2)) = 0, then P(g(q) ∈ (q1, q2)) = 0 for all two-agent profiles q. Similarly,
if P(g(x) ∈ (−∞, x1) ∪ (x2,∞)) = 0, then P(g(q) ∈ (−∞, q1) ∪ (q2,∞)) = 0 for all two-agent
profiles q.
Thus, all that is left for us to do is to show strategyproofness of g. We can do so by verifying the
conditions in Lemma 6 (the fact that it holds for all the required profiles is then again immediate by
shift and scale invariance). When p = p1λ , we claim that it suffices to show that:
−z′1(p2−(1−λ)p)+z′2(p2−(1−λ)p)+x2(P(Y ′ = x2)+p) ≥ −z′1p2−z1p1−z2p1 +z′2p2 +x2P(Y = x2),
and that
z′1(p2− (1− λ)p)− z′2(p2− (1− λ)p) + x2(P(Y ′ = x2) + p) ≥ z′1p2 + z1p1 + z2p1− z′2p2 + x2P(Y = x2).
To justify this claim, we need to show that the right hand sides are always greater than or equal to 0.




2, and p2 were defined so that the right hand sides amount exactly to the
conditions of Lemma 6 for f on the profile x, and thus must be greater than or equal to zero. After
some algebra, the two inequalities above reduce to:
z′1(1− λ)p− z′2(1− λ)p+ x2p ≥ −z1p1 − z2p1, (B.1)
and
−z′1(1− λ)p+ z′2(1− λ)p+ x2p ≥ z1p1 + z2p1. (B.2)
To show (B.1), we know that




2(1− λ) + z2λ)p ≥ z′2(1− λ)p− z2p1, that is x2p− z′2(1− λ)p ≥ −z2p1.
Combining the two above expressions gives us the desired result. Similarly, (B.2) follows from the fact
that z′1(1− λ)p+ z1p1 = 0 and that x2p = (z′2(1− λ) + z2λ)p ≥ −z′2(1− λ)p+ z2p1. The proof for the
case where p = p21−λ is similar and so will be omitted.
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B.3 Alternative Assumptions in Section 4.2
Theorem 4 holds if we replace the assumption of shift invariance with symmetry. It is clear from the
structure of the proof that it is enough to replace Lemma 4 with the following lemma:
Lemma B.1. Given any strategyproof, symmetric and scale invariant mechanism, there exists a strat-
egyproof, symmetric, scale and shift invariant mechanism with a weakly smaller worst-case approxima-
tion ratio.
Proof. Given a mechanism f , define g(x) = f(0, x2 − x1) + x1. Assume f is strategyproof, symmetric
and scale invariant. We claim that g is strategyproof, symmetric, scale and shift invariant with a
weakly smaller worst-case approximation ratio. The fact that g is shift invariant and has a weakly
smaller worst-case approximation ratio than f is immediate. Let Yx1,x2 ∼ f(x) and Y ′x1,x2 ∼ g(x); the
relevant equalities below are in distribution.
1. g is symmetric: let x ∈ R2, and let b ∈ R. Then P(Y ′x1,x2 ≥ mx+b) = P(Y0,x2−x1 ≥ mx+b−x1) =
P(Y0,x2−x1 ≥ m(0,x2−x1) + b) = P(Y0,x2−x1 ≤ m(0,x2−x1) − b) = P(Y0,x2−x1 ≤ mx − b − x1) =
P(Y0,x2−x1 + x1 ≤ mx − b) = P(Y ′x1,x2 ≤ mx − b).
2. g is scale invariant: let x ∈ R2 and let c ∈ R. Then Ycx1,cx2 = Y0,c(x2−x1)+cx1 = cY0,x2−x1 +cx1 =
c(Y0,x2−x1 + x1) = cY
′
x1,x2 . The second equality follows from scale invariance of f .
3. g is strategyproof: let x ∈ R2, b, x′2 ∈ R. There are two cases:
(a) Assume E[|x2−Y ′x1,x2 |] > E[|x2−Y ′x1,x′2 |]. Note that E[|x2−Y
′
x1,x2 |] = E[|(x2−x1)−Y0,x2−x1 |]
and E[|x2−Y ′x1,x′2 |] = E[|(x2−x1)−Y0,x′2−x1 |]. Thus, it follows that when agent 1’s location
is 0 and agent 2’s location is x2 − x1, agent 2 can benefit under f when reporting x′2 − x1
instead, violating strategyproofness of f . Contradiction.
(b) Assume E[|x1 − Y ′x1,x2 |] > E[|x1 − Y ′x1+b,x2 |]. Note that E[|x1 − Y ′x1,x2 |] = E[| − Y0,x2−x1 |] =
E[|(x2−x1)−Y0,x2−x1 |], where the last equality follows from symmetry of f . Also note that
E[|x1 − Y ′x1+b,x2 |] = E[| − b− Y0,x2−x1−b|] = E[|(x2 − x1)− Y0,x2−x1−b|], where again the last
equality follows from symmetry of f . Thus, when agent 1’s true location is 0 and agent 2’s
true location is x2 − x1, then agent 2 benefits under f by reporting x2 − x1 − b, violating
strategyproofness of f . Contradiction.
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Appendix C
Approximation Algorithms for the
Incremental Knapsack Problem
C.1 Proof of Proposition 6.2
We will define a greedy algorithm, like that of value-to-weight ratio greedy algorithm for the standard
knapsack. The algorithm ensures that the solution it constructs till time t satisfies the following two
properties for all t:
1. the total value of items packed in the knapsack at time t′ has value at least half of the optimal
solution to the LP relaxation of the standard knapsack problem with capacity Bt′ for every t
′ ≤ t.
2. the solution respects the precedence constraints at each time.
Index the items in non-increasing ratio order (break ties arbitrarily). Let Wi =
∑i
i′=1wi. Note that
whenever the knapsack capacity is B, where Wi−1 ≤ B < Wi (with W0 = 0), the greedy solution either
choose the set of items {1, . . . , i− 1} or {i}, depending on which set gives a higher objective value. We
will construct a sequence of nested solutions S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ . . . ST as follows. Suppose we want to construct
a 1/2-approximation solution for time t given a sequence of nested solutions S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ . . . St−1
inductively. If Wi−1 ≤ Bt < Wi for some i. If Wi−1 ≤ Bt−1 < Wi, then we can set St = St−1 and
still maintain a 1/2-approximate solution. So suppose Bt−1 < Wi−1, then it can be shown through our
construction that St−1 ⊆ {1, . . . , i− 1}. There are two cases to consider.
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1. Ratio greedy picks {1, . . . i − 1} in time period t. Since St−1 ⊆ {1, . . . , i − 1}, setting St =
{1, . . . i− 1} maintains the precedence constraint for time t.
2. Ratio greedy picks {i} in time period t. Since item i fits into the knapsack initially, we can reset
S1 = S2 = . . . St−1 = St = {i} and still maintain a 1/2-approximate solution.
This completions the proof. Note that the approximation is valid for all possible set of discounting
factors.
C.2 Proof of Lemma C.2
For every nonempty polyhedron Qσ,h, we begin by showing (6.13) holds for every Sk,h with the help
of the following auxiliary LP. The auxiliary LP has constraints similar to those governing the feasible
region of Qσ,h, except that we only focus on the variables from the value class Sk,h. Instead of the
knapsack capacity constraint, we require that the total weight of items from value class Sk,h packed















xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xk|Sk,h|,t = 0 ∀(k, t) s.t. σ
k
t = 0




+1,t = . . . = xk|Sk,h|,t = 0 ∀(k, t) s.t. 1 ≤ σ
k
t < J and σ
k
t < |Sk,h|
xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xkσkt
,t = 1 ∀(k, t) s.t. σkt = J and σkt < |Sk,h|
xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xk|Sk,h|,t = 1 ∀(k, t) s.t. σ
k
t ≥ |Sk,h|
xki,t−1 ≤ xki,t ∀ki, and t = 2, 3, . . . , T ′
xki,t−1 ∈ [0, 1] ∀ki, t.
APPENDIX C. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR THE INCREMENTAL KNAPSACK
PROBLEM 187
Lemma C.1. For every Sk,h, there exists an optimal solution to the auxiliary LP that contains at
most one fractional variable xki,t in each time period t.
Proof. We only need to focus on the case when there exists t such that σkt = J and J < |Sk,h|, otherwise
the LP feasible region has at most one feasible point, which is an integer.
Let t? be the first (smallest) period in which we are in the case σkt = J and σ
k
t < |Sk,h|. Ignoring
the precedence constraints for a moment, then the auxiliary LP can be broken up into T − t?+ 1 single












xk1,t = xk2,t = . . . = xkσkt
,t = 1 (C.3)
xki,t−1 ∈ [0, 1] ∀ki.
Notice that in the modified instance of the problem, all items have the same value within a value
class Sk,h. Hence, an optimal solution to LPt is simply to pack the items in increasing order of their
weight, starting from the smallest weight item first. Moreover, notice that this set of optimal solutions
satisfy the precedence constraints.
Lemma C.2. Let x̄ be an optimal solution to the optimization problem max{∑T ′t=1 ∆t∑i∈Sh v′ixi,t :
x ∈ Qσ,h} over a non-empty Qσ,h for some σ ∈ {0, . . . , J}T ′K and suppose h ∈ S. There exists an




























v′ix̄i,t −∆T εvh. (C.5)
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Proof. We first show the validity of inequality C.4. Without lost of generality, let x̂ be the optimal
solution to the auxiliary LP (C.1). For a time period t where σkt < J and σ
k
t < |Sk,h| or when
σkt ≥ |Sk,h|, we don’t need to round the variables x̂ki,t since they are already integral. Hence, we set













for such a period t.
For a time period t where σkt = J and σ
k
t ≥ |Sk,h|, by Lemma C.1, there is at most one fractional
x̂ki,t in such a time period. Consequently, we round down this fractional variable while keeping others







































Summing up the above inequalities over all time periods gives us the desired result.















xi,t−1 ≤ xi,t ∀i ∈ T h, and t = 2, 3, . . . , T ′
xi,t−1 ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, t.
An optimal solution of the LP above would be to greedily pack items in the order of non-increasing
value-to-weight ratio. Let x̂ be such an optimal solution. It is clear that x̂ has at most one fractional
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variable in each time period. We round down such a fractional variable in each time period to 0 to



















∆t ≤ ∆T ′εvh,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that every item in T h has value no more than εvhT ′ , and






















C.3 Proof of Proposition 6.5
We prove each of the three cases via an interchange argument. Suppose there exists an optimal schedule
OPT that does not follow the index rule. Then there will be a pair of adjacent items i and j (not
belong to the same indifference class) that disobeys the index rule, i.e. σ−1(i) < σ−1(j) but i is
scheduled after j in OPT. Consider a schedule MOD that switches the order between i and j while
keeping the ordering of the rest of the jobs the same. We measure V (MOD)−V (OPT ) and show that
the difference is positive, contradicting the optimality of OPT. Let w be the total capacity of items
packed into the knapsack right before both items i and j.
• When ∆(s) = 1,
V (MOD)− V (OPT ) = vi(T −
1
c
(w + wi)) + vj(T −
1
c




(w + wj))− vi(T −
1
c
(w + wi + wj))
= viwj − vjwi > 0
• When ∆(s) = e−rs,
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−rwi(1− e−rwj )− vje−rwj (1− e−rwi)
)
> 0
• When ∆(s) = (1 + r)−s, since we can rewrite (1 + r)−s as e− ln(1+r)s, the same derivation follows.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 6.4
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bq. We proceed via induction on p+ q.
Base case: the result holds true for p = 1 and any q trivially as a1 =
∑q
i=1 bi.
Inductive step: since a1 ≥ maxi=1,...,q bi, there exists m ≥ 1 such that a1 ≥
∑m
i=1 bi and a1 <
∑m+1
i=1 bi.
Write bm+1 = bm+1,1 + bm+1,2 such that a1 =
∑m












2 + b2m+1,1 + 2bm+1,2bm+1,1, (C.6)
as
∑m
i=1 bi ≥ b1 ≥ bm+1,2. Now, we apply the inductive hypothesis on the sets {a2, . . . , ap} and
{bm+1,2, bm+2 . . . , bq} (note that these two sets satisfy the assumptions of the lemma) and get
p∑
i=2




Adding both sides of equations (C.6) and (C.7) gives us the desired result.
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Appendix D
Capacity Constrained Assortment
Optimization under the Markov Chain
based Choice Model
D.1 Proofs of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7.1. Consider an instance I of VCC, consisting of a cubic graph G = (V,E)
on n vertices V = {v1, . . . , vn}. We can assume that k > |E|/3, or otherwise, the distinction between
the two cases above is easy. We construct an instance M(I) of Cardinality-Assort as follows. Each
vertex vi ∈ V corresponds to an item i of N . In addition, we also have the no-purchase item 0. For
each vertex v ∈ V , let N(v) denote the neighborhood of v in G, i.e., N(v) = {u : (u, v) ∈ E}, consisting
of exactly 3 vertices. Now, for all (i, j) ∈ N ×N+ the transition probabilities are defined as
ρij =
 1/4 if vj ∈ N(vi) or j = 00 otherwise.
Finally, for all items i ∈ N , we have an arrival rate of λi = 1/n and a price of pi = 1. Out of these
items, at most k can be selected.
The goal in VCC is to choose a minimum-cardinality set of vertices such that every edge is incident
to at least one of the chosen vertices. Let U∗ ⊆ V be a minimum vertex cover in G. We show that the
instance M(I) satisfies the following properties:
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where S∗ is the optimal assortment for M(I). This implies that Cardinality-Assort cannot be approx-




4n − α16 and 34 + k4n is monotone-increasing in k, meaning that the maximum value attained is
1− α16 .
Case (a): |U∗| ≤ k. In this case, we can augment U∗ with k − |U∗| additional vertices chosen
arbitrarily from V \ U∗, and obtain a (not-necessarily minimum) vertex cover U with |U | = k. Now,
consider the assortment S = {i : vi ∈ U}, which is indeed a feasible solution. Since all prices are equal
to 1, we can write the expected revenue of this set as














Pi(S ≺ 0). (D.1)
When starting at any state i /∈ S, the Markov chain moves to 0 with probability 1/4 and gets absorbed.
With probability 3/4, the Markov chain moves from i to one of the vertices in N(i). Since U is a vertex
cover, it follows that N(i) ⊆ S. Therefore, Pi(S ≺ 0) = 3/4 for all i /∈ S. Based on these observations
for the optimal assortment S∗, we have












Case (b): |U∗| ≥ (1 + α)k. Let S be some assortment consisting of k items. In this case, equa-
tion (D.1) is still a valid decomposition of R(S), and we need to consider two cases for items i /∈ S. If
N(i) ⊆ S, then Pi(S ≺ 0) = 3/4 as in case (a). However, when N(i) * S, there exists j ∈ N(i) such
that j /∈ S. Therefore, there is a probability of 1/16 that starting from i the Markov chain moves to j






























To upper bound the latter term, let V (S) be the set of vertices of V corresponding to S, i.e., V (S) =
{vi : i ∈ S}. Let Ē(S) be the set of edges that are not covered by V (S). We have (2 · |Ē(S)|) =
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∑
i/∈S,N(i)*S |N(i)\S|. The important observation is that |Ē(S)| ≥ αk. Otherwise, V (S) can be
augmented to a vertex cover via the addition of fewer than αk vertices, contradicting |U∗| ≥ (1 +α)k.
Now,
|Ē(S)| ≥ αk ≥ α
3
· |E| = αn
2
,
where the second inequality follows from k > |E|/3, and the last equality holds since |E| = 3n/2, as G
















Since the above upper bound on R(S) holds for any assortment S of k items, this must also be true
for the maximum-revenue one, S∗. 
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7.2. Aouad et al. [7] show that unconstrained assortment optimization over
the distribution over permutations model is hard to approximate within factor O(n1−ε) for any fixed
ε > 0 even for the case where the number of preference lists is equal to the number of items, i.e.,
K = n.
We consider an instance I of the assortment optimization problem over distribution over permu-
tations model with n preference lists: L1, . . . , Ln. We construct a corresponding instanceM(I) of the
assortment optimization under the Markov chain model as follows. Each of the original items in N
has a separate copy as a state in M(I) for every list that contains it. More precisely, for every list Li
and for every 1 ≤ j ≤ |Li|, we have a state (j, i) corresponding to the j-th most preferred item in Li.
In addition, there is a state 0 corresponding to the no-purchase option. Therefore, the set of states is:
S = {0} ∪ {(j, i) : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , |Li|}.
The transition probabilities between these states are given by:
ρ((j,i),s) =

1 if j < |Li| and s = (j + 1, i)
1 else if j = |Li| and s = 0
0 otherwise.
In other words, for each list there is a directed path (with transition probabilities 1) over its corre-
sponding states in decreasing order of preference, ending at the no-purchase option. This is illustrated
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in Figure D.1. Finally, the arrival rates are defined by
λ(j,i) =
 ψi if j = 10 otherwise,
where ψi is the probability of list Li. With this construction, each row corresponds to a list, and each




1, 1 2, 1 3, 1 4, 1









Figure D.1: Sketch of our construction for an instance on 4 items, where L1 = (1  2  3  4),
L2 = (1  3  4), L3 = (2  3), and L4 = (1  2  4). Note, for example, that the state (2, 2)
corresponds to the second item of L2, but actually corresponds to item 3.
In order to obtain a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions to I andM(I), it remains to
ensure that, when item i is offered in I, all of its corresponding copies (appearing in the same column)
are offered inM(I), and vice versa. This restriction can be captured by the constraints x(j,i) = x(k,`),
for every i, ` ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that j ≤ |Li|, k ≤ |L`| and such that the jth item in Li is the kth item
in L`. This way, we guarantee that each column is either completely picked or completely unpicked
in the instance M(I). The resulting set of inequalities specifies a constraint matrix with a single
appearance of +1 and −1 in each row, where all other entries are 0. Such matrices are well-known to
be totally-unimodular (see, for example, [107]).
To complete the proof, note that the original instance I consists of n items and n preference lists
and therefore, the Markov chain instance M(I) has O(n2) states. Since the former problem is NP-
hard to approximate within factor O(n1−ε), for any fixed ε > 0, it follows that TU-Assort cannot be
efficiently approximated within O(n1/2−ε), unless P = NP . 
APPENDIX D. CAPACITY CONSTRAINED ASSORTMENT OPTIMIZATION UNDER THE
MARKOV CHAIN BASED CHOICE MODEL 195
D.2 Proof of Lemma 7.2
This result is an immediate corollary of the following (more general) claim: Let Sg be the solution
returned by Algorithm 7.1, and let S be any subset of states. Then,
R(Sg) ≥ R(S)|S| .
To prove this claim, let g be the first item selected by Algorithm 7.1, which necessarily exists as long
as there is an item i with pi > 0. Then, by definition of the greedy algorithm, we have R({g}) ≥ R({i})
for every item i ∈ S. Therefore,
R(Sg) ≥ R({g}) ≥ 1|S| ·
∑
i∈S
R({i}) ≥ R(S)|S| ,
where the last inequality follows from the sublinearity of the revenue function (Lemma 7.9).
D.3 Proof of Lemma 7.4
Let Sgu be the set of states selected by Algorithm 7.2. Note that for every i ∈ Sgu, we have that



















where S∗ is the optimal solution to Cardinality-Assort. Here, the second inequality holds due to pick-
ing the top k states in terms of P(i ≺ U∗+\{i}) values. The last inequality holds since the optimal
unconstrained revenue provides an upper bound on the optimal revenue in the constrained case.
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D.4 Proof of Lemma 7.6
It suffices to verify that (pS1i )
S2 = pS1∪S2i for all S1,S2 and i /∈ S1 ∪ S2, as the above identity clearly














PS1i (j ≺ S2+\{j})pS1j︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.




PS1i (j ≺ S2+\{j})pj −
∑
j∈S2







Pi(j ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pj −
∑
j∈S2
PS1i (j ≺ S2+\{j})
∑
l∈S1
Pj(l ≺ S1+\{l})pl︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.















Pi(l ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pl.
Putting everything together, we get
(pS1i )
S2 = pi −
∑
j∈(S2∪S1)
Pi(j ≺ (S2 ∪ S1)+\{j})pj = pS1∪S2i .

D.5 Application of Algorithm 7.3 to MNL
In the MNL model, we are given a collection of items, 1, . . . , n, along with the no-purchase option,
which is denoted by item 0. Each item i has a utility parameter ui and a price pi. Without loss of
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generality, we can assume that
∑n

















Blanchet et al. [25] prove that the MNL choice model is a special case of the Markov chain model.
More precisely, when ρij = uj for all j and λi = ui for all i, the choice probabilities of the two models
are identical. In this special case, our local ratio updates can be written as
pSi =










Note that in the above update, the subtracted term is independent of i. Therefore, the ordering of the
prices does not change after each update. Since we are picking the highest adjusted price item at each
step, it follows that the optimal assortment is nested by price, i.e., consists of the top ` priced items,
for some `. This is a well known structural property that we recover here as a direct consequence of
our algorithm. Moreover, the updated prices provide a criteria for when to stop adding items to the
assortment.
D.6 Algorithm 7.5 with Varying Threshold
Recall the consideration set used in Algorithm 7.5:
Ct =
{





Now instead of using the same threshold constant α, we allow it to vary with the iteration t. In
other words, let threshold of the consideration set Ct in iteration t be αt,k
R(S∗)
k for some αt,k ≥ 0 for
all t = 1, . . . , k.
Proposition D.1. No choice of αt,k can give an approximation ratio better than 1/2 +O(1/k) using
our current line of analysis, i.e. relying on direct implications of Lemmas 7.9 and 7.11.
Proof. Suppose the algorithm terminates on an instance after some k′ ≤ k iterations because the




t=1 αt,k. On the
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other hand, one can strengthen Lemma 7.11 to say that the lost in incremental revenue of any individual
item in S∗\Sk′ is upper bounded by αmaxk′ ,k
R(S∗)
k , where αmaxk′ ,k = maxt=1,...,k′ αt,k. Together with
Lemma 7.9, we get
R(Sk′) ≥ R(S∗)− |S∗\Sk′ | · αmax,k ·R(S∗)/k ≥ (1− αmax,k)R(S∗).






αt,k, (1− αmaxk′ ,k)R(S
∗)
)












We would like to show that the above expression is at most 1/2 +O(1/k).
Given a sequence of α1,k, ..., αk,k. Take k
∗ denote the smallest t ≤ k such that αt,k ≥ 1/2. (If k∗
does not exist, then in the event that the consideration set is not empty after iteration t, our current























αt,k, (1− αmaxk′ ,k)R(S
∗)
)
≤ R(S∗)(1/2 + 1/k),
as desired.
